Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1 of 2) / or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850

by Thomas Hart Benton

FRENCH SPOLIATIONS: SPEECH OF MR. WRIGHT, OF NEW-YORK.

"Mr. Wright understood the friends of this bill to put its merits upon the single and distinct ground that the government of the United States had released France from the payment of the claims for a consideration, passing directly to the benefit of our government, and fully equal in value to the claims themselves. Mr. W. said he should argue the several questions presented, upon the supposition that this was the extent to which the friends of the bill had gone, or were disposed to go, in claiming a liability on the part of the United States to pay the claimants; and, thus understood, he was ready to proceed to an examination of the strength of this position.

"His first duty, then, was to examine the relations existing between France and the United States prior to the commencement of the disturbances out of which these claims have arisen; and the discharge of this duty would compel a dry and uninteresting reference to the several treaties which, at that period, governed those relations.

"The seventeenth article of the treaty of amity and commerce of the 6th February, 1778, was the first of these references, and that article was in the following words:

"'Art. 17. It shall be lawful for the ships of war of either party, and privateers, freely to carry whithersoever they please the ships and goods taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duty to the officers of the admiralty or any other judges; nor shall such prizes be arrested or seized when they come to or enter the ports of either party; nor shall the searchers or other officers of those places search the same, or make examination concerning the lawfulness of such prizes; but they may hoist sail at any time and depart and carry their prizes to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanders of such ships of war shall be obliged to show; on the contrary, no shelter or refuge shall be given in their ports to such as shall have made prize of the subjects, people, or property of either of the parties; but if such shall come in, being forced by stress of weather, or the danger of the sea, all proper means shall be vigorously used, that they go out and retire from thence as soon as possible.'

"This article, Mr. W. said, would be found to be one of the most material of all the stipulations between the two nations, in an examination of the diplomatic correspondence during the whole period of the disturbances, from the breaking out of the war between France and England, in 1793, until the treaty of the 30th September, 1800. The privileges claimed by France, and the exclusions she insisted on as applicable to the other belligerent Powers, were fruitful sources of complaint on both sides, and constituted many material points of disagreement between the two nations through this entire interval. What these claims were on the part of France, and how far they were admitted by the United States, and how far controverted, will, Mr. W. said, be more properly considered in another part of the argument. As connected, however, with this branch of the relations, he thought it necessary to refer to the twenty-second article of the same treaty, which was in the following words:

"'Art. 22. It shall not be lawful for any foreign privateers, not belonging to subjects of the Most Christian King, nor citizens of the said United States, who have commissions from any other prince or State in enmity with either nation, to fit their ships in the ports of either the one or the other of the aforesaid parties, to sell what they have taken, or in any other manner whatsoever to exchange their ships, merchandises, or any other lading; neither shall they be allowed even to purchase victuals, except such as shall be necessary for their going to the next port of that prince or State from which they have commissions.'

"Mr. W. said he now passed to a different branch of the relations between the two countries, as established by this treaty of amity and commerce, which was the reciprocal right of either to carry on a free trade with the enemies of the other, restricted only by the stipulations of the same treaty in relation to articles to be considered contraband of war. This reciprocal right is defined in the twenty-third article of the treaty, which is in the words following:

"'Art. 23. It shall be lawful for all and singular the subjects of the Most Christian King, and the citizens, people, and inhabitants of the said United States, to sail with their ships with all manner of liberty and security, no distinction being made who are the proprietors of the merchandises laden thereon, from any port to the places of those who now are or hereafter shall be at enmity with the Most Christian King, or the United States. It shall likewise be lawful for the subjects and inhabitants aforesaid to sail with the ships and merchandises aforementioned, and to trade with the same liberty and security from the places, ports, and havens of those who are enemies of both or either party, without any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, not only directly from the places of the enemy aforementioned to neutral places, but also from one place belonging to an enemy to another place belonging to an enemy, whether they be under the jurisdiction of the same prince, or under several. And it is hereby stipulated that free ships shall also give a freedom to goods, and that every thing shall be deemed to be free and exempt which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the subjects of either of the confederates, although the whole lading, or any part thereof, should appertain to the enemies of either, contraband goods being always excepted. It is also agreed, in like manner, that the same liberty be extended to persons who are on board a free ship, with this effect, that although they be enemies to both or either party, they are not to be taken out of that free ship, unless they are soldiers and in actual service of the enemies.'

"The restrictions as to articles to be held between the two nations as contraband of war, Mr. W. said, were to be found in the twenty-fourth article of this same treaty of amity and commerce, and were as follows:

"'Art. 24. This liberty of navigation and commerce shall extend to all kinds of merchandises, excepting those only which are distinguished by the name of contraband, and under this name of contraband, or prohibited goods, shall be comprehended arms, great guns, bombs, with fuses and other things belonging to them, cannon ball, gunpowder, match, pikes, swords, lances, spears, halberds, mortars, petards, grenades, saltpetre, muskets, musket ball, helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, and the like kinds of arms proper for arming soldiers, musket rests, belts, horses with their furniture, and all other warlike instruments whatever. These merchandises which follow shall not be reckoned among contraband or prohibited goods; that is to say, all sorts of cloths, and all other manufactures woven of any wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other material whatever; all kinds of wearing apparel, together with the species whereof they are used to be made; gold and silver, as well coined as uncoined: tin, iron, latten, copper, brass, coals; as also wheat and barley, and any other kind of corn and pulse: tobacco, and likewise all manner of spices; salted and smoked flesh, salted fish, cheese, and butter, beer, oils, wines, sugars, and all sorts of salts; and, in general, all provisions which serve for the nourishment of mankind, and the sustenance of life; furthermore, all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes, cables, sails, sail cloths, anchors, and any part of anchors, also ships' masts, planks, boards, and beams, of what trees soever; and all other things proper either for building or repairing ships, and all other goods whatever which have not been worked into the form of any instrument or thing prepared for war by land or by sea, shall not be reputed contraband, much less such as have been already wrought and made up for any other use; all which shall be wholly reckoned among free goods; as likewise all other merchandises and things which are not comprehended and particularly mentioned in the foregoing enumeration of contraband goods, so that they may be transported and carried in the freest manner by the subjects of both confederates, even to the places belonging to an enemy, such towns or places being only excepted as are at that time besieged, blocked up, or invested.'

