I was in the State of Virginia, when the Globe newspaper arrived, towards the end of September, bringing this "paper," which the President had read to his cabinet, and the further information that he had carried his announced design into affect. I felt an emotion of the moral sublime at beholding such an instance of civic heroism. Here was a President, not bred up in the political profession, taking a great step upon his own responsibility from which many of his advisers shrunk; and magnanimously, in the act itself, releasing all from the peril that he encountered, and boldly taking the whole upon himself. I say peril; for if the bank should conquer, there was an end to the political prospects of every public man concurring in the removal. He believed the act to be necessary; and believing that, he did the act—leaving the consequences to God and the country. I felt that a great blow had been struck, and that a great contest must come on, which could only be crowned with success by acting up to the spirit with which it had commenced. And I repaired to Washington at the approach of the session with a full determination to stand by the President, which I believed to be standing by the country; and to do my part in justifying his conduct, and in exposing and resisting the powerful combination which it was certain would be formed against him.
CHAPTER XCIII.
BANK PROCEEDINGS, ON SEEING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT, IN RELATION TO THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS.
Immediately on the publication in the Globe of the "Paper read to the Cabinet," the bank took it into consideration in all the forms of a co-ordinate body. It summoned a meeting of the directors—appointed a committee—referred the President's "Paper" to it—ordered it to report—held another meeting to receive the report—adopted it (the government directors, Gilpin, Wager, and Sullivan voting against it)—and ordered five thousand copies of the report to be printed. A few extracts from the report, entitled a Memorial to Congress, are here given, for the purpose of showing, First, The temper and style in which this moneyed corporation, deriving its existence from the national Congress, indulged itself, and that in its corporate capacity, in speaking of the President of the United States and his cabinet; and, next, to show the lead which it gave to the proceedings which were to be had in Congress. Under the first head, the following passages are given:
"The committee to whom was referred on the 24th of September, a paper signed 'Andrew Jackson,' purporting to have been read to a cabinet on the 18th, and also another paper signed 'H. D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, Peter Wager, and Hugh McEldery,' bearing date August 19th, 1833—with instructions to consider the same, and report to the board 'whether any, and what steps may be deemed necessary on the part of the board in consequence of the publication of said letter and report,' beg leave to state—
"To justify this measure is the purpose of the paper signed 'Andrew Jackson.' Of the paper itself, and of the individual who has signed it, the committee find it difficult to speak with the plainness by which alone such a document, from such a source, should be described, without wounding their own self-respect, and violating the consideration which all American citizens must feel for the chief magistracy of their country. Subduing, however, their feelings and their language down to that respectful tone which is due to the office, they will proceed to examine the history of this measure, its character and the pretexts offered in palliation of it.
"1st. It would appear from its contents and from other sources of information, that the President had a meeting of what is called the cabinet, on Wednesday, the 18th September, and there read this paper. Finding that it made no impression on the majority of persons assembled, the subject was postponed, and in the mean time this document was put into the newspapers. It was obviously published for two reasons. The first was to influence the members of the cabinet by bringing to bear upon their immediate decision the first public impression excited by misrepresentations, which the objects of them could not refute in time—the second was, by the same excitement, to affect the approaching elections in Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey. Its assailants are what are called politicians (i.e., the assailants of the bank)."
Such is the temper and style in which the President of the United States is spoken of by this great moneyed corporation, in a memorial addressed to Congress. Erecting itself into a co-ordinate body, and assuming in its corporate capacity an authority over the President's act, it does not even condescend to call him President. It is "Andrew Jackson," and the name always placed between inverted commas to mark the higher degree of contempt. Then the corporation shrinks from remarking on the "paper" itself, and the "individual" who signed it, as a thing injurious to their own self-respect, and only to be done in consideration of the "office" which he fills, and that after "subduing" their feelings—and this was the insolence of the moneyed power in defeat, when its champion had received but forty-nine votes for the Presidency out of two hundred and eighty-eight given in! What would it have been in victory? The lead which it gave to the intended proceedings in Congress, is well indicated in these two paragraphs, and the specifications under them:
"The indelicacy of the form of those proceedings corresponds well with the substance of them, which is equally in violation of the rights of the bank and the laws of the country.
