This situation should be kept clearly in mind. There were many encounters throughout the night between British and German war-craft of various types, but these fought on their own initiative, and there was no concerted touch maintained with the German fleet—nothing that could be called a part of a battle of fleets. The Germans simply ploughed their way home through the stragglers left in the wake of the British fleet, and Lord Jellicoe frankly states that he was out of touch with his cruisers and destroyers. Consequently Lord Jellicoe’s decision, and move to the south, ended the Battle of Jutland.
This should be recognized as the final decision of the battle, and the British Commander-in-Chief makes it plain that he so considered it, as he states the situation at the time and the reasons which influenced him.
At 9 o’clock the German fleet was to the westward. The British fleet was between it and all its bases. The British fleet was superior in speed, and had such an overwhelming superiority in ships and guns that it could afford to discard its damaged ships without impairing this superiority. The British Admiral had light cruisers and destroyers, to throw out a screen and to maintain touch with the German fleet. There was a proportion of damaged ships in the German fleet; and this, with its original inferior fleet speed, would have made it a hard task for the German fleet to ease around the British fleet and reach the German bases. These conditions were in favor of keeping in touch with the German fleet.
On the other hand, for Admiral Jellicoe to have kept his fleet in touch with the German fleet through the dark hours, even by the most efficient use of his screen of destroyers and cruisers, would have meant taking the risk of a night action, which would have involved his capital ships, as Admiral Scheer intended to fight his way through that night. Above all things there was the ominous threat of torpedo attacks in the night, with possibilities of disaster to the Battle Fleet upon which depended the established British control of the seas.
Lord Jellicoe’s arguments show that he followed a line of conduct well considered in advance,[18] and he writes with a sincere conviction that his act in breaking off the battle was justified by the results. In explaining the many advantages possessed by the weaker German fleet Admiral Jellicoe also reveals disappointing conditions in backwardness of methods on the part of the British Navy. There was not alone the lack of modern methods in range-finding and director fire-control, but also in torpedo attack and defense, and in preparation for action “under night conditions.” (J)[19] It is something of a shock to read that the stronger British fleet went into the Jutland battle with a handicap in these essentials that became a factor to prevent a decisive action.[20] Lord Jellicoe makes a very strong plea for his contention that, under the existing conditions of smoke, mist and darkness, with the German fleet skilfully taking advantage of these conditions, and with the handicaps of the Grand Fleet in construction, equipment, and methods to contend with these tactics and conditions, there was no opportunity to force a decision without prohibitive risks of losing the existing supremacy of the British Navy on the seas.[21]
[18] Lord Jellicoe had sent to the Admiralty a formal dispatch (October 30, 1914) stating his conviction that the Germans would “rely to a great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes,” (J) and defining his own “tactical methods in relation to these forms of attack.” (J) On November 7, 1914, the Admiralty approved the “views stated therein.” Lord Jellicoe in his book cites this Admiralty approval of 1914 as applying to the Battle of Jutland.
[19] “The German organization at night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours are practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours, and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am reluctantly of the opinion that under night conditions we have a good deal to learn from them.” (J)
[20] “The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German fleet was. Consequently to fight them at night would only have been to court disaster. Lord Jellicoe’s business was to preserve the Grand Fleet, the main defense of the Empire as well as of the Allied cause, not to risk its existence.” Sir Percy Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy.
[21] See A Guide to the Military History of The World War, pp. 320–22.
Accordingly, at 9 o’clock Admiral Jellicoe disposed the British battleships for the night in columns of divisions abeam one mile apart, to insure the columns not losing sight of one another through the dark hours. The destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern. In this order the British fleet steamed through the night at seventeen knots “some 85 miles” (J) on a southerly course. The only British ship that is mentioned as having been given another mission was the small minelayer Abdiel which was sent to strew mines in an area off the Vyl Lightship “over which it was expected the High Seas Fleet would pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during the night via the Horn Reef.” (J) No other craft was assigned to observe or harass the German fleet. The Sixth Division of the Grand Fleet had fallen behind, as the Marlborough, which had been damaged by a torpedo, could not maintain fleet speed. (This ship had to be sent back after 2 A.M., and Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge.) The British light craft also became widely scattered in the dark hours.