"Mr. W. said this closed his references to this treaty, with the remark, which he wished carefully borne in mind, that the accepted public law was greatly departed from in this last article. Provisions, in their broadest sense, materials for ships, rigging for ships, and indeed almost all the articles of trade mentioned in the long exception in the article of the treaty, were articles contraband of war by the law of nations. This article, therefore, placed our commerce with France upon a footing widely different, in case of a war between France and any third power, from the rules which would regulate that commerce with the other belligerent, with whom we might not have a similar commercial treaty. Such was its effect as compared with our relations with England, with which power we had no commercial treaty whatever, but depended upon the law of nations as our commercial rule and standard of intercourse.

"Mr. W. said he now passed to the treaty of alliance between France and the United States, of the same date with the treaty of amity and commerce before referred to, and his first reference was to the 11th article of this latter treaty. It was in the following words:

"'Art. 11. The two parties guarantee mutually from the present time, and for ever, against all other powers, to wit: The United States to His Most Christian Majesty the present possessions of the Crown of France in America, as well as those which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace: And His Most Christian Majesty guarantees on his part to the United States, their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions, and the additions or conquests that their confederation may obtain during the war, from any of the dominions now or heretofore possessed by Great Britain in North America, conformable to the fifth and sixth articles above written, the whole as their possessions shall be fixed and assured to the said States at the moment of the cessation of their present war with England.'

"This article, Mr. W. said, was the most important reference he had made, or could make, so far as the claims provided for by this bill were concerned, because he understood the friends of the bill to derive the principal consideration to the United States, which created their liability to pay the claims, from the guaranty on the part of the United States contained in it. The Senate would see that the article was a mutual and reciprocal guaranty, 1st. On the part of the United States to France, of her possessions in America; and 2d. On the part of France to the United States, of their 'liberty, sovereignity, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions,' &c.; and that the respective guarantees were 'for ever.' It would by-and-by appear in what manner this guaranty on the part of our government was claimed to be the foundation for this pecuniary responsibility for millions, but at present he must complete his references to the treaties which formed the law between the two nations, and the rule of their relations to and with each other. He had but one more article to read, and that was important only as it went to define the one last cited. This was the 12th article of the treaty of alliance, and was as follows:

"'Art. 12. In order to fix more precisely the sense and application of the preceding article, the contracting parties declare that, in case of a rupture between France and England, the reciprocal guaranty declared in the said article shall have its full force and effect the moment such war shall break out; and if such rupture shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the said guaranty shall not commence until the moment of the cessation of the present war between the United States and England shall have ascertained their possessions.'

"These, said Mr. W., are the treaty stipulations between France and the United States, existing at the time of the commencement of the disturbances between the two countries, which gave rise to the claims now the subject of consideration, and which seem to bear most materially upon the points in issue. There were other provisions in the treaties between the two governments more or less applicable to the present discussion, but, in the course he had marked out for himself, a reference to them was not indispensable, and he was not disposed to occupy the time or weary the patience of the Senate with more of these dry documentary quotations than he found absolutely essential to a full and clear understanding of the points he proposed to examine.

"Mr. W. said he was now ready to present the origin of the claims which formed the subject of the bill. The war between France and England broke out, according to his recollection, late in the year 1792, or early in the year 1793, and the United States resolved upon preserving the same neutral position between those belligerents, which they had assumed at the commencement of the war between France and certain other European powers. This neutrality on the part of the United States seemed to be acceptable to the then French Republic, and her minister in the United States and her diplomatic agents at home were free and distinct in their expressions to this effect.

"Still that Republic made broad claims under the 17th article of the treaty of amity and commerce before quoted, and her minister here assumed the right to purchase ships, arm them as privateers in our ports, commission officers for them, enlist our own citizens to man them and, thus prepared, to send them from our ports to cruise against English vessels upon our coast. Many prizes were made, which were brought into our ports, submitted to the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the French Republic upon her consuls in the United States, condemned, and the captured vessels and cargoes exposed for sale in our markets. These practices were immediately and earnestly complained of by the British government as violations of the neutrality which our government had declared, and which we assumed to maintain in regard to all the belligerents, as favors granted to one of the belligerents, not demandable of right under our treaties with France, and as wholly inconsistent, according to the rules of international law, with our continuance as a neutral power. Our government so far yielded to these complaints as to prohibit the French from fitting out, arming, equipping, or commissioning privateers in our ports, and from enlisting our citizens to bear arms under the French flag.

"This decision of the rights of France, under the treaty of amity and commerce, produced warm remonstrances from her minister in the United States, but was finally ostensibly acquiesced in by the Republic, although constant complaints of evasions and violations of the rule continued to harass our government, and to occupy the attention of the respective diplomatists.

"The exclusive privilege of our ports for her armed vessels, privateers, and their prizes, granted to France by the treaty of amity and commerce, as has before been seen, excited the jealousy of England, and she was not slow in sending a portion of her vast navy to line our coast and block up our ports and harbors. The insolence of power induced some of her armed vessels to enter our ports, and to remain, in violation of our treaty with France, though not by the consent of our government, or when we had the power to enforce the treaty by their ejection. These incidents, however, did not fail to form the subject of new charges from the French ministers, of bad faith on our part, of partiality to England to the prejudice of our old and faithful ally, of permitted violations of the treaties, and of an inefficiency and want of zeal in the performance of our duties as neutrals. To give point to these complaints, some few instances occurred in which British vessels brought their prizes into our ports, whether in all cases under those casualties of stress of weather, or the dangers of the sea, which rendered the act in conformity with the treaties and the law of nations or not, is not perhaps very certain or very material, inasmuch as the spirit of complaint seems to have taken possession of the French negotiators, and these acts gave colorable ground to their remonstrances.

