Notices, such as these, might be cited in any number; but those given are enough to show to what a degree people can be excited, when a great moneyed power, and a great political party, combine for the purpose of exciting the passions through the public sufferings and the public alarms. Immense amounts of money were expended in these operations; and it was notorious that it chiefly came from the great moneyed corporation in Philadelphia.
CHAPTER CIII.
SENATORIAL CONDEMNATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON: HIS PROTEST: NOTICE OF THE EXPUNGING RESOLUTION.
Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun were the two leading spirits in the condemnation of President Jackson. Mr. Webster did not speak in favor of their resolution, but aided it incidentally in the delivery of his distress speeches. The resolution was theirs, modified from time to time by themselves, without any vote of the Senate, and by virtue of the privilege which belongs to the mover of any motion to change it as he pleases, until the Senate, by some action upon it, makes it its own. It was altered repeatedly, and up to the last moment; and after undergoing its final mutation, at the moment when the yeas and nays were about to be called, it was passed by the same majority that would have voted for it on the first day of its introduction. The yeas were: Messrs. Bibb of Kentucky; Black of Mississippi; Calhoun; Clay; Clayton of Delaware; Ewing of Ohio; Frelinghuysen of New Jersey; Kent of Maryland; Knight of Rhode Island; Leigh of Virginia; Mangum of North Carolina; Naudain of Delaware; Poindexter of Mississippi; Porter of Louisiana; Prentiss of Vermont; Preston of South Carolina; Robbins of Rhode Island; Silsbee of Massachusetts; Nathan Smith of Connecticut; Southard of New Jersey; Sprague of Maine; Swift of Vermont; Tomlinson of Connecticut; Tyler of Virginia; Waggaman of Louisiana; Webster.—26. The nays were: Messrs. Benton; Brown of North Carolina; Forsyth of Georgia; Grundy of Tennessee; Hendricks of Indiana; Hill of New Hampshire; Kane of Illinois; King of Alabama; King of Georgia; Linn of Missouri; McKean of Pennsylvania; Moore of Alabama; Morris of Ohio; Robinson of Illinois; Shepley of Maine; Tallmadge of New York; Tipton of Indiana; Hugh L. White of Tennessee; Wilkins of Pennsylvania; Silas Wright of New York.—20. And thus the resolution was passed, and was nothing but an empty fulmination—a mere personal censure—having no relation to any business or proceeding in the Senate; and evidently intended for effect on the people. To increase this effect, Mr. Clay proposed a resolve that the Secretary should count the names of the signers to the memorials for and against the act of the removal, and strike the balance between them, which he computed at an hundred thousand: evidently intending to add the effect of this popular voice to the weight of the senatorial condemnation. The number turned out to be unexpectedly small, considering the means by which they were collected.
When passed, the total irrelevance of the resolution to any right or duty of the Senate was made manifest by the insignificance that attended its decision. There was nothing to be done with it, or upon it, or under it, or in relation to it. It went to no committee, laid the foundation for no action, was not communicable to the other House, or to the President; and remained an intrusive fulmination on the Senate Journal: put there not for any legislative purpose, but purely and simply for popular effect. Great reliance was placed upon that effect. It was fully believed—notwithstanding the experience of the Senate, in Mr. Van Buren's case—that a senatorial condemnation would destroy whomsoever it struck—even General Jackson. Vain calculation! and equally condemned by the lessons of history, and by the impulsions of the human heart. Fair play is the first feeling of the masses; a fair and impartial trial is the law of the heart, as well as of the land; and no condemnation is tolerated of any man by his enemies. All such are required to retire from the box and the bench, on a real trial: much more to refrain from a simulated one; and above all from instigating one. Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Clay were both known to have their private griefs against General Jackson and also to have been in vehement opposition to each other, and that they had "compromised" their own bone of contention to be able to act in conjunction against him. The instinctive sagacity of the people saw all this; and their innate sense of justice and decorum revolted at it; and at the end of these proceedings, the results were in exact contradiction to the calculation of their effect. General Jackson was more popular than ever; the leaders in the movement against him were nationally crippled; their friends, in many instances, were politically destroyed in their States. It was a second edition of "Fox's martyrs."
