Another question concerning vision, which has very much perplexed philosophers, is this; how comes it that we see objects erect, when it is well known that their images or pictures on the retina are inverted? The sagacious Kepler, who first made this discovery, was the first that endeavoured to explain the cause of it.
The reason he gives for our seeing objects erect, is this, that as the rays from different points of an object cross each other before they fall on the retina, we conclude that the impulse we feel upon the lower part of the retina comes from above; and that the impulse we feel from the higher part, comes from below. Des Cartes afterwards gave the same solution of this phenomenon, and illustrated it by the judgment we form of the position of objects which we feel with our arms crossed, or with two sticks that cross each other. But this solution is by no means satisfactory: first, because it supposes our seeing objects erect to be a deduction from reason, drawn from certain premises, whereas it seems to be an immediate perception; and secondly, because all the premises from which this conclusion is supposed to be drawn, are absolutely unknown to far the greater part of mankind, and yet they all see objects erect.
Bishop Berkeley, who justly rejects this solution, gives another, founded on his own principles, in which he is followed by Dr. Smith. This ingenious writer thinks that the ideas of sight are altogether unlike those of touch; and since the notions we have of an object by these different senses, have no similitude, we can learn only by experience how one sense will be affected, by what, in a certain manner, affects the other. Thus, finding from experience, that an object in an erect position, affects the eye in one manner, and that the same object in an inverted position, affects it in another, we learn to judge, by the manner in which the eye is affected, whether the object is erect or inverted. But it is evident that Bishop Berkeley proceeds upon a capital mistake, in supposing that there is no resemblance between the extension, figure, and position, which we see, and that which we perceive by touch. It may be further observed, that Bishop Berkeley's system, with regard to material things, must have made him see this question, in a very different light from that in which it appears to those who do not adopt his system.
In order to give a satisfactory answer to this question, we must first examine some of the laws of nature, which take place in vision; for by these the phenomena of vision must be regulated.
It is now, I believe, pretty well established, as a law of nature, that we see every point of an object in the direction of a right line, which passes from the picture of that point on the retina, through the centre of the eye. This beautiful law is proved by a very copious induction of facts; the facts upon which it is founded are taken from some curious experiments of Scheiner, in his Fundamenta Optices. They are confirmed by Dr. Porterfield, and well illustrated by Dr. Reid. The seeing objects erect by inverted images is a necessary consequence of this law of nature: for from thence it is evident that the point of the object whose picture is lowest on the retina, must be seen in the highest direction from the eye; and that the picture which is on the right side of the retina, must be seen on the left.
Of seeing Objects single with two Eyes.
That we should have two pictures of an object, and yet see it single, has long been looked upon as a curious circumstance by philosophers: and of consequence, many attempts have been made to account for it, few of which, however, are satisfactory.
As it would take up too much time to give a view of all the opinions on this subject, I shall pass over the opinions of Galen, Gassendus, Baptista Porta, Rohault, and others, which do not deserve a serious refutation; and shall content myself with making a few observations on the hypothesis of Bishop Berkeley.
But it seems the most proper way of proceeding, first of all to consider the phenomena of single and double vision, in order, if possible, to discover some general principle to which they lead, and of which they are necessary consequences; and, for the sake of perspicuity, we shall premise the following definition.
When a small object is seen single with both eyes, those points on the two retinas on which the pictures of the object fall, may be called corresponding points: and when the object is seen double, we shall call such points, non-corresponding points.