CHAPTER XCV.
NOMINATION OF GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS, AND THEIR REJECTION.
By the charter of the bank, the government was entitled to five directors, to be nominated annually by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. At the commencement of the session of 1833-'34, the President nominated the five, four of them being the same who had served during the current year, and who had made the report on which the order for the removal of the deposits was chiefly founded. This drew upon them the resentment of the bank, and caused them to receive a large share of reproach and condemnation in the report which the committee of the bank drew up, and which the board of directors adopted and published. When these nominations came into the Senate it was soon perceived that there was to be opposition to these four; and for the purpose of testing the truth of the objections, Mr. Kane, of Illinois, submitted the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the nominations of H. D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, Peter Wager, and Hugh McEldery, be recommitted to the Committee on Finance, with instructions to inquire into their several qualifications and fitness for the stations to which they have been nominated; also into the truth of all charges preferred by them against the board of directors of the Bank of the United States, and into the conduct of each of the said nominees during the time he may have acted as director of the said bank; and that the said nominees have notice of the times and places of meetings of said committee, and have leave to attend the same."
Which was immediately rejected by the following vote:
"Yeas.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moor, Morris, Rives, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20.
"Nays.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, King of Georgia, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.—27."
And this resolution being rejected, requiring a two-fold examination—one into the character and qualifications of the nominees, the other into the truth of their representations against the bank, it was deemed proper to submit another, limited to an inquiry into the character and fitness of the nominees; which was rejected by the same vote. The nominations were then voted upon separately, and each of the four was rejected by the same vote which applied to the first one, to wit, Mr. Gilpin: and which was as follows:
"Yeas.—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moore, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20.
"Nays.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.—24."
These rejections being communicated to the President, he immediately felt that it presented a new case for his energy and decision of conduct. The whole of the rejected gentlemen had been confirmed the year before—had all acted as directors for the current year—and there was no complaint against them except from the Bank of the United States; and that limited to their conduct in giving information of transactions in the bank to President Jackson at his written request. Their characters and fitness were above question. That was admitted by the Senate, both by its previous confirmation for the same places, and its present refusal to inquire into those points. The information which they had given to the President had been copied from the books of the bank, and the transactions which they communicated had been objected to by them at the time as illegal and improper; and its truth, unimpeachable in itself, was unimpeached by the Senate in their refusal to inquire into their conduct while directors. It was evident then that they had been rejected for the report which they made to the President; and this brought up the question, whether it was right to punish them for that act? and whether the bank should have the virtual nomination of the government directors by causing those to be rejected which the government nominated? and permitting none to serve but those whose conduct should be subordinate to the views and policy of the bank? These were questions, first, for the Senate, and then for the country; and the President determined to bring it before both in a formal message of re-nomination. He accordingly sent back the names of the four rejected nominations in a message which contained, among others, these passages:
"I disclaim all pretension of right on the part of the President officially to inquire into, or call in question, the reasons of the Senate for rejecting any nomination whatsoever. As the President is not responsible to them for the reasons which induce him to make a nomination, so they are not responsible to him for the reasons which induce them to reject it. In these respects, each is independent of the other and both responsible to their respective constituents. Nevertheless, the attitude in which certain vital interests of the country are placed by the rejection of the gentlemen now re-nominated require of me, frankly, to communicate my views of the consequences which must necessarily follow this act of the Senate, if it be not reconsidered.
"The characters and standing of these gentlemen are well known to the community, and eminently qualify them for the offices to which I propose to appoint them. Their confirmation by the Senate at its last session to the same offices is proof that such was the opinion of them entertained by the Senate at that time; and unless some thing has occurred since to change it, this act may now be referred to as evidence that their talents and pursuits justified their selection.
"The refusal, however, to confirm their nominations to the same offices, shows that there is something in the conduct of these gentlemen during the last year which, in the opinion of the Senate, disqualifies them; and as no charge has been made against them as men or citizens, nothing which impeaches the fair private character they possessed when the Senate gave them their sanction at its last session, and as it moreover appears from the journal of the Senate recently transmitted for my inspection, that it was deemed unnecessary to inquire into their qualifications or character, it is to be inferred that the change in the opinion of the Senate has arisen from the official conduct of these gentlemen. The only circumstances in their official conduct which have been deemed of sufficient importance to attract public attention are the two reports made by them to the executive department of the government, the one bearing date the 22d day of April, and the other the 19th day of August last; both of which reports were communicated to the Senate by the Secretary of the Treasury with his reasons for removing the deposits.
"The truth of the facts stated in these reports, is not, I presume, questioned by any one. The high character and standing of the citizens by whom they were made prevent any doubt upon the subject. Indeed the statements have not been denied by the president of the bank, and the other directors. On the contrary, they have insisted that they were authorized to use the money of the bank in the manner stated in the two reports, and have not denied that the charges there made against the corporation are substantially true.
"It must be taken, therefore, as admitted that the statements of the public directors, in the reports above mentioned, are correct: and they disclose the most alarming abuses on the part of the corporation, and the most strenuous exertions on their part to put an end to them. They prove that enormous sums were secretly lavished in a manner, and for purposes that cannot be justified; and that the whole of the immense capital of the bank has been virtually placed at the disposal of a single individual, to be used, if he thinks proper, to corrupt the press, and to control the proceedings of the government by exercising an undue influence over elections.