"Contemporaneously with these grounds of misunderstanding and these collisions of interest between the belligerents, and between the interests of either of them and the preservation of our neutrality, the French began to discover the disadvantages to them, and the great advantages to the British, of the different rules which governed the commerce between the two nations and the United States. The rule between us and France was the commercial treaty of which the articles above quoted form a part, and the rule between us and Great Britain, was that laid down by the law of nations. Mr. W. said he would detain the Senate to point out but two of the differences between these rules of commerce and intercourse, because upon these two principally depended the difficulties which followed. The first was, that, by the treaty between us and France, 'free ships shall also give a freedom to the goods; and every thing shall be deemed to be free and exempt which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the subjects of either of the confederates, although the whole lading, or any part thereof, should appertain to the enemy of either, contraband goods being always excepted;' while the law of nations, which was the rule between us and England, made the goods of an enemy a lawful prize, though found in the vessel of a friend. Hence it followed that French property on board of an American vessel was subject to capture by British cruisers without indignity to our flag, or a violation to international law, while British property on board of an American vessel could not be captured by a French vessel without an insult to the flag of the United States, and a direct violation of the twenty-third article of the treaty of amity and commerce between us and France, before referred to.

"Mr. W. said the second instance of disadvantage to France which he proposed to mention, was the great difference between the articles made contraband of war by the twenty-fourth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, before read to the Senate, and by the law of nations. By the treaty, provisions of all kinds, ship timber, ship tackle (guns only excepted), and a large list of other articles of trade and commerce, were declared not to be contraband of war, while the same articles are expressly made contraband by the law of nations. Hence an American vessel, clearing for a French port with a cargo of provisions or ship stores, was lawful prize to a British cruiser, as, by the law of nations, carrying articles contraband of war to an enemy, while the same vessel, clearing for a British port, with the same cargo, could not be captured by a French vessel, because the treaty declared that the articles composing the cargo should not be contraband as between the United States and France. Mr. W. said the Senate would see, at a single glance, how eminently these two advantages on the part of Great Britain were calculated to turn our commerce to her ports, where, if the treaty between us and France was observed, our vessels could go in perfect safety, while, laden with provisions, our only considerable export, and destined for a French port, they were liable to capture, as carrying to an enemy contraband articles. Upon their return, too, they were equally out of danger from French cruisers, as, by the treaty, free ships made free the goods on board; while, if they cleared from a port in France with a French cargo, they were lawful prize to the British, upon the principle of the law of nations, that the goods of an enemy are lawful prize, even when found in the vessel of a friend.

"Both nations were in constant and urgent want of provisions from the United States; and this double advantage to England of having her ports open and free to our vessels, and of possessing the right to capture those bound to French ports, exasperated the French Republic beyond endurance. Her ministers remonstrated with our government, controverted our construction of British rights, again renewed the accusations of partiality, and finally threw off the obligations of the treaty; and, by a solemn decree of their authorities at home, established the rule which governed the practice of the British cruisers. France, assuming to believe that the United States permitted the neutrality of her flag to be violated by the British, without resistance, declared that she would treat the flag of all neutral vessels as that flag should permit itself to be treated by the other belligerents. This opened our commerce to the almost indiscriminate plunder and depredation of all the powers at war, and but for the want of the provisions of the United States, which was too strongly felt both in England and France not to govern, in a great degree, the policy of the two nations, it would seem probable, from the documentary history of the period, that it must have been swept from the ocean. Impelled by this want, however, the British adopted the rule, at an early day, that the provisions captured, although in a strict legal sense forfeited, as being by the law of nations contraband, should not be confiscated, but carried into English ports, and paid for, at the market price of the same provisions, at the port of their destination. The same want compelled the French, when they came to the conclusion to lay aside the obligations of the treaty, and to govern themselves, not by solemn compacts with friendly powers, but by the standards of wrong adopted by their enemies, to adopt also the same rule, and instead of confiscating the cargo as contraband of war, if provisions, to decree a compensation graduated by the market value at the port of destination.

"Such, said Mr. W., is a succinct view of the disturbances between France and the United States, and between France and Great Britain, out of which grew what are now called the French claims for spoliations upon our commerce, prior to the 30th of September, 1800. Other subjects of difference might have had a remote influence; but, Mr. W. said, he believed it would be admitted by all, that those he had named were the principal, and might be assumed as having given rise to the commercial irregularities in which the claims commenced. This state of things, without material change, continued until the year 1798, when our government adopted a course of measures intended to suspend our intercourse with France, until she should be brought to respect our rights. These measures were persevered in by the United States, up to September, 1800, and were terminated by the treaty between the two nations of the 30th of that month. Here, too, terminated claims which now occupy the attention of the Senate.

"As it was the object of the claimants to show a liability, on the part of our government, to pay their claims, and the bill under discussion assumed that liability, and provided, in part at least, for the payment, Mr. W. said it became his duty to inquire what the government had done to obtain indemnity for these claimants from France, and to see whether negligence on its part had furnished equitable or legal ground for the institution of this large claim upon the national treasury. The period of time covered by the claims, as he understood the subject, was from the breaking out of the war between France and England, in 1793, to the signing of the treaty between France and the United States, in September, 1800; and he would consider the efforts the government had made to obtain indemnity:

"1st. From 1793 to 1798.

"2d. From 1798 to the treaty of the 30th September, 1800.

"During the first period, Mr. W. said, these efforts were confined to negotiation, and he felt safe in the assertion that, during no equal period in the history of our government, could there be found such untiring and unremitted exertions to obtain justice for citizens who had been injured in their properties by the unlawful acts of a foreign power. Any one who would read the mass of diplomatic correspondence between this government and France, from 1793 to 1798, and who would mark the frequent and extraordinary missions, bearing constantly in mind that the recovery of these claims was the only ground upon our part for the whole negotiation, would find it difficult to say where negligence towards the rights and interests of its citizens is imputable to the government of the United States, during this period. He was not aware that such an imputation had been or would be made; but sure he was that it could not be made with justice, or sustained by the facts upon the record. No liability, therefore, equitable or legal, had been incurred, up to the year 1798.

