CHAPTER XLI
Had Napoleon promptly accepted the Frankfort Proposal as they were made, would he have secured peace? Manifestly not, for Metternich had put two conditions to his offer which do not look pacific. First, the war was not to be suspended during negotiations. Second, the Frankfort Proposals were only to be taken as bases upon which diplomats could work. Does this look like a bona fide offer of peace? Napoleon thought not, and impartial history must hesitate long before saying he erred. When in December, 1813, he sent his envoy to the Allies, agreeing to all they demanded, he was once more told that he should have consented sooner. The Allies had gained their point in having made the offer, and their active interest in the matter was at an end. The French envoy was kept in hand, seeking audiences and positive replies, while the allied armies marched into France.
France in 1814 was a nation of about thirty million souls. During the years 1812 and 1813 she had furnished nearly six hundred thousand soldiers to Napoleon’s armies. Of these about half were prisoners in Russia and Germany, or were shut up in distant garrisons; about two hundred thousands were dead or missing; about one hundred thousand remained subject to the Emperor’s call. It was his hope that further conscription would yield him three hundred thousand recruits; but it failed to do so.
So much war material had been lost in the campaigns in Russia and Saxony that he could not furnish muskets to volunteers; some went to war armed with shot-guns. Neither could he mount any large force of cavalry; horses could not be had. Nor were there uniforms for all; some went to the front in sabots and blouse. Money was lacking, and the Emperor took more than $10,000,000 from his own private funds (saved from his Civil List), and threw them into the equipment of the troops, calling also upon the rich for voluntary contributions, on a sliding scale which he was thoughtful enough to furnish. A few of the taxes were increased, the communal lands taken for the public service, and paper money issued against the value of this particular property.
Competent judges have expressed the opinion that had Napoleon at this time liberated the Pope and Ferdinand of Spain, and done so unconditionally, he might have won in the campaign which was about to open. The release of the Pope might have brought back to allegiance many of the disaffected; the release of Ferdinand might have made it necessary for the English to quit Spain, and in this manner Napoleon would have drawn to his own support the veterans he still kept there. The Duke of Wellington is quoted as saying that had Ferdinand appeared in Spain in December, 1813, the English would have had to evacuate it. He, of all men, should have known.
But Napoleon would not consent to make unconditional surrender to the Pope or to Ferdinand. He patched up a peace with the latter, which, being a halfway measure, yielded no benefit; and as to the Pope, the Holy Father refused to treat on any terms with his “son in Christ Jesus.” Restore him to Rome first; then he would treat.
From the time Napoleon returned from Saxony till he left Paris to take charge of his last campaign, less than three months passed.
There was never a time when he labored with greater patience or exhibited greater fortitude, courage, and determination. But the evidence seems to indicate that he had lost hope, that he was conscious of the fact that nothing less than a miracle could save him.
Ever since the Russian campaign, he had not had the same confidence in his star. As he set out from St. Cloud for his campaign in Saxony he said to Caulaincourt: “I envy the lot of the meanest peasant of my empire. At my age he has discharged his debts to the country and remains at home, enjoying the society of his wife and children; while I—I must fly to the camp and throw myself into the struggles of war.”