[!-- Note Anchor 73 --][Footnote 73: A phrase of contempt employed by the Kaiser when speaking of the Social Democrats in 1889, and which became proverbial.]
"Whatever our opponents have done to us, at this moment we all feel the duty to fight against Russian knout-rule. Our women and children shall not be sacrificed to Russian bestiality, nor the German people become a booty for the Cossacks." Die Volksstimme (Chemnitz), August 2nd.
It is possible that even at the end of the war no explanation will be forthcoming for this astounding change of attitude. Some have suggested that the Russian or Slavonic danger caused it. Yet just these journals, and this party, had maintained, so long as any degree of free speech was permitted, that Austria had provoked the danger, and they were fully aware that the German Government had from first to last approved of and openly assisted in provoking, nay challenging, Russia on a question which involved the latter's prestige and diplomatic existence.
Bethmann-Hollweg gave the alleged Russian mobilization as the immediate cause of the war, but doubtless the Social Democrats knew full well that for several days before Russia's mobilization was announced, Germany had been secretly mobilizing her army. From July 26th till July 30th German papers contained many reports that Russia was mobilizing; they may have been true or not, but the diplomatic correspondence published by Austria and discussed on [page 63] shows conclusively that the Central Powers were baiting Russia into taking that step, and when the greatest Slavonic power had made the desired move, Germany replied with an ultimatum which brought about the war, so ardently desired by the great majority of Germany's warlike tribes.
Britishers who sympathize with German Social Democracy may advance the plea: If Germany's military preparations were secret, how could the Social Democrats know of these proceedings? The answer is direct and simple: Every individual Social Democrat—and men, women, and children, they number some twenty millions—has for years past been a spy and informer in the interests of the Umsturzpartei (overthrow-party). All the happenings of the workshop, barracks, farmyard, shop and office have been systematically reported to the local Press, and local committees of the Democratic Party; the ammunitions thus obtained have been just as systematically employed to fire insidious paragraphs and Press articles at governments, local authorities, employers, officers, and even the employers of servant-girls. Of late years it has been dangerous to have a difference even with a maid-servant; a few days later the inevitable insidious, anonymous attack would certainly appear in one or other of the S.D. journals.
One instance will suffice to illustrate the everyday routine of the class-war (Klassenkampf) in which the whole energies of the Social Democrats have been absorbed for a quarter of a century. An acquaintance of the author's, Major Schub, in the 19th Infantry Regiment, stationed in Erlangen, dared some years ago to send his orderly with a she-goat to a peasant in the district who kept the indispensable he-goat. Two days later he was pilloried in a Furth paper for calling upon a private soldier to fulfil such a degrading office. German workmen do not read the Vorwärts (its circulation is well under 100,000), but they read one or other of the seventy purveyors of filth and class hatred which form the stock-in-trade of the Social Democratic Party.
The author of this work, knew as early as July 25th, that reserve officers had been warned to hold themselves in readiness; on succeeding days he saw tangible evidence that mobilization was proceeding stealthily, and it would be ridiculous for him to claim greater knowledge than the hundred and eleven S.D. members of the Reichstag, and the seventy-seven editors of their party papers—especially when these have an army of millions of spies at their command.
In order to obtain a correct judgment of the motives which actuated German Social Democrats in their complete support of the German Government it is necessary to consult the works published by them during the war. Karl Kautsky writes:[[74]] "That which under these circumstances, was most immediate and pressing in determining the attitude to war, not only for the masses, but also many of our leaders, was the fear of a hostile invasion, the urgent necessity to keep the enemy out of our territory, no matter what the causes, object or results of the war may be. This fear was never greater and more justified than on this occasion; never have the devastating results of invasion been more terrible. Belgium and East Prussia speak plainly.
[!-- Note Anchor 74 --][Footnote 74: "Die Internationalität und der Krieg." Berlin, 1915; p. 32.]
"The increased size of the armies greatly extends the unavoidable desolation of war, and in addition to this a second strongly-working popular motive decides the attitude of a nation to war, viz., the interest of the entire people in the fate of an army in which every family is represented."