"And if, said Mr. W., negligence is not imputable, prior to 1798, and no liability had then been incurred, how is it for the second period, from 1798 to 1800? The efforts of the former period were negotiation—constant, earnest, extraordinary negotiation. What were they for the latter period? His answer was, war; actual, open war; and he believed the statute book of the United States would justify him in the position. He was well aware that this point would be strenuously controverted, because the friends of the bill would admit that, if a state of war between the two countries did exist, it put an end to claims existing prior to the war, and not provided for in the treaty of peace, as well as to all pretence for claims to indemnity for injuries to our commerce, committed by our enemy in time of war. Mr. W. said he had found the evidences so numerous, to establish his position that a state of actual war did exist, that he had been quite at a loss from what portion of the testimony of record to make his selections, so as to establish the fact beyond reasonable dispute, and at the same time not to weary the Senate by tedious references to laws and documents. He had finally concluded to confine himself exclusively to the statute book, as the highest possible evidence, as in his judgment entirely conclusive, and as being susceptible of an arrangement and condensation which would convey to the Senate the whole material evidence, in a satisfactory manner, and in less compass than the proofs to be drawn from any other source. He had, therefore, made a very brief abstract of a few statutes, which he would read in his place:

"By an act of the 28th May, 1798, Congress authorized the capture of all armed vessels of France which had committed depredations upon our commerce, or which should be found hovering upon our coast for the purpose of committing such depredations.

"By an act of the 13th June, 1798, only sixteen days after the passage of the former act, Congress prohibited all vessels of the United States from visiting any of the ports of France or her dependencies, under the penalty of forfeiture of vessel and cargo; required every vessel clearing for a foreign port to give bonds (the owner, or factor and master) in the amount of the vessel and cargo, and good sureties in half that amount, conditioned that the vessel to which the clearance was to be granted, would not, voluntarily, visit any port of France or her dependencies; and prohibited all vessels of France, armed or unarmed, or owned, fitted, hired, or employed, by any person resident within the territory of the French Republic, or its dependencies, or sailing or coming therefrom, from entering or remaining in any port of the United States, unless permitted by the President, by special passport, to be granted by him in each case.

"By an act of the 25th June, 1798, only twelve days after the passage of the last-mentioned act, Congress authorized the merchant vessels of the United States to arm, and to defend themselves against any search, restraint, or seizure, by vessels sailing under French colors, to repel force by force to capture any French vessel attempting a search, restraint, or seizure, and to recapture any American merchant vessel which had been captured by the French.

"Here, Mr. W. said, he felt constrained to make a remark upon the character of these several acts of Congress, and to call the attention of the Senate to their peculiar adaptation to the measures which speedily followed in future acts of the national legislature. The first, authorizing the capture of French armed vessels, was peculiarly calculated to put in martial preparation all the navy which the United States then possessed, and to spread it upon our coast. The second, establishing a perfect non-intercourse with France, was sure to call home our merchant vessels from that country and her dependencies, to confine within our own ports those vessels intended for commerce with France, and thus to withdraw from the reach of the French cruisers a large portion of the ships and property of our citizens. The third, authorizing our merchantmen to arm, was the greatest inducement the government could give to its citizens to arm our whole commercial marine, and was sure to put in warlike preparation as great a portion of our merchant vessels as a desire of self-defence, patriotism, or cupidity, would arm. Could measures more eminently calculated to prepare the country for a state of war have been devised or adopted? Was this the intention of those measures, on the part of the government, and was that intention carried out into action? Mr. W. said he would let the subsequent acts of the Congress of the United States answer; and for that purpose, he would proceed to read from his abstract of those acts:

"By an act of the 28th June, 1798, three days after the passage of the act last referred to, Congress authorized the forfeiture and condemnation of all French vessels captured in pursuance of the acts before mentioned, and provided for the distribution of the prize money, and for the confinement and support, at the expense of the United States, of prisoners taken in the captured vessels.

"By an act of the 7th July, 1798, nine days after the passage of the last-recited act, Congress declared 'that the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties and of the consular convention heretofore concluded between the United States and France; and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of the United States.'

"By an act of the 9th July, 1798, two days after the passage of the act declaring void the treaties, Congress authorized the capture, by the public armed vessels of the United States, of all armed French vessels, whether within the jurisdictional limits of the United States or upon the high seas, their condemnation as prizes, their sale, and the distribution of the prize money; empowered the President to grant commissions to private armed vessels to make the same captures, and with the same rights and powers, as public armed vessels; and provided for the safe keeping and support of the prisoners taken, at the expense of the United States.

"By an act of the 9th February, 1799, Congress continued the non-intercourse between the United States and France for one year, from the 3d of March, 1799.

"By an act of the 28th February, 1799, Congress provided for an exchange of prisoners with France, or authorized the President, at his discretion, to send to the dominions of France, without an exchange, such prisoners as might remain in the power of the United States.

"By an act of the 3d March, 1799, Congress directed the President, in case any citizens of the United States, taken on board vessels belonging to any of the powers at war with France, by French vessels, should be put to death, corporally punished, or unreasonably imprisoned, to retaliate promptly and fully upon any French prisoners in the power of the United States.

"By an act of the 27th February, 1800, Congress again continued the non-intercourse between us and France, for one year, from the 3d of March, 1800.

"Mr. W. said he had now closed the references he proposed to make to the laws of Congress, to prove that war—actual war—existed between the United States and France, from July, 1798, until that war was terminated by the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800. He had, he hoped, before shown that the measures of Congress, up to the passage of the act of Congress of the 25th of June, 1798, and including that act, were appropriate measures preparatory to a state of war; and he had now shown a total suspension of the peaceable relations between the two governments, by the declaration of Congress that the treaties should no longer be considered binding and obligatory upon our government or its citizens. What, then, but war could be inferred from an indiscriminate direction to our public armed vessels, put in a state of preparation, by preparatory acts, to capture all armed French vessels upon the high seas, and from granting commissions to our whole commercial marine, also armed by the operation of previous acts of Congress, authorizing them to make the same captures, with regulations applicable to both, for the condemnation of the prizes, the distribution of the prize money, and the detention, support, and exchange of the prisoners taken in the captured vessels? Will any man, said Mr. W., call this a state of peace?

"[Here Mr. Webster, chairman of the select committee which reported the bill, answered, 'Certainly.']

"Mr. W. proceeded. He said he was not deeply read in the treatises upon national law, and he should never dispute with that learned gentleman upon the technical definitions of peace and war, as given in the books; but his appeal was to the plain sense of every senator and every citizen of the country. Would either call that state of things which he had described, and which he had shown to exist from the highest of all evidence, the laws of Congress alone, peace? It was a state of open and undisguised hostility, of force opposed to force, of war upon the ocean, as far as our government were in command of the means to carry on a maritime war. If it was peace, he should like to be informed, by the friends of the bill, what would be war. This was violence and bloodshed, the power of the one nation against the power of the other, reciprocally exhibited by physical force.