During all the progress of this proceeding—while a phalanx of orators and speakers were daily fulminating against him—while many hundred newspapers incessantly assailed him—while public meetings were held in all parts, and men of all sorts, even beardless youths, harangued against him as if he had been a Nero—while a stream of committees was pouring upon him (as they were called), and whom he soon refused to receive in that character; during the hundred days that all this was going on, and to judge from the imposing appearance which the crowds made that came to Washington to bring up the "distress," and to give countenance to the Senate, and emphasis to its proceedings, and to fill the daily gallery, applauding the speakers against the President—saluting with noise and confusion those who spoke on his side: during all this time, and when a nation seemed to be in arms, and the earth in commotion against him, he was tranquil and quiet, confident of eventual victory, and firmly relying upon God and the people to set all right. I was accustomed to see him often during that time, always in the night (for I had no time to quit my seat during the day); and never saw him appear more truly heroic and grand than at this time. He was perfectly mild in his language, cheerful in his temper, firm in his conviction; and confident in his reliance on the power in which he put his trust. I have seen him in a great many situations of peril, and even of desperation, both civil and military, and always saw him firmly relying upon the success of the right through God and the people; and never saw that confidence more firm and steady than now. After giving him an account of the day's proceedings, talking over the state of the contest, and ready to return to sleep a little, and prepare much, for the combats of the next day, he would usually say: "We shall whip them yet. The people will take it up after a while." But he also had good defenders present, and in both Houses, and men who did not confine themselves to the defensive—did not limit themselves to returning blow for blow—but assailed the assailants—boldly charging upon them their own illegal conduct—exposing the rottenness of their ally, the bank—showing its corruption in conciliating politicians, and its criminality in distressing the people—and the unholiness of the combination which, to attain political power and secure a bank charter, were seducing the venal, terrifying the timid, disturbing the country, destroying business and property, and falsely accusing the President of great crimes and misdemeanors; because, faithful and fearless, he stood sole obstacle to the success of the combined powers. Our labors were great and incessant, for we had superior numbers, and great ability to contend against. I spoke myself above thirty times; others as often; all many times; and all strained to the utmost; for we felt, that the cause of Jackson was that of the country—his defeat that of the people—and the success of the combination, the delivering up of the government to the domination of a moneyed power which knew no mode of government but that of corruption and oppression. We contended strenuously in both Houses; and as courageously in the Senate against a fixed majority as if we had some chance for success; but our exertions were not for the Senate, but for the people—not to change senatorial votes, but to rouse the masses throughout the land; and while borne down by a majority of ten in the Senate, we looked with pride to the other end of the building; and derived confidence from the contemplation of a majority of fifty, fresh from the elections of the people, and strong in their good cause. It was a scene for Mons. De Tocqueville to have looked on to have learnt which way the difference lay between the men of the direct vote of the people, and those of the indirect vote of the General Assembly, "filtrated" through the "refining" process of an intermediate body.
But although fictitious and forged, yet the distress was real, and did an immensity of mischief. Vast numbers of individuals were ruined, or crippled in their affairs; a great many banks were broken—a run being made upon all that would not come into the system of the national bank. The deposit banks above all were selected for pressure. Several of them were driven to suspension—some to give up the deposits—and the bank in Washington, in which the treasury did its business, was only saved from closing its doors by running wagons with specie through mud and mire from the mint in Philadelphia to the bank in Washington, to supply the place of what was hauled from the bank in Washington to the national bank in Philadelphia—the two sets of wagons, one going and one coming, often passing each other on the road. But, while ruin was going on upon others, the great corporation in Philadelphia was doing well. The distress of the country was its harvest; and its monthly returns showed constant increases of specie.
When all was over, and the Senate's sentence had been sent out to do its office among the people, General Jackson felt that the time had come for him to speak; and did so in a "Protest," addressed to the Senate, and remarkable for the temperance and moderation of its language. He had considered the proceeding against him, from the beginning, as illegal and void—as having no legislative aim or object—as being intended merely for censure; and, therefore, not coming within any power or duty of the Senate. He deemed it extra-judicial and unparliamentary, legally no more than the act of a town meeting, while invested with the forms of a legal proceeding; and intended to act upon the public mind with the force of a sentence of conviction on an impeachment, while in reality but a personal act against him in his personal, and not in his official character. This idea he prominently put forth in his "Protest;" from which some passages are here given:
"The resolution in question was introduced, discussed, and passed, not as a joint, but as a separate resolution. It asserts no legislative power, proposes no legislative action; and neither possesses the form nor any of the attributes of a legislative measure. It does not appear to have been entertained or passed, with any view or expectation of its issuing in a law or joint resolution, or in the repeal of any law or joint resolution, or in any other legislative action.
