With regard to the assertion that Russia—stiffened by England—took a "momentous decision" on the evening of July 30th, Professor Oncken is guilty of distortion. The decision to mobilize had been taken earlier, and as M. de l'Escaille wrote, was made public at four o'clock on the morning of July 30th.
Whether Russia had increased her demands ("peremptorily sharpened" are Oncken's words) the reader can judge for himself by comparing the two texts.
I: "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which infringe the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (Russian Orange Book, No. 60.)
II: "If Austria agrees to stay the advance of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro—Serbian dispute has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers shall examine the satisfaction which Serbia might give to the Austro—Hungarian Government without affecting her sovereign rights and independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (French Yellow Book, No. 133.)
Oncken, in making this comparison, comments: "It is most remarkable that the original formula chosen by Sasonow had been peremptorily sharpened (einschneidend verschärft) on July 31st at the request of the British Ambassador. This interference by England in the formulation of the proposal must arouse the gravest doubt regarding the peaceful tendencies of England's policy. Sasonow had every reason to thank Grey 'for the firm, amicable tone which he has employed in his pourparlers with Germany and Austria.'"[[206]]
[!-- Note Anchor 206 --][Footnote 206: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 553. Oncken's quotation in the last lines taken from the Russian Orange Book, No. 69.]
Sir Edward Grey had proposed five days earlier (July 26th) that all military measures should cease pending a settlement. Hence the introduction of this clause is not a new demand. Moreover, in the meantime Russia and Germany—in spite of the latter's denial—had commenced to mobilize; Austria had mobilized and commenced hostilities against Serbia. Thus there were far more urgent reasons to include the cessation of military measures on July 31st than before. Lastly, it was the only acceptable pledge of Austrian sincerity which Russia could accept. Whether the formula would have met with Austria's approval cannot be determined, for Austria was saved from what Oncken terms "complete submission" by Germany's ultimatum to Russia, despatched on the same day, July 31st.
It is impossible to get rid of the suspicion that Germany thought Austria might accept the proposal; in any case, Germany deliberately shattered the last chance of a settlement by her demand that Russia should demobilize.
If Germany outwardly worked for peace in St. Petersburg, as M. de l'Escaille states, it would be quite in harmony with the methods of German diplomacy. But, as the same gentleman testifies: "Austria would not yield a step"—the conclusion must be drawn that Germany had ordered her to stand firm. Austria did not yield a single inch, and so it is a matter of indifference as to the sincerity or otherwise of Germany's peace endeavours.
Oncken further mentions Britain's refusal to remain neutral in return for a promise that French territory should not be annexed, but he omits the question of French colonies. His analysis of the Belgian question deserves quotation: "Grey was seeking an excuse for war, and he found one in the question of Belgian neutrality. It was just such a reason as he required in order to carry away the Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion. And since then that reason has been much discussed, accompanied by appeals to international law and humanity, by England's and the world's Press.