"The reports were made in obedience to my official directions; and I herewith transmit copies of my letter calling for information of the proceedings of the bank. Were they bound to disregard the call? Was it their duty to remain silent while abuses of the most injurious and dangerous character were daily practised? Were they bound to conceal from the constituted authorities a course of measures destructive to the best interests of the country, and intended, gradually and secretly, to subvert the foundations of our government, and to transfer its powers from the hands of the people to a great moneyed corporation? Was it their duty to sit in silence at the board, and witness all these abuses without an attempt to correct them; or, in case of failure there, not to appeal to higher authority? The eighth fundamental rule authorizes any one of the directors, whether elected or appointed, who may have been absent when an excess of debt was created, or who may have dissented from the act, to exonerate himself from personal responsibility by giving notice of the fact to the President of the United States; thus recognizing the propriety of communicating to that officer the proceedings of the board in such cases. But, independently of any argument to be derived from the principle recognized in the rule referred to, I cannot doubt for a moment that it is the right and the duty of every director at the board to attempt to correct all illegal proceedings, and in case of failure, to disclose them; and that every one of them, whether elected by the stockholders or appointed by the government, who had knowledge of the facts, and concealed them, would be justly amenable to the severest censure.
"But, in the case of the public directors, it was their peculiar and official duty to make the disclosures; and the call upon them for information could not have been disregarded without a flagrant breach of their trust. The directors appointed by the United States cannot be regarded in the light of the ordinary directors of a bank appointed by the stockholders, and charged with the care of their pecuniary interests in the corporation. They have higher and more important duties. They are public officers. They are placed at the board not merely to represent the stock held by the United States, but to observe the conduct of the corporation, and to watch over the public interests. It was foreseen that this great moneyed monopoly might be so managed as to endanger the interests of the country; and it was therefore deemed necessary, as a measure of precaution, to place at the board watchful sentinels, who should observe its conduct, and stand ready to report to the proper officers of the government every act of the board which might affect injuriously the interests of the people.
"It was, perhaps, scarcely necessary to present to the Senate these views of the powers of the Executive, and of the duties of the five directors appointed by the United States. But the bank is believed to be now striving to obtain for itself the government of the country, and is seeking, by new and strained constructions, to wrest from the hands of the constituted authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter. And as misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack, I have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate, in a manner not to be misunderstood, the principles on which I have acted.
"Entertaining, as I do, a solemn conviction of the truth of these principles, I must adhere to them, and act upon them, with constancy and firmness.
"Aware, as I now am, of the dangerous machinations of the bank, it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the rights of the people from the impending danger. And I should feel that I ought to forfeit the confidence with which my countrymen have honored me, if I did not require regular and full reports of every thing in the proceedings of the bank calculated to affect injuriously the public interests, from the public directors, and if the directors should fail to give the information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise the power conferred on me by the law of removing them from office, and of appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to the public. I can never suffer any one to hold office under me, who would connive at corruption, or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free institutions, and to subject the free people of the United States to the dominion of a great moneyed corporation.
"Any directors of the bank, therefore, who might be appointed by the government, would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the late directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should exercise the power of ordering a scire facias, which is reserved to the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted, that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought to light by the aid of a public proceeding at the board of directors.
"The board, when called on by the government directors, refused to institute an inquiry or require an account, and the mode adopted by the latter was the only one by which the object could be attained. It would be absurd to admit the right of the government directors to give information, and at the same time deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another mode of enabling the bank to conceal its proceedings, and practice with impunity its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the information, therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to the abuses disclosed, as well as in reporting them, the conduct of the late directors was judicious and praiseworthy, and the honesty, firmness, and intelligence, which they have displayed, entitle them, in my opinion, to the gratitude of the country.
"If the views of the Senate be such as I have supposed, the difficulty of sending to the Senate any other names than those of the late directors will be at once apparent. I cannot consent to place before the Senate the name of any one who is not prepared, with firmness and honesty, to discharge the duties of a public director in the manner they were fulfilled by those whom the Senate have refused to confirm. If, for performing a duty lawfully required of them by the Executive, they are to be punished by the subsequent rejection of the Senate, it would not only be useless but cruel to place men of character and honor in that situation, if even such men could be found to accept it. If they failed to give the required information, or to take proper measures to obtain it, they would be removed by the Executive. If they gave the information, and took proper measures to obtain it, they would, upon the next nomination, be rejected by the Senate. It would be unjust in me to place any other citizens in the predicament in which this unlooked for decision of the Senate has placed the estimable and honorable men who were directors during the last year.
"If I am not in error in relation to the principles upon which these gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence will be that the bank will hereafter be without government directors and the people of the United States must be deprived of their chief means of protection against its abuses; for, whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to the right of the directors appointed in January, 1833, to hold over until new appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that, whilst their rejection by the Senate remains in force, they cannot, with propriety, attempt to exercise such a power. In the present state of things, therefore, the corporation will be enabled effectually to accomplish the object it has been so long endeavoring to attain. Its exchange committees, and its delegated powers to its president, may hereafter be dispensed with, without incurring the danger of exposing its proceedings to the public view. The sentinels which the law had placed at its board can no longer appear there.
"Justice to myself, and to the faithful officers by whom the public has been so well and so honorably served, without compensation or reward, during the last year, has required of me this full and frank exposition of my motives for nominating them again after their rejection by the Senate. I repeat, that I do not question the right of the Senate to confirm or reject at their pleasure; and if there had been any reason to suppose that the rejection, in this case, had not been produced by the causes to which I have attributed it, or of my views of their duties, and the present importance of their rigid performance, were other than they are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced, and attempted to find others who would accept the unenviable trust. But I cannot consent to appoint directors of the bank to be the subservient instruments, or silent spectators, of its abuses and corruptions; nor can I ask honorable men to undertake the thankless duty, with the certain prospect of being rebuked by the Senate for its faithful performance, in pursuance of the lawful directions of the Executive."