"Whilst wanting both the form and substance of a legislative measure, it is equally manifest, that the resolution was not justified by any of the executive powers conferred on the Senate. These powers relate exclusively to the consideration of treaties and nominations to office; and they are exercised in secret session, and with closed doors. This resolution does not apply to any treaty or nomination, and was passed in a public session.
"Nor does this proceeding in any way belong to that class of incidental resolutions which relate to the officers of the Senate, to their chamber, and other appurtenances, or to subjects of order, and other matters of the like nature—in all which either House may lawfully proceed without any co-operation with the other, or with the President.
"On the contrary the whole phraseology and sense of the resolution seem to be judicial. Its essence, true character, and only practical effect, are to be found in the conduct which it charges upon the President, and in the judgment which it pronounces on that conduct. The resolution, therefore, though discussed and adopted by the Senate in its legislative capacity, is, in its office, and in all its characteristics, essentially judicial.
"That the Senate possesses a high judicial power, and that instances may occur in which the President of the United States will be amenable to it, is undeniable. But under the provisions of the constitution, it would seem to be equally plain that neither the President nor any other officer can be rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial power of the Senate except in the cases and under the forms prescribed by the constitution.
"The constitution declares that 'the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors'—that the House of Representatives 'shall have the sole power of impeachment'—that the Senate 'shall have the sole power to try all impeachments'—that 'when sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation'—that 'when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside'—that no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present'—and that 'judgment shall not extend further than to remove from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit, under the United States.'
"The resolution above quoted, charges in substance that in certain proceedings relating to the public revenue, the President has usurped authority and power not conferred upon him by the constitution and laws, and that in doing so he violated both. Any such act constitutes a high crime—one of the highest, indeed, which the President can commit—a crime which justly exposes him to impeachment by the House of Representatives, and upon due conviction, to removal from office, and to the complete and immutable disfranchisement prescribed by the constitution.
"The resolution, then, was in substance an impeachment of the President; and in its passage amounts to a declaration by a majority of the Senate, that he is guilty of an impeachable offence. As such it is spread upon the journals of the Senate—published to the nation and to the world—made part of our enduring archives—and incorporated in the history of the age. The punishment of removal from office and future disqualification, does not, it is true, follow this decision; nor would it have followed the like decision, if the regular forms of proceeding had been pursued, because the requisite number did not concur in the result. But the moral influence of a solemn declaration, by a majority of the Senate, that the accused is guilty of the offence charged upon him, has been as effectually secured, as if the like declaration had been made upon an impeachment expressed in the same terms. Indeed, a greater practical effect has been gained, because the votes given for the resolution, though not sufficient to authorize a judgment of guilty on an impeachment, were numerous enough to carry that resolution.
"That the resolution does not expressly allege that the assumption of power and authority, which it condemns, was intentional and corrupt, is no answer to the preceding view of its character and effect. The act thus condemned, necessarily implies volition and design in the individual to whom it is imputed, and being unlawful in its character, the legal conclusion is, that it was prompted by improper motives, and committed with an unlawful intent. The charge is not of a mistake in the exercise of supposed powers, but of the assumption of powers not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both, and nothing is suggested to excuse or palliate the turpitude of the act. In the absence of any such excuse, or palliation, there is room only for one inference; and that is, that the intent was unlawful and corrupt. Besides, the resolution not only contains no mitigating suggestion, but on the contrary, it holds up the act complained of as justly obnoxious to censure and reprobation; and thus as distinctly stamps it with impurity of motive, as if the strongest epithets had been used.
"The President of the United States, therefore, has been by a majority of his constitutional triers, accused and found guilty of an impeachable offence; but in no part of this proceeding have the directions of the constitution been observed.
"The impeachment, instead of being preferred and prosecuted by the House of Representatives, originated in the Senate, and was prosecuted without the aid or concurrence of the other House. The oath or affirmation prescribed by the constitution, was not taken by the senators; the Chief Justice did not preside; no notice of the charge was given to the accused; and no opportunity afforded him to respond to the accusation, to meet his accusers face to face, to cross-examine the witnesses, to procure counteracting testimony, or to be heard in his defence. The safeguards and formalities which the constitution has connected with the power of impeachment, were doubtless supposed by the framers of that instrument, to be essential to the protection of the public servant, to the attainment of justice, and to the order, impartiality, and dignity of the procedure. These safeguards and formalities were not only practically disregarded, in the commencement and conduct of these proceedings, but in their result, I find myself convicted by less than two-thirds of the members present, of an impeachable offence."