"Couple with this the withdrawal by France of her minister from this government, and her refusal to receive the American commission, consisting of Messrs. Marshall, Pinckney, and Gerry, and the consequent suspension of negotiations between the two governments, during the period referred to; and Mr. W. said, if the facts and the national records did not show a state of war, he was at a loss to know what state of things between nations should be called war.

"If, however, the Senate should think him wrong in this conclusion, and that the claims were not utterly barred by war, he trusted the facts disclosed in this part of his argument would be considered sufficient at least to protect the faith of the government in the discharge of its whole duty to its citizens; and that after it had carried on these two years of war, or, if not war, of actual force and actual fighting, in which the blood of its citizens had been shed, and their lives sacrificed to an unknown extent, for the single and sole purpose of enforcing these claims of individuals, the imputation of negligence, and hence of liability to pay the claims, would not be urged as growing out of this portion of the conduct of the government.

"Mr. W. said he now came to consider the treaty of the 30th September, 1800, and the reasons which appeared plainly to his mind to have induced the American negotiators to place that negotiation upon the basis, not of an existing war, but of a continued peace. That such was assumed to be the basis of the negotiation, he believed to be true, and this fact, and this fact only, so far as he had heard the arguments of the friends of the bill, was depended upon to prove that there had been no war. He had attempted to show that war in fact had existed, and been carried on for two years; and if he could now show that the inducement, on the part of the American ministers, to place the negotiation which was to put an end to the existing hostilities upon a peace basis, arose from no considerations of a national or political character, and from no ideas of consistency with the existing state of facts, but solely from a desire still to save, as far as might be in their power, the interests of these claimants, he should submit with great confidence that it did not lay in the mouths of the same claimants to turn round and claim this implied admission of an absence of war, thus made by the agents of the government out of kindness to them, and an excess of regard for their interests, as the basis of a liability to pay the damages which they had sustained, and which this diplomatic untruth, like all the previous steps of the government, failed to recover for them. What, then, Mr. President, said Mr. W., was the subject on our part, of the constant and laborious negotiations carried on between the two governments from 1793 to 1798? The claims. What, on our part, was the object of the disturbances from 1798 to 1800—of the non-intercourse—of the sending into service our navy, and arming our merchant vessels—of our raising troops and providing armies on the land—of the expenditure of the millions taken from the treasury and added to our public debt, to equip and sustain these fleets and armies? The claims. Why were our citizens sent to capture the French, to spill their blood, and lay down their lives upon the high seas? To recover the claims. These were the whole matter. We had no other demand upon France, and, upon our part, no other cause of difference with her.

"What public, or national, or political object had we in the negotiation of 1800, which led to the treaty of the 30th September of that year? None, but to put an end to the existing hostilities, and to restore relations of peace and friendship. These could have been as well secured by negotiating upon a war as a peace basis. Indeed, as there were in our former treaties stipulations which we did not want to revive, a negotiation upon the basis of existing war was preferable, so far as the interests of the government were concerned, because that would put all questions, growing out of former treaties between the parties, for ever at rest. Still our negotiators consented to put the negotiation upon the basis of continued peace, and why? Because the adoption of a basis of existing war would have barred effectually and for ever all classes of the claims. This, Mr. W. said, was the only possible assignable reason for the course pursued by the American negotiators; it was the only reason growing out of the existing facts, or out of the interests, public or private, involved in the difficulties between the two nations. He therefore felt himself fully warranted in the conclusion, that the American ministers preferred and adopted a peace basis for the negotiation which resulted in the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, solely from a wish, as far as they might be able, to save the interests of our citizens holding claims against France.

"Did they, Mr. President, said Mr. W., succeed by this artifice in benefiting the citizens who had sustained injuries? He would let the treaty speak for itself. The following are extracts from the 4th and 5th articles:

"'Art. 4. Property captured, and not yet definitively condemned, or which may be captured before the exchange of ratifications (contraband goods destined to an enemy's port excepted), shall be mutually restored on the following proof of ownership.'

"[Here follows the form of proof, when the article proceeds:]

"'This article shall take effect from the date of the signature of the present convention. And if, from the date of the said signature, any property shall be condemned contrary to the intent of the said convention, before the knowledge of this stipulation shall be obtained, the property so condemned shall, without delay, be restored or paid for.'

"'Art. 5. The debts contracted for by one of the two nations with individuals of the other, or by individuals of the one with individuals of the other, shall be paid, or the payment may be prosecuted in the same manner as if there had been no misunderstanding between the two States. But this clause shall not extend to indemnities claimed on account of captures or confiscations.'

"Here, Mr. W. said, was evidence from the treaty itself, that, by assuming a peace basis for the negotiation, the property of our merchants captured and not condemned was saved to them, and that certain classes of claimants against the French government were provided for, and their rights expressly reserved. So much, therefore, was gained by our negotiators by a departure from the facts, and negotiating to put an end to existing hostilities upon the basis of a continued peace. Was it, then, generous or just to permit these merchants, because our ministers did not succeed in saving all they claimed, to set up this implied admission of continued peace as the foundation of a liability against their own government to pay what was not recovered from France? He could not so consider it, and he felt sure the country never would consent to so responsible an implication from an act of excessive kindness. Mr. W. said he must not be understood as admitting that all was not, by the effect of this treaty, recovered from France, which she ever recognized to be due, or ever intended to pay. On the contrary, his best impression was, from what he had been able to learn of the claims, that the treaty of Louisiana provided for the payment of all the claims which France ever admitted, ever intended to pay, or which there was the most remote hope of recovering in any way whatever. He should, in a subsequent part of his remarks, have occasion to examine that treaty, the claims which were paid under it, and to compare the claims paid with those urged before the treaty of September, 1800.

