Putting aside these contentions, and seeking only to visualize the truth, one is forced to the conclusion that the chief cause of failure on the part of the British fleet was the obvious handicap that methods had not been devised in advance for decisive operations under the existing conditions.
The problem for the British was to unite two parts of a superior force, and to impose this united superior force with destructive effect upon the enemy. This problem was simplified by the fact that the weaker enemy voluntarily came into contact in a position where escape by flight was out of the question. On the other hand, the solution was made difficult by unusual conditions of mist and smoke.
The decision was missed through the lack of rehearsed methods, not only for effectively joining the British forces, but for bringing into contact the superior British strength, against an enemy who actually possessed the great advantage of rehearsed methods adapted to the existing conditions. These conditions must be realized in order to arrive at a fair verdict.
When considering the Battle of Jutland, we must not think in the old terms of small dimensions, but we must picture the long miles of battle lines wreathed in mist and smoke, the great areas of manœuvre—and the complicated difficulties that must beset anyone who was called to command in this first great battle of dreadnoughts. These widely extended manœuvres of ships, only intermittently visible, must not be thought of as merely positions on a chart or game-board.
Reviewing the course of the action, the conclusion cannot be avoided that, on the day of the battle and under its conditions, the Germans were better prepared in advance for a battle of fleets. In his book Lord Jellicoe states many advantages possessed by the German fleet in construction, armament, and equipment—but, as has been said, his revelation of the British lack of methods is more significant.
All these deficiencies cannot be charged against Admiral Jellicoe, and the persistent efforts to give him all the blame are unjust. Is there any real evidence that another man would have done better under the circumstances? The tendency of certain writers to laud Vice Admiral Beatty at the expense of Admiral Jellicoe does not seem justified. As has been noted, when contact was established with the German advance force, Beatty failed to bring his full strength into action against this isolated weaker enemy force. In the ensuing stages it cannot be denied that haphazard methods were in evidence.
The idea must be put aside that the German ships were a huddled, helpless prey “delivered” to the British Commander-in-Chief. On the contrary, as stated, the German battle cruisers had already closed up with the German battleships and the High Seas Fleet had been slowed down to correct its formations. Consequently at this stage the German fleet was in hand and ready to sheer off, by use of their well rehearsed elusive manœuvre of ships-right-about, with baffling concealment in smoke screens. It has been shown that after the Grand Fleet had completed deployment, the unsuspected situation existed in which Admiral Scheer’s fleet was again in close contact with the British fleet. It has also been explained that Vice Admiral Beatty made his much discussed signal, to “cut off” the German fleet, long after Admiral Scheer had put his fleet into safety by his third swing-around of the German ships. With these situations totally uncomprehended, it cannot be said that Vice Admiral Beatty had a firmer grasp upon the actual conditions than anyone else. The simple truth is, the British Command was always compelled to grope for the German ships, while his enemies were executing carefully rehearsed elusive manœuvres concealed in smoke—and the British were not prepared in advance to counter these tactics.
In the matter of signaling, the Germans were far ahead—in that they had their manœuvres carefully prepared in advance, to be executed with the minimum number of signals. The result was that, while the British Commander-in-Chief was obliged to keep up a constant succession of instructions by signals, the German Admiral was able to perform his surprising manœuvres with comparatively few master signals.[22] Lord Jellicoe also emphasizes the great advantage possessed by the Germans in their recognition signals at night.
[22] “Jellicoe was sending out radio instructions at the rate of two a minute—while von Scheer made only nine such signals during the whole battle. This I learn on credible testimony.” Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U.S.N.
Sir Percy Scott, as already quoted, bluntly states: “The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German Fleet was.” To this should be added the statement that the British fleet was not prepared in methods in advance to cope with the conditions of the afternoon of May 31. The German fleet was. Herein lay the chief cause for failure to gain a decision, when the one great opportunity of the war was offered to the British fleet.