The remainder of Professor Marcks' essay is devoted to proving that "the freedom of our world requires that it shall not be so in future." Whatever motives actuated Germany in precipitating the war, this much is now evident—it is her supreme desire and the aim of her highest endeavour to destroy Britain's favoured situation and every advantage accruing to her from it.
To-day the issue is clear and simple for Germany—the annihilation of British power and influence in the world. Literally hundreds of German war books echo that cry, and, above all else, it is the hope of attaining this aim which has aroused the bitterest war fury in the entire German nation—man, woman and child. Reduced to first principles, this difference of geographical position and the varying advantages arising therefrom are the prime causes—if not the cause—of the present world-struggle.
It was solely the fear of perpetuating British supremacy[[189]] which has led Germany consistently to reject the extended hand of friendship. Standing side by side with Great Britain, either in friendship or alliance, Germany would have given her approval to Britain's historical position in the world. When this country departed from the policy of "splendid isolation" repeated attempts were made to establish more intimate relations with Germany (1898-1902).
[!-- Note Anchor 189 --][Footnote 189: Graf Ernst zu Reventlow: "Der Vampir des Festlandes ("England, the Vampire of the Continent"). Berlin, 1915, p. 117. "England's withdrawal from the policy which sought to establish a mutual plan of procedure in world politics between Germany and Britain dates from the time when Britain recognized that Germany would not allow herself to be employed against Russia. In Germany to-day, voices may be heard proclaiming that von Bülow chose wrongly in refusing England's offer, especially as Russia has repaid our loyalty and friendship with iniquitous ingratitude. The latter represents the truth.
"But in judging the policy of that period two factors must be borne in mind. The acceptance of Great Britain's offer would have placed a tie upon the German Empire which would have been unendurable. Germany would have become the strong but stupid Power, whose duty would have been to fight British battles on the continent. Besides which the choice concerned Germany's world future, above all the development of the German war fleet.">[
But as Professor Marcks (p. 315) observes: "Germany refused the hand extended to her." Count Reventlow and a host of other writers have chronicled the fact too, yet on September 2nd, 1914, the German Chancellor dared to say to representative American journalists: "When the archives are opened then the world will learn how often Germany has offered the hand of friendship to England."
It is only one more confirmation that the "law of necessity" is incompatible with the truth. The truth is that Germany preferred to drive Britain into another and hostile camp rather than have her friendship. Germany preferred British hostility rather than relinquish her plans for unlimited naval expansion—which she believed to be the only means of destroying Britain's position, and with that resolution already taken the Kaiser presented his photograph to a distinguished Englishman with this significant remark written on it with his own hand: "I bide my time!"
Although Britain drew the sword to defend Belgium, the supreme issue—and the only one which occupies the German mind to-day—is whether this country shall continue to hold the position allotted to her by destiny and confirmed by history, or whether she is to be supplanted by Germany. That is the one political thought which permeates German intelligence at this moment, and no other considerations must be allowed to darken this issue.
Professor Oncken reviews the events of the period 1900-1914 in considerable detail, and to him the policy of ententes appears to be the main cause leading up to the world war. From this alone it is obvious that, consciously or unconsciously, he is wrong; the ententes in themselves are results, not prime causes. The prime causes leading to these political agreements are to be found in Germany's attitude to the rest of Europe. In a word they were defensive actions taken by the Powers concerned, as a precaution against German aggression.
German aggression consisted in committing herself to unlimited armaments, cherishing the irreconcilable determination to be the strongest European power. According to her doctrine of might, everything can be attained by the mightiest. British advances she answered with battleships, simultaneously provoking France and Russia by increasing her army corps. The balance of power in Europe, Germany declares to be an out-of-date British fad, invented solely in the interests of these islands.