"Mr. W. said he now came to the consideration of the liability of the United States to these claimants, in case it shall be determined by the Senate that a war between France and the United States had not existed to bar all ground of claim either against France or the United States. He understood the claimants to put this liability upon the assertion that the government of the United States had released their claims against France by the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, and that the release was made for a full and valuable consideration passing to the United States, which in law and equity made it their duty to pay the claims. The consideration passing to the United States is alleged to be their release from the onerous obligations imposed upon them by the treaties of amity and commerce and alliance of 1778, and the consular convention of 1778, and especially and principally by the seventeenth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, in relation to armed vessels, privateers, and prizes, and by the eleventh article of the treaty of alliance containing the mutual guarantees.

"The release, Mr. W. said, was claimed to have been made in the striking out, by the Senate of the United States, of the second article of the treaty of 30th September, 1800, as that article was originally inserted and agreed upon by the respective negotiators of the two powers, as it stood at the time the treaty was signed. To cause this point to be clearly understood, it would be necessary for him to trouble the Senate with a history of the ratification of this treaty. The second article, as inserted by the negotiators, and as standing at the time of the signing of the treaty, was in the following words:

"'Art. 2. The ministers plenipotentiary of the two powers not being able to agree, at present, respecting the treaty of alliance of 6th February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of 14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further upon these subjects at a convenient time; and, until they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows:'

"The residue of the treaty, Mr. W. said, was a substantial copy of the former treaties of amity and commerce, and alliance between the two nations, with such modifications as were desirable to both, and as experience under the former treaties had shown to be for the mutual interests of both.

"This second article was submitted to the Senate by the President as a part of the treaty, as by the constitution of the United States the President was bound to do, to the end that the treaty might be properly ratified on the part of the United States, the French government having previously adopted and ratified it as it was signed by the respective negotiators, the second article being then in the form given above. The Senate refused to advise and consent to this article, and expunged it from the treaty, inserting in its place the following:

"'It is agreed that the present convention shall be in force for the term of eight years from the time of the exchange of the ratifications.'

"In this shape, and with this modification the treaty was duly ratified by the President of the United States, and returned to the French government for its dissent or concurrence. Bonaparte, then First Consul, concurred in the modification made by the Senate, in the following language, and upon the condition therein expressed:

"'The government of the United States having added to its ratification that the convention should be in force for the space of eight years, and having omitted the second article, the government of the French Republic consents to accept, ratify, and confirm the above convention, with the addition, purporting that the convention shall be in force for the space of eight years, and with the retrenchment of the second article: Provided, That, by this retrenchment, the two States renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article.'

"This ratification by the French Republic, thus qualified, was returned to the United States, and the treaty, with the respective conditional ratifications, was again submitted by the President of the United States to the Senate. That body 'resolved that they considered the said convention as fully ratified, and returned the same to the President for the usual promulgation;' whereupon he completed the ratification in the usual forms and by the usual publication.

"This, Mr. W. said, was the documentary history of this treaty and of its ratification, and here was the release of their claims relied upon by the claimants under the bill before the Senate. They contend that this second article of the treaty, as originally inserted by the negotiators, reserved their claims for future negotiation, and also reserved the subjects of disagreement under the treaties of amity and commerce, and of alliance, of 1778, and the consular convention of 1788; that the seventeenth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, and the eleventh article of the treaty of alliance, were particularly onerous upon the United States; that, to discharge the government from the onerous obligations imposed upon it in these two articles of the respective treaties, the Senate was induced to expunge the second article of the treaty of the 30th September above referred to, and, by consequence, to expunge the reservation of their claims as subjects of future negotiation between the two nations; that, in thus obtaining a discharge from the onerous obligations of these treaties, and especially of the two articles above designated, the United States was benefited to an amount beyond the whole value of the claims discharged, and that this benefit was the inducement to the expunging of the second article of the treaty, with a full knowledge that the act did discharge the claims, and create a legal and equitable obligation on the part of the government to pay them.

"These, Mr. W. said, he understood to be the assumptions of the claimants, and this their course of reasoning to arrive at the conclusion that the United States were liable to them for the amount of their claims. He must here raise a preliminary question, which he had satisfied himself would show which assumptions of the claimants to be wholly without foundation, so far as the idea of benefit to the United States was supposed to be derived from expunging this second article of the treaty of 1800. What, he must be permitted to ask, would have been the liability of the United States under the 'onerous obligations' referred to, in case the Senate had ratified the treaty, retaining this second article? The binding force of the treaties of amity and commerce, and of alliance, and of the consular convention, was released, and the treaties and convention were themselves suspended by the very article in question; and the subjects of disagreement growing out of them were merely made matters of future negotiation 'at a convenient time.' What was the value or the burden of such an obligation upon the United States? for this was the only obligation from which our government was released by striking out the article. The value, Mr. W. said, was the value of the privilege, being at perfect liberty, in the premises, of assenting to or dissenting from a bad bargain, in a matter of negotiation between ourselves and a foreign power. This was the consideration passing to the United States, and, so far as he was able to view the subject, this was all the consideration the government had received, if it be granted (which he must by no means be understood to admit), that the striking out of the article was a release of the claims, and that such release was intended as a consideration for the benefits to accrue to the government from the act.

"Mr. W. said he felt bound to dwell, for a moment, upon this point. What was the value of an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time?' Was it any thing to be valued? The 'convenient time' might never arrive, or if it did arrive, and negotiations were opened, were not the government as much at liberty as in any other case of negotiation, to refuse propositions which were deemed disadvantageous to itself? The treaties were suspended, and could not be revived without the consent of the United States; and, of consequence, the 'onerous obligations' comprised in certain articles of these treaties were also suspended until the same consent should revive them. Could he, then, be mistaken in the conclusion that, if the treaty of 1800 had been ratified with the second article forming a part of it, as originally agreed by the negotiators, the United States would have been as effectually released from the onerous obligations of the former treaties, until those obligations should again be put in force by their consent, as they were released when that article was stricken out, and the treaty ratified without it? In short, could he be mistaken in the position that all the inducement, of a national character, to expunge that article from the treaty, was to get rid of an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time?' And could it be possible that such an inducement would have led the Senate of the United States, understanding this consequence, to impose upon the government a liability to the amount of $5,000,000? He could not adopt so absurd a supposition; and he felt himself compelled to say that this view of the action of the government in the ratification of the treaty of 1800, in his mind, put an end to the pretence that the striking out of this article relieved the United States from obligations so onerous as to form a valuable consideration for the payments provided for in this bill. He could not view the obligation released—a mere obligation to negotiate—as onerous at all, or as forming any consideration whatever for a pecuniary liability, much less for a liability for millions.

