These are the entire list of the remedial powers suspected, by the Resolutions of 1798, and their author and adopters, to exist in the States with reference to federal enactments. Their variant character from the peremptory arrest of acts of Congress proposed by nullification, is well illustrated in the comparison made in the report between expressions of opinion like those of the resolutions, and the compulsory operation of a judicial process. Supposing, says the report, "that it belongs to the judiciary of the United States, and not the State legislatures, to declare the meaning of the federal constitution," yet the declarations either of a State, or the people, "whether affirming or denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions thereon," cannot "be deemed in any point of view an assumption of the office of the judge;" because, "the declarations in such cases are expressions of opinions unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection;"—whereas, "the expositions of the judiciary are carried into immediate effect by force."
The Republicans who adopted the Resolutions of 1798, never contemplated carrying their expositions into effect by force; never contemplated imparting to them the character of decisions, or decrees, or the legal determination of a question; or of arresting by means of them the operation of the acts they condemned. The worst the enemies of the resolutions undertook to say of them, was that they were intemperate, and might mislead the people into disobedience of the laws. This was successfully combated; but had it been true—had the authors of the resolutions even intended any thing so base, it would still have been nothing comparable to the crime of State nullification; of placing the State itself in hostile array to the federal government. Insubordination of individuals may usually be overcome by ordinary judicial process, or by the posse of the county where it occurs; or even if so extensive as to require the peace-officers to be aided by the military, it is still but a matter of police, and in our country cannot endanger the existence of the government. But the array of a State of the Union against the federal authority, is war—a war between powers—both sovereign in their respective spheres—and that could only terminate in the destruction of the one, or the subjugation and abasement of the other.
But neither the one or the other of these crimes was contemplated by the authors of the Resolutions of 1798. The remedies they claimed a right to exercise are all pointed out in the constitution itself; capable of application without disturbing the processes of the law, or suggesting an idea of insubordination; remedies capable of saving the liberties of the people and the rights of the States, and bringing back the federal government to its constitutional track, without a jar or a check to its machinery; remedies felt to be sufficient, and by crowning experience soon proven to be so. It is due to the memory of those men and those times that their acts should no longer be misconstrued to cover a doctrine synonymous with disorganization and civil war. The conduct both of the government, and the people, on the occasion of these resolutions, show how far they were from any nullifying or insubordinate intention; and this furnishes us with another convincing proof of the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions. So far (as Mr. Madison justly says,)[6] was the State of Virginia from countenancing the nullifying doctrine, that the occasion was viewed as a proper one for exemplifying its devotion to public order, and acquiescence in laws which it deemed unconstitutional, while those laws were not repealed. The language of the Governor of the State (Mr. James Monroe), in a letter to Mr. Madison, in May and June of 1800, will attest the principles and feelings which dictated the course pursued on the occasion, and whether the people understood the resolutions in any inflammatory or vicious sense.
On the 15th May, 1800, Governor Monroe writes to Mr. Madison as follows:
"Besides, I think there is cause to suspect the sedition law will be carried into effect in this State at the approaching federal court, and I ought to be there (Richmond) to aid in preventing trouble.... I think it possible an idea may be entertained of opposition, and by means whereof the fair prospect of the republican party may be overcast. But in this they are deceived, as certain characters in Richmond and some neighboring counties are already warned of their danger, so that an attempt to excite a hot-water insurrection will fail."
And on the 4th of June, 1800, he wrote again, as follows:
"The conduct of the people on this occasion was exemplary, and does them the highest honor. They seemed aware that the crisis demanded of them a proof of their respect for law and order, and resolved to show they were equal to it. I am satisfied a different conduct was expected from them, for every thing that could was done to provoke it. It only remains that this business be closed on the part of the people, as it has been so far acted; that the judge, after finishing his career, go off in peace, without experiencing the slightest insult from any one; and that this will be the case I have no doubt."
Governor Monroe was correct in the supposition that the sedition law would be carried into effect, at the approaching session of the federal court, and he was also right in the anticipation that the people would know how to distinguish between the exercise of means to procure the repeal of an act, and the exercise of violence to stop its operation. The act was enforced; was "carried into effect" in their midst, and a fellow-citizen incarcerated under its odious provisions, without a suggestion of official or other interference. Thus we have the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions exemplified and set at rest, by the most powerful of arguments: by the impressive fact, that when the public indignation was at its height, subsequent to the resolutions of 1798, and subsequent to the report of '99, and when both had been universally disseminated and read, and they had had, with the debates upon them, their entire influence on the public mind; that at that moment, the act of Congress against which the resolutions were chiefly aimed, and the indignation of the community chiefly kindled, was then and there carried into execution, and that in a form—the unjust deprivation of a citizen of his liberty—the most obnoxious to a free people, and the most likely to rouse their opposition; yet quietly and peaceably done, by the simple, ordinary process of the federal court. This fact, so creditable to the people of Virginia, is thus noted in the annual message of Governor Monroe, to the general assembly, at their next meeting, December, 1800:
"In connection with this subject [of the resolutions] it is proper to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law, one of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect in this commonwealth by the decision of a federal court. I notice this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil submission on the part of the people, as could have been shown by them on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary, constitutional and popular acts of the government."
Governor Monroe then adds his official and personal testimony to the proper intent and character of the proceedings of '98, '9, as follows: