The constitution itself suggests several modes of interposition, competent for either the States or the people. It provides for the election (by a mixed system, popular and State), at brief intervals, of all the functionaries of the federal government; and hence, the interposition of the will of the States and people to effect a change of rulers; hence, of policy. It provides that freedom of speech and the press, shall not be abridged, which is equivalent to a provision that those powerful means be perpetually interposed to affect the public conscience and sentiment—to counsel and alarm the public servants; to influence public policy—to restrain and remedy government abuses. It recognizes the right, and provides that it shall not be abridged, of the people "to assemble and petition the government for the redress of grievances;" hence, contemplating that there may be grievances on the part of the government, and suggesting a means of meeting and overcoming them. Finally, it provides that, on the application of a designated proportion of the States, Congress shall cause a convention to be called, to provide, in the constitution itself, should it be judged necessary, additional securities to the States and the people, and additional restraints on the government.
To act on the sentiments of the country then; to bring to their aid the potent engines of the press and public harangues; to move the people to petition and remonstrance against the obnoxious measures; to draw the attention of other States to the abuses complained of, and to the latitudinous construction the federal authorities were giving to their powers; and thus bring those States, in like manner, to act on their senators and representatives, and on the public voice, so as to produce an immediate remedy, or to co-operate in calling a convention to provide further securities—one or both; these alone are the modes of "interposition" the Virginia resolutions of 1798 contemplated; all they professed; all they attempted; all that the resolutions, or their history, warrant to be imputed to them. These modes of interposition are all consistent with peace and order; with obedience to the laws, and respect to the lawful authorities; the very means, as was well argued by the supporters of the resolutions, to prevent civil strife, insubordination, or revolution; in all respects, the antipodes of nullification.
To enlarge somewhat on the force of the words of the resolutions: The right and duty of "the States" to interpose, certainly does not mean the right of "a State" to nullify and set at nought. The States—less than the whole number—have a right to interpose, secured, as already shown, in the constitution; and this, not only persuasively, but peremptorily; to compel the action they may desire; and it is demonstrable, that it was this constitutional provision that the Virginia legislature had in mind, as a last resort. The resolutions do not speak any where of the right of a State; but use the plural number, States. Virginia exercises the right that pertains to a State—all the right that, in the premises, she pretends to—in passing the resolutions, declaring her views, and inviting the like action of her co-States. Instead, therefore, of the resolutions being identical with nullification, the two doctrines are not merely hostile, but exactly opposites; the sum of the Virginia doctrine being, that it belongs to a State to take, as Virginia does in this instance, the initiative in impeaching any objectionable action of the federal government, and to ask her co-States to co-operate in procuring the repeal of a law, a change of policy, or an amendment of the constitution—according as one or the other, or all, may be required to remedy the evil complained of; whereas, nullification claims, that a single State may, of its own motion, nullify any act of the federal government it objects to, and stay its operation, until three fourths of all the States come to the aid of the national authority, and re-enact the nullified measure. One submits to the law, till a majority repeal it, or a convention provides a constitutional remedy for it; the other undertakes to annul the law, and suspend its operation, so long as three fourths of the States are not brought into active co-operation to declare it valid. The resolutions maintain the government in all its functions, only seeking to call into use the particular function of repeal or amendment: nullification would stop the functions of government, and arrest laws indefinitely; and is incapable of being brought to actual experiment, in a single instance, without a subversion of authority, or civil war. To this essential, radical, antagonistic degree do the Virginia resolutions and the doctrine of nullification differ, one from the other; and thus unjustly are the Virginia republicans, of 1798, accused of planting the seeds of dissolution—a "deadly poison," as Mr. Madison, himself, emphatically calls the doctrine of nullification—in the institutions they had so labored to construct.
II. Upon their contemporaneous interpretation.
The contemporaneous construction of the resolutions is found in the debates on their adoption; in the responses to them of other State legislatures; and in the confirmatory report prepared by the same author, and adopted by the Virginia general assembly, in January, 1800; and by the conduct of the State, in the case of Callender. And it is remarkable (when we consider the uses to which the resolutions have subsequently been turned), that, while the friends of the resolutions nowhere claim more than a declaratory right for the legislature, and deny all idea of force or resistance, their adversaries, in the heat of debate, nor the States which manifested the utmost bitterness in their responses, have not attributed to the resolutions any doctrine like that of nullification. Both in the debates and in the State responses, the opponents of the resolutions denounce them as inflamatory, and "tending" to produce insubordination, and whatever other evil could then be thought of, concerning them; but no one attributes to them the absurdity of claiming for the State a right to arrest, of its own motion, the operation of the acts of Congress.
The principal speakers, in the Virginia legislature, in opposition to the resolutions, were: Mr. George Keith Taylor, Mr. Magill, Mr. Brooke, Mr. Cowan, Gen. Henry Lee, and Mr. Cureton. Nearly the whole debate turned, not on the abstract propriety or expediency of such resolutions, on the question whether the acts of Congress, which were specially complained of, were, in fact, unconstitutional. It was admitted, indeed, by Gen. Lee, who spoke elaborately and argumentatively against the resolutions, that, if the acts were unconstitutional, it was "proper to interfere;" but the extreme notions of the powers of the federal government that then prevailed in the federal party, led them to contend that those powers extended to the acts in question, though, at this day, they are universally acknowledged to be out of the pale of federal legislation. Beyond the discussion of this point, and one or two others not pertinent to the present matter, the speakers dwelt only on the supposed "tendency" of such declarations to excite the people to insubordination and non-submission to the law.
Mr. George K. Taylor complained at the commencement of his speech, that the resolutions "contained a declaration, not of opinion, but of fact;" and he apprehended that "the consequences of pursuing the advice of the resolutions would be insurrection, confusion, and anarchy;" but the legal effect and character that he attributed to the resolutions, is shown in his concluding sentence, as follows:
"The members of that Congress which had passed those laws, had been, so far as he could understand, since generally re-elected; therefore he thought the people of the United States had decided in favor of their constitutionality, and that such an attempt as they were then making to induce Congress to repeal the laws would be nugatory."
Mr. Brooke thought resolutions "declaring laws which had been made by the government of the United States to be unconstitutional, null and void," were "dangerous and improper;" that they had a "tendency to inflame the public mind;" to lessen the confidence that ought to subsist between the representatives of the people in the general government and their constituents; and to "sap the very foundations of the government, by producing resistance to its laws." But that he did not apprehend the resolutions to be, or to intend, any thing beyond an expression of sentiment, is evident from his further declaration, that he was opposed to the resolutions, and equally opposed to any modification of them, that should be "intended as an expression of the general sentiment on the subject, because he conceived it to be an improper mode by which to express the wishes of the people of the State on the subject."
General Lee thought the alien and sedition laws "not unconstitutional;" but if they were unconstitutional he "admitted the right of interposition on the part of the general assembly." But he thought these resolutions showed "indecorum and hostility," and were "not the likeliest way to obtain a repeal of the laws." He "suspected," in fact, that "the repeal of the laws was not the leading point in view," but that they "covered" the objects of "promotion of disunion and separation of the States." The resolutions "struck him as recommending resistance. They declared the laws null and void. Our citizens thus thinking would disobey the laws." His plan would be, if he thought the laws unconstitutional, to let the people petition, or that the legislature come forward at once, "with a proposition for amending the doubtful parts of the constitution;" or with a "respectful or friendly memorial, urging Congress to repeal the laws." But he "admitted" the only right which the resolutions assert for the State, namely, the right "to interpose." The remarks of the other opponents to the resolutions were to the same effect.