"Mr. W. said he now proposed to consider whether the effect of expunging the second article of the treaty of 1800 was to release any claim of value—any claim which France had ever acknowledged, or ever intended to pay. He had before shown, by extracts from the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty of 1800, that certain classes of claims were saved by that treaty, as it was ratified. The claims so reserved and provided for were paid in pursuance of provisions contained in the treaty between France and the United States, of the 30th of April, 1803; and to determine what claims were thus paid, a reference to some of the articles of that treaty was necessary. The purchase of Louisiana was made by the United States for the sum of 80,000,000 of francs, 60,000,000 of which were to be paid into the French treasury, and the remaining 20,000,000 were to be applied to the payment of these claims. Three separate treaties were made between the parties, bearing all the same date, the first providing for the cession of the territory, the second for the payment of the 60,000,000 of francs to the French treasury, and the third for the adjustment and payment of the claims.

"Mr. W. said the references proposed were to the last-named treaty, and were the following:

"'Art. 1. The debts due by France to citizens of the United States, contracted before the 8th of Vendemiaire, ninth year of the French Republic (30th September, 1800), shall be paid according to the following regulations, with interest at six per cent., to commence from the period when the accounts and vouchers were presented to the French government.'

"'Art. 2. The debts provided for by the preceding article are those whose result is comprised in the conjectural note annexed to the present convention, and which, with the interest, cannot exceed the sum of twenty millions of francs. The claims comprised in the said note, which fall within the exceptions of the following articles, shall not be admitted to the benefit of this provision.'

"'Art. 4. It is expressly agreed that the preceding articles shall comprehend no debts but such as are due to citizens of the United States, who have been and are yet creditors of France, for supplies, for embargoes, and prizes made at sea, in which the appeal has been properly lodged within the time mentioned in the said convention of the 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year (30th September, 1800).'

"'Art. 5. The preceding articles shall apply only, 1st, to captures of which the council of prizes shall have ordered restitution, it being well understood that the claimant cannot have recourse to the United States otherwise than he might have had to the government of the French Republic, and only in case of the insufficiency of the captors; 2d, the debts mentioned in the said fifth article of the convention, contracted before the 8th Vendemiaire, and 9 (30th September, 1800), the payment of which has been heretofore claimed of the actual government of France, and for which the creditors have a right to the protection of the United States; the said fifth article does not comprehend prizes whose condemnation has been or shall be confirmed; it is the express intention of the contracting parties not to extend the benefit of the present convention to reclamations of American citizens, who shall have established houses of commerce in France, England, or other countries than the United States, in partnership with foreigners, and who by that reason and the nature of their commerce, ought to be regarded as domiciliated in the places where such houses exist. All agreements and bargains concerning merchandise, which shall not be the property of American citizens, are equally excepted from the benefit of the said convention, saving, however, to such persons their claims in like manner as if this treaty had not been made.

"From these provisions of the treaty, Mr. W. said, it would appear that the claims to be paid were of three descriptions, to wit:

"1. Claims for supplies.

"2. Claims for embargoes.

"3. Claims for captures made at sea, of a description defined in the last clause of the 4th and the first clause of the 5th article.

"How far these claims embraced all which France ever acknowledged, or ever intended to pay, Mr. W. said he was unable to say, as the time allowed him to examine the case had not permitted him to look sufficiently into the documents to make up his mind with precision upon this point. He had found, in a report made to the Senate on the 14th of January, 1831, in favor of this bill, by the honorable Mr. Livingston, then a Senator from the State of Louisiana, the following Classification of the French claims, as insisted on at a period before the making of the treaty of 1800, to wit:

"'1. From the capture and detention of about fifty vessels.

"'2. The detention, for a year, of eighty other vessels, under the Bordeaux embargo.

"'3. The non-payment of supplies to the West India islands, and to continental France.

"'4. For depredations committed on our commerce in the West Indies.

"Mr. W. said the comparison of the two classifications of claims would show, at a single view, that Nos. 2 and 3 in Mr. Livingston's list were provided for by the treaty of 1803, from which he had read. Whether any, and if any, what portions of Nos. 1 and 4 in Mr. Livingston's list were embraced in No 3 of the provisions of the treaty, as he had numbered them he was unable to say; but this much he could say, that he had found nothing to satisfy his mind that parts of both those classes of claims were not so included, and therefore provided for and paid under the treaty; nor had he been able to find any thing to show that this treaty of 1803 did not provide for and pay all the claims which France ever acknowledged or ever intended to pay. He was, therefore, unprepared to admit, and did not admit, that any thing of value to any class of individual claimants was released by expunging the second original article from the treaty of the 30th September, 1800. On the contrary, he was strongly impressed with the belief that the adjustment of claims provided for in the treaty of 1803 had gone to the whole extent to which the French government had, at any period of the negotiations, intended to go.

"Mr. W. said this impression was greatly strengthened by the circumstance that the claims under the Bordeaux embargo were expressly provided for in this treaty, while he could see nothing in the treaty of 1800 which seemed to him to authorize the supposition that this class of claims was more clearly embraced within the reservations in that treaty than any class which had been admitted by the French government.

"Another fact, Mr. W. said, was material to this subject, and should be borne carefully in mind by every senator. It was, that not a cent was paid by France, even upon the claims reserved and admitted by the treaty of 1800, until the sale of Louisiana to the United States, for a sum greater by thirty millions of francs than that for which the French minister was instructed to sell it. Yes, Mr. President, said Mr. W., the only payment yet made upon any portion of these claims has been virtually made by the United States; for it has been made out of the consideration money paid for Louisiana, after paying into the French treasury ten millions of francs beyond the price France herself placed upon the territory. It is a singular fact that the French negotiator was instructed to make the sale for fifty millions, if he could get no more; and when he found that, by yielding twenty millions to pay the claims, he could get eighty millions for the territory, and thus put ten millions more into the treasury of his nation than she had instructed him to ask for the whole, he yielded to the claims and closed the treaty. It was safe to say that, but for this speculation in the sale of Louisiana, not one dollar would have been paid upon the claims to this day. All our subsequent negotiations with France of a similar character, and our present relations with that country, growing out of private claims, justify this position. What, then, would have been the value of claims, if such fairly existed, which were not acknowledged and provided for by the treaty of 1800, but were left for future negotiation 'at a convenient time?' Would they have been worth the five millions of dollars you propose to appropriate by this bill? Would they have been worth further negotiation? He thought they would not.