"The committee willingly leave to the Congress of the United States, the assertion of their own constitutional power, and the vindication of the principles of our government, against the most violent assault they have ever yet encountered; and will now confine themselves to the more limited purpose of showing that the reasons assigned for this measure are as unfounded as the object itself is illegal."
The illegality of the proceeding, and the vindication of the constitution, and the principles of the government, from a most violent assault, are the main objects left by the bank to the Congress; the invalidity of the reasons assigned for the removal, are more limited, and lest the Congress might not discover these violations of law and constitution, the corporation proceeds to enumerate and establish them. It says:
"Certainly since the foundation of this government, nothing has ever been done which more deeply wounds the spirit of our free institutions. It, in fact, resolves itself into this—that whenever the laws prescribe certain duties to an officer, if that officer, acting under the sanctions of his official oath and his private character, refuses to violate that law, the President of the United States may dismiss him and appoint another; and if he too should prove to be a 'refractory subordinate,' to continue his removals until he at last discovers in the descending scale of degradation some irresponsible individual fit to be the tool of his designs. Unhappily, there are never wanting men who will think as their superiors wish them to think—men who regard more the compensation than the duties of their office—men to whom daily bread is sufficient consolation for daily shame.
"The present state of this question is a fearful illustration of the danger of it. At this moment the whole revenue of this country is at the disposal—the absolute, uncontrolled disposal—of the President of the United States. The laws declare that the public funds shall be placed in the Bank of the United States, unless the Secretary of the Treasury forbids it. The Secretary of the Treasury will not forbid it. The President dismisses him, and appoints somebody who will. So the laws declare that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, except on warrants for appropriations made by law. If the Treasurer refuses to draw his warrant for any disbursement, the President may dismiss him and appoint some more flexible agent, who will not hesitate to gratify his patron. The text is in the official gazette, announcing the fate of the dismissed Secretary to all who follow him. 'The agent cannot conscientiously perform the service, and refuses to co-operate, and desires to remain to thwart the President's measures. To put an end to this difficulty between the head and the hands of the executive department, the constitution arms the chief magistrate with authority to remove the refractory subordinate.' The theory thus avowed, and the recent practice under it, convert the whole free institutions of this country into the mere absolute will of a single individual. They break down all the restraints which the framers of the government hoped they had imposed on arbitrary power, and place the whole revenue of the United States in the hands of the President.
"For it is manifest that this removal of the deposits is not made by the order of the Secretary of the Treasury. It is a perversion of language so to describe it. On the contrary, the reverse is openly avowed. The Secretary of the Treasury refused to remove them, believing, as his published letter declares, that the removal was 'unnecessary, unwise, vindictive, arbitrary and unjust.' He was then dismissed because he would not remove them, and another was appointed because he would remove them. Now this is a palpable violation of the charter. The bank and Congress agree upon certain terms, which no one can change but a particular officer; who, although necessarily nominated to the Senate by the President, was designated by the bank and by Congress as the umpire between them. Both Congress and the bank have a right to the free and honest and impartial judgment of that officer, whoever he may be—the bank, because the removal may injure its interests—the Congress, because the removal may greatly incommode and distress their constituents. In this case, they are deprived of it by the unlawful interference of the President, who 'assumes the responsibility,' which, being interpreted, means, usurps the power of the Secretary.
"The whole structure of the Treasury shows that the design of Congress was to make the Secretary as independent as possible of the President. The other Secretaries are merely executive officers; but the Secretary of the Treasury, the guardian of the public revenue, comes into more immediate sympathy with the representatives of the people who pay that revenue; and although, according to the general scheme of appointment, he is nominated by the President to the Senate, yet he is in fact the officer of Congress, not the officer of the President.
"This independence of the Secretary of the Treasury—if it be true in general—is more especially true in regard to the bank. It was in fact the leading principle in organizing the bank, that the President should be excluded from all control of it. The question which most divided the House of Representatives was, whether there should be any government directors at all; and although this was finally adopted, yet its tendency to create executive influence over the bank was qualified by two restrictions: first, that no more than three directors should be appointed from any one State; and, second, that the president of the bank should not be, as was originally designed by the Secretary of the Treasury, chosen from among the government directors. Accordingly, by the charter, the Secretary of the Treasury is every thing—the President comparatively nothing. The Secretary has the exclusive supervision of all the relations of the bank with the government."