1. It is certainly my opinion, for what it is worth, that the full operation of the Convention of 1888 is suspended by the reserves first made on behalf of this country during the sittings of the Conference of 1885. These reserves were texually repeated by Lord Salisbury in his despatch of October 21, 1887, enclosing the draft convention which, three days later, was signed at Paris by the representatives of France and Great Britain, the two Powers which, with the assent of the rest, had been carrying on the resumed negotiations with reference to the canal. Lord Salisbury's language was also carefully brought to the notice of each of the other Powers concerned; in the course of the somewhat protracted discussions which preceded the final signature of the same convention at Constantinople on October 29, 1888.
2. All the signatories of the convention having thus become parties to it after express notice of "the conditions under which her Majesty's Government have expressed [055]their willingness to agree to it," must, it can hardly be doubted, share the view that the convention is operative only sub modo.
3. Supposing the convention to have become operative, and supposing the territorial Power to be neutral in a war between States which we may call A and B, the convention would certainly entitle A to claim unmolested passage for its ships of war on their way to attack the forces of B in the Eastern seas.
4. The language of the convention, being as it, is the expression of a compromise involving much re-drafting, is by no means always as clear as it might be. But when Mr. Gibson Bowles is again within reach of Blue-books he will probably agree with me that the treaty need not, as he suggests, be "read as obliging the territorial Power, even when itself a belligerent, to allow its enemy to use the canal freely for the passage of that enemy's men-of-war." The wide language of Art. 1 (which is substantially in accordance with Mr. Gibson Bowles's reminiscence of it) must be read in connection with Art. 10, and without forgetting that, in discussing the effect of an attack upon the canal by one of the parties to the convention, Lord Salisbury wrote in 1887, "on the whole it appears to be the sounder view that, in such a case, the treaty, being broken by one of its signatories, would lose its force in all respects."
Your obedient servant,
T. E. HOLLAND
Oxford, October 9 (1898).
THE CLOSING OF THE DARDANELLES
Sir,—Now that the pressure upon your space due to the clash of opposing views of domestic politics is likely to be for the moment relaxed, you may, perhaps, not think it inopportune that attention should be recalled to a question of permanent international interest raised by the recent [056]action of the Turkish Government in closing the Dardanelles to even commercial traffic.
I cordially agree, as would, I suppose, most people, with your leading article of some weeks since in deprecating any crude application to the case of the Dardanelles and Bosporus of dicta with reference to freedom of passage through straits connecting two open seas. It would, indeed, be straining what may be taken to be a general principle of international law to say that Turkey is by it prohibited from protecting her threatened capital by temporarily closing the Straits.