"Mr. W. said he would avail himself of this occasion, when speaking of the treaty of Louisiana and of its connection with these claims, to explain a mistake into which he had fallen, and which he found from conversation with several gentlemen, who had been for some years members of Congress, had been common to them and to himself. The mistake to which he alluded was, the supposition that the claimants under this bill put their case upon the assumption that their claims had constituted part of the consideration for which Louisiana had been ceded to the United States; and that the consideration they contended the government had received, and upon which its liability rested, was the cession of that territory for a less sum, in money, than was considered to be its value, on account of the release of the French government from those private claims. He had rested under this misapprehension until the opening of the present debate, and until he commenced an examination of the case. He then found that it was an entire misapprehension; that the United States had paid, in money, for Louisiana, thirty millions of francs beyond the price which France had set upon it; that the claimants under this bill did not rest their claims at all upon this basis, and that the friends of the bill in the Senate did not pretend to derive the liability of the government from this source. Mr. W. said he was induced to make this explanation in justice to himself, and because there might be some person within the hearing of his voice who might still be under the same misapprehension.

"He had now, Mr. W. said, attempted to establish the following propositions, viz.:

"1. That a state of actual war, by which he meant a state of actual hostilities and of force, and an interruption of all diplomatic or friendly intercourse between the United States and France, had existed from the time of the passage of the acts of the 7th and 9th of July, 1798, before referred to, until the sending of the negotiators, Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, in 1800, to make a treaty which put an end to the hostilities existing, upon the best terms that could be obtained; and that the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, concluded by these negotiators, was, in fact, and so far as private claims were concerned, to be considered as a treaty of peace, and to conclude all such claims, not reserved by it, as finally ratified by the two powers.

"2. That the treaty of amity and commerce, and the treaty of alliance of 1778, as well as the consular convention of 1788, were suspended by the 2d article of the treaty of 1800, and from that time became mere matters for negotiation between the parties at a convenient time; that, therefore, the desire to get rid of these treaties, and of any 'onerous obligations' contained in them, was only the desire to get rid of an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time;' and that such a consideration could not have induced the Senate of the United States to expunge that article from the treaty, if thereby that body had supposed it was imposing upon the country a liability to pay to its citizens the sum of five millions of dollars—a sum much larger than France had asked, in money, for a full discharge from the 'onerous obligations' relied upon.

"3. That the treaty of 1800 reserved and provided for certain portions of the claims; that payment, according to such reservations, was made under the treaty of 1803; and that it is at least doubtful whether the payment thus made did not cover all the claims ever admitted, or ever intended to be paid by France; for which reason the expunging of the second article of the treaty of 1800, by the Senate of the United States, in all probability, released nothing which ever had, or which was ever likely to have value.

"Mr. W. said, if he had been successful in establishing either of these positions, there was an end of the claims, and, by consequence, a defeat of the bill.

"The advocates of the bill conceded that two positions must be established, on their part, to sustain it, to wit:

"1. That the claims were valid claims against France, and had never been paid. And

"2. That they were released by the government of the United States for a full and valuable consideration passing to its benefit by means of the release.

"If, then, a state of war had existed, it would not be contended that any claims of this character, not reserved or provided for in the treaty of peace, were valid claims after the ratification of such a treaty. His first proposition, therefore, if sustained, would defeat the bill, by establishing the fact that the claims, if not reserved in the treaty of 1800, were not valid claims.

"The second proposition, if sustained, would establish the fact that, inasmuch as the valuable consideration passing to the United States was alleged to grow out of the 'onerous obligations' in the treaty of amity and commerce, the treaty of alliance, and the consular convention; and inasmuch as these treaties, and all obligations, past, present, or future, 'onerous' or otherwise, growing out of them, were suspended and made inoperative by the second article of the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, until further negotiation, by the common consent of both powers, should revive them, the Senate of the United States could not have expected, when they expunged this article from the treaty, that, by thus discharging the government from an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time,' they were incurring against it a liability of millions; in other words, the discharge of the government from an obligation to negotiate upon any subject 'at a convenient time,' could not have been considered by the Senate of the United States as a good and valuable consideration for the payment of private claims to the amount of five millions of dollars.

"The third proposition, if sustained, would prove that all the claims ever acknowledged, or ever intended to be paid by France, were paid under the treaty of 1803, and that, therefore, as claims never admitted or recognized by France would scarcely be urged as valid claims against her, no valid claims remained; and, consequently, the expunging of the second article of the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, released nothing which was valid, and nothing remained to be paid by the United States as a liability incurred by that modification of that treaty. Here Mr. W. said he would rest his reasoning as to these three propositions.

"But if the Senate should determine that he had been wrong in them all, and had failed to sustain either, he had still another proposition, which he considered conclusive and unanswerable, as to any valuable consideration for the release of these claims having passed to the United States in consequence of their discharge from the 'onerous obligations' said to have been contained in the former treaties. These 'onerous obligations,' and the only ones of which he had heard any thing in the course of the debate, or of which he had found any thing in the documents, arose under the 17th article of the treaty of amity and commerce, and the 11th article of the treaty of alliance; and, in relation to both, he laid down this broad proposition, which would be fully sustained by the treaties themselves, and by every act and every expression on the part of the American negotiators, and the government of the United States, viz.:

"'The obligations, liabilities, and responsibilities, imposed upon the government of the United States and upon France by the 17th article of the treaty of amity and commerce of 1778, and by the 11th article of the treaty of alliance of 1778, where mutual, reciprocal, and equal: each formed the consideration, and the only consideration, for the other; and, therefore, any release which discharged both powers from those liabilities, responsibilities, and obligations, must have been mutual, reciprocal, and equal; and the release of either must have formed a full and valuable consideration for the release of the other.'

"Mr. W. said he would not