"ARTICLE 42.—Requisitions shall be made only by the authority of the commandant of the locality occupied."

These conclusions are substantially followed in the chapter on the "Customs of War" contained in the Manual of Military Law issued for the use of officers by the British War Office.

The bombardment of an unfortified town would, I conceive, be lawful—(1) as a punishment for disloyal conduct; (2) in extreme cases, as retaliation for disloyal conduct elsewhere; (3) for the purpose of quelling armed resistance (not as a punishment for resistance when quelled); (4) in case of refusal of reasonable supplies requisitioned, or of a reasonable money contribution in lieu of supplies. It would, I conceive, be unlawful—(1) for the purpose of enforcing a fancy contribution or ransom, such as we were told was exacted from Liverpool; (2) by way of wanton injury to private property, such as was supposed to have been caused in the Clyde and at Folkestone, and a fortiori such as would have resulted from the anticipated shelling during the night-time of the south coast of the Isle of Wight.

2. Is it the case that international law is "all nonsense," and that "when we are at war with an enemy he will do his best to injure us: he will do so in what way he thinks proper, all treaties and all so-called international law [116]notwithstanding"? Are we, with Admiral Aube, to speak of "cette monstrueuse association de mots: les droits de la guerre"? If so, cadit quæstio, and a vast amount of labour has been wasted during the last three centuries. I can only say that such a view of the future is not in accordance with the teachings of the past. The body of accepted usage, supplemented by special conventions, which is known as international law, has, as a matter of fact, exercised, even in time of war, a re staining influence on national conduct. This assertion might be illustrated from the discussions which have arisen during recent wars with reference to the Geneva Conventions to the treatment of the wounded and the St. Petersburg declaration against the use of explosive bullets. The binding obligation of these instruments, which would doubtless be classed by your correspondent with the fleet among "old-fashioned treaties, protocols, and other diplomatic documents," has never been doubted, while each party has eagerly endeavoured to disprove alleged infractions of them.

The naval manœuvres have doubtless taught many lessons of practical seamanship. They will have done good service of another sort if they have brought to the attention of responsible statesmen such questions as those with which I have attempted to deal. It is essential that the country should know the precise extent of the risks to which our seaboard towns will be exposed in time of war, and it is desirable that our naval forces should be warned against any course of action, in their conduct of mimic warfare, which could be cited against us, in case we should ever have to complain of similar action on the part of a real enemy.

Your obedient servant,

T. E. HOLLAND

Oxford, August 18 (1888).

THE NAVAL MANŒUVRES

Sir,—In my first letter I called attention to certain operations of the Spider and her consorts which seemed to be inspired by no principle beyond that of doing unlimited mischief to the enemy's seaboard. In a second letter I endeavoured to distinguish between the mischief which would and that which would not be regarded as permissible in civilised warfare. The correspondence which has subsequently appeared in your columns has made sufficiently clear the opposition between the view which seems to find favour just now in naval circles and the principles of international law, as I have attempted to define them. The question between my critics and myself is, in effect, whether the mediæval or the modern view as to the treatment of private property is to prevail. According to the former, all such property is liable to be seized or destroyed, in default of a "Brandschatz," or ransom. According to the latter, it is inviolable, subject only to certain well-defined exceptions, among which reasonable requisitions of supplies would be recognised, while demands of money contributions, as such, would not be recognised.