Remaining in the vicinity of Dresden till the last days of September, Napoleon found himself gradually growing weaker. His army was crumbling away through hardships, disease, and battle. Reënforcements as steadily added to the strength of the Allies. Operating in a country hostile to him as it had never been before, Napoleon had the utmost difficulty in keeping himself advised of the numbers and movements of the forces opposed to him. So intense was the patriotic spirit in Germany that the spy could do almost nothing for the French, while the Allies were kept informed of everything.
It was Blücher who took the offensive for the Allies, and boldly crossed the Elbe at Wartenburg. Napoleon rushed from Dresden to throw himself upon the Prussians; but as soon as Blücher learned that Napoleon was in his front he shunned battle and went to join Bernadotte (October 7, 1813). The huge iron girdle of the allied armies was slowly being formed around the French; it became evident that the line of the Elbe must be abandoned.
But before taking this decision it seems that Napoleon had contemplated a bold forward march upon Berlin, and had been thwarted by the opposition of his generals. Ever since the Russian disasters had broken the spell of his influence, the Emperor had encountered more or less surliness and independence among his higher officers. The marshals had taken a tone which was almost insubordinate, and the great captain was no longer able to ignore their opinions.
When it became known that he intended to make a dash at Berlin, regardless of the possibility that armies double the size of his own might throw themselves between him and France, there was almost universal dissatisfaction among the troops. Moscow was recalled. Nobody wanted a repetition of that hideous experience. “Have not enough of us been killed? Must we all be left here?”
To add to Napoleon’s embarrassment, news came that Bavaria had deserted and gone over to the Allies. Says Constant, “An unheard-of thing happened: his staff went in a body to the Emperor, entreating him to abandon his plans on Berlin and march on Leipsic.”
For two days the Emperor did nothing. Quartered in the dismal château of Düben, he became as inert, as apathetic, as he had been at Borodino and at Moscow. “I saw him,” writes Constant, “during nearly an entire day, lying on a sofa, with a table in front of him covered with maps and papers which he did not look at, with no other occupation for hours together than that of slowly tracing large letters on sheets of white paper.”
The Emperor yielded to the pressure of his officers, and “the order to depart was given. There was an outburst of almost immoderate joy. Every face was radiant. Throughout the army could be heard the cry, ‘We are going to see France again, to embrace our children, our parents, our friends.’”
Falling back upon Leipsic, Napoleon found Murat already engaged with the Austrians. In the hope that he could crush Schwarzenberg before Blücher and Bernadotte came up, the Emperor prepared for battle. There were about one hundred and fifty thousand of the Austrians, while the French numbered about one hundred and seventy thousand; but it was necessary to place the divisions of Ney and Marmont on the north, where the Russians and Prussians and Swedes were expected. The great “Battle of the Nations” began on the morning of the 16th of October, 1813, and raged all day. The advantage was with the French, for they fought from positions more or less sheltered; but the Emperor appears to have made one serious mistake. Blücher not having yet arrived, Ney and Marmont were ordered to Napoleon’s aid in the effort to destroy the Austrians before the coming of reënforcements. Ney moved, but Marmont was already engaged with Blücher when he received the Emperor’s order. Holding his ground and assaulted by overwhelming numbers, Marmont’s corps was almost destroyed; while Ney, divided between his old position and the new, rendered no effective service in either place. Just as d’Erlon’s corps, swinging like a pendulum between Quatre-Bras and Ligny did not strike at either point, so Ney lost his force on the fatal field of Leipsic.
General Marbot states, moreover, that Ney left his original position without orders from the Emperor. Blücher, getting up before Napoleon expected him, and worsting the French on the north, turned the scales in favor of the Allies.
Why it was that Napoleon had not called St. Cyr from Dresden, and thus added thirty thousand to his own forces, cannot now be known. He himself said at St. Helena that he sent despatches to this effect, but that they were intercepted. Taking into account the swarms of Cossacks and Bashkirs which were flying over the country, and also the intensely hostile spirit of the native populations, the capture of a French courier would seem to have been a natural event.