"I have received your communication of the 29th ultimo, and have read it with much pleasure. It presents the doctrine of nullification and secession in lights that must confound, if failing to convince their patrons. You have done well in rescuing the proceedings of Virginia in 1798-'99, from the many misconstructions and misapplications of them."
"Of late, attempts are observed to shelter the heresy of secession under the case of expatriation, from which it essentially differs. The expatriating party removes only his person and his movable property, and does not incommode those whom he leaves. A seceding State mutilates the domain, and disturbs the whole system from which it separates itself. Pushed to the extent in which the right is sometimes asserted, it might break into fragments every single community."
To Mr. Stevenson, February 10, 1833, in reference to the South Carolina nullifying ordinance:
"I consider a successful resistance to the laws as now attempted, if not immediately mortal to the Union, as at least a mortal wound to it."
To "a Friend of the Union and State rights," 1833:
"It is not usual to answer communications without proper names to them. But the ability and motives disclosed in the essays induce me to say, in compliance with the wish expressed, that I do not consider the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, as countenancing the doctrine that a State may, at will, secede from its constitutional compact with the other States."
To Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, April 1, 1833:
"The attempt to prove me a nullifier, by a misconstruction of the resolutions of 1798-'99, though so often and so lately corrected, was, I observe, renewed some days ago in the 'Richmond Whig,' by an inference from an erasure in the House of Delegates from one of those resolutions, of the words 'are null, void and of no effect,' which followed the word 'unconstitutional.' These words, though synonymous with 'unconstitutional,' were alleged by the critic to mean nullification; and being, of course, ascribed to me, I was, of course, a nullifier. It seems not to have occurred, that if the insertion of the words could convict me of being a nullifier, the erasure of them (unanimous, I believe), by the legislature, was the strongest of protests against the doctrine.... The vote, in that case seems not to have engaged the attention due to it. It not merely deprives South Carolina of the authority of Virginia, on which she has relied and exulted so much in support of her cause, but turns that authority pointedly against her."
From a memorandum "On Nullification," written in 1835-'36:
"Although the legislature of Virginia declared, at a late session, almost unanimously, that South Carolina was not supported in her doctrine of nullification by the resolutions of 1798, it appears that those resolutions are still appealed to as expressly or constructively favoring the doctrine."
"And what is the text in the proceedings of Virginia which this spurious doctrine of nullification claims for its patronage? It is found in the third of the resolutions of 1798."
"Now is there any thing here from which a 'single' State can infer a right to arrest or annul an act of the general government, which it may deem unconstitutional? So far from it, that the obvious and proper inference precludes such a right."
"In a word, the nullifying claims, if reduced to practice, instead of being the conservative principle of the constitution, would necessarily, and it may be said, obviously, be a deadly poison."
"The true question, therefore, is, whether there be a 'constitutional' right in a single State to nullify a law of the United States? We have seen the absurdity of such a claim, in its naked and suicidal form. Let us turn to it, as modified by South Carolina, into a right in every State to resist within itself the execution of a federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional, and to demand a convention of the States to decide the question of constitutionality, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent unless three fourths of the States concur in overruling the annulment.
"Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results would be the same as those proceeding from an unqualified nullification, and the result of a convention might be that seven out of twenty-four States might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the United States whatever, and give to the constitution, constructively, any shape they pleased, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen.[8] Every feature of the constitution might thus be successively changed; and after a scene of unexampled confusion and distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not, as a whole, be agreed to by a single party."
To this graphic picture of the disorders which even the first stages of nullification would necessarily produce, drawn when the graphic limner was in the eighty-sixth and last year of his life, the following warning pages, written only a few months earlier, may be properly appended: