"A garrison of 900 men had been placed in this useless cage, and they had fled almost at the first shot. Instead of putting these men in trenches, their superiors had put them at this 'lost post' and allowed them to suffer the moral effects of a complete, inevitable defeat.
"Near the fort I saw the grave of its commander, the unfortunate man who had witnessed the hopeless struggle. He lived to see his men save their lives in wild flight—and then ended his own."[[147]]
[!-- Note Anchor 147 --][Footnote 147: Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," pp. 107-9.]
Here we have a sorry picture of the poacher whom Germany feared so much. The world knows now that neither Britain, France nor Russia were prepared for war, which excludes the probability that they desired or provoked a conflict. But Germany knew that, and much more, in the month of July, 1914. Bethmann-Hollweg when addressing the Reichstag drew a terrifying picture of French armies[[148]] standing ready to invade Belgium, but he knew full well that the necessary base-fortresses were lacking on the Franco-Belgian frontier.
[!-- Note Anchor 148 --][Footnote 148: Richard Grasshoff in his work "Belgien's Schuld" ("Belgium's Guilt"), p. 14 et seq., reproduces several confessions alleged to have been made by French soldiers, prisoners of war in Germany, stating that they entered Belgian territory on July 31st, 1914. At present it is impossible to test the value of this evidence. Cf. [p. 151].]
As regards the alleged plans which Germany's enemies had made to annihilate Germany, it will be necessary for Professor Schoenborn to prove that the Entente Powers had: (1.) Caused the murder in Serajewo; (2.) Despatched the ultimatum to Serbia; (3.) Prepared themselves for war. Until he proves these three points the world will continue to believe that it was Germany alone who cherished "annihilation-plans."
Schoenborn mentions too, Britain's refusal to promise her neutrality even if Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium. This offer was made to Sir Edward Grey, who declined it. According to Professor Schoenborn Germany's final decision to invade Belgium was only taken after that refusal. It is a striking example of the immorality which prevails both in Germany's business and political life. She gave her solemn pledge in 1839, yet endeavoured to sell the same pledge in 1914—for Britain's neutrality!
The author once made an agreement with a German, but soon found that the arrangement was ignored and wrote to the person in question: "You have employed our arrangement merely as a means for making further incursions into my rights."
That summarizes the Teutonic conception of a treaty, either private or national. It is only a wedge with which to broaden the way for a further advance. Usually a man signs an agreement with an idea of finality, and looks forward to freedom from further worry in the matter. Not so the German; with him it is an instrument to obtain, or blackmail, further concessions; and as individuals, instead of occupying their thoughts and energies in the faithful fulfilment of its terms, they plot and plan in the pursuit of ulterior advantages.
Heidelberg's great scholar seems to have had doubts concerning his simile of the gamekeeper; hence in his last footnote he makes the innocuous remark: "Because the house-breaking gamekeeper fired the first shot, it is not usual to draw the conclusion that the poacher had only defensive intentions" (p. 590).