While the German nation has been gradually and systematically leavened with the teaching that might alone is right, the French revenge party has been weakened year by year by national prosperity, colonial expansion and the growth of a powerful anti-military party. Whatever may be said of French chauvinists, this much remains an immovable fact—the party was incapable of providing adequate national defences against the Germanic neighbour, while plans of reconquest can only be assigned to the domain of myths.
On every occasion that the revanche cry has been resuscitated, the direct cause is to be sought in Germany. Having displaced France in 1870 from her position of the first military power in Europe, Germany has endeavoured by fair and foul means to prevent her neighbour from again raising her head, and that policy alone is to blame for the suspicion and hatred which have marked Franco-German relations during the whole period and plunged Europe into an era of armaments, ending in a world war. England and Russia prevented Bismarck from annihilating France in 1875, an incident which aroused justified fear throughout France and gave an impulse to the revenge party.
In 1881 the Iron Chancellor told the French Ambassador: "Outside Europe you can do what you like." Bismarck's intention was to divert reviving French energies to colonial work, and if possible involve her in conflicts with the other Colonizing Powers. In both of these plans he succeeded, but the common sense and loyalty of Great Britain and Italy prevented the conflicts from assuming a dangerous form—war—as desired by the Government in Berlin.
As soon as the latter perceived that French genius and persistency were bearing fruit in a magnificent colonial empire, the innate jealousy and greed of the German nation led to a policy of colonial pinpricks on the part of the Kaiser's Government. This seems the most probable explanation of Germany's attitude during the last decade before 1914. The natural consequence was that those powers which had most to fear through German ill-will were welded together more firmly in a policy of self-protection.
Germany cannot, or will not, recognize that the causes of the above-mentioned development are to be found solely and alone in her own actions. On the contrary, she designates the "consequences" a world-wide conspiracy against German interests. In naval affairs she adopts the same naïve line of argument. First and foremost Germany committed herself to a policy of unlimited—even provocative—naval expansion. When the Power most concerned—Great Britain—took precautionary measures to guarantee British interests in view of Germany's "peaceful" development, then the latter Power declared the consequences of her own actions to be a hostile initiative directed against her.
A defence of this kind may be convincing for those who observe events in the German perspective, but it will be unable to withstand impartial historical criticism. Boxers expect a rebound when they "punch the ball," but none of them would be so foolish as to deny having delivered a blow when the rebound takes place. Yet that is the unscientific defence which Germany has adopted in her endeavours to explain away her aggressive attitude to Belgium, France, and Great Britain.
In a word, the principles underlying saigner à blanc have grown during the past four decades into a possible avalanche possessing huge potential energy; the momentum was given to it in August, 1914.
If it were necessary, a picture of German popular opinion might be projected, showing how that opinion was influenced and formed during the critical days at the close of July last year. But from considerations of space only the outlines of the picture can be given. Before the war German newspapers abounded in reports of French unpreparedness and chaos. The German public was informed that France dreaded and feared war with Germany.
"Without any exaggeration it may be said that a state of nerves has seized the French nation, such as we should seek for in vain at the time of Tangiers and Agadir. There is tremendous excitement, which in many reports suggests absolute panic."[[162]]
[!-- Note Anchor 162 --][Footnote 162: Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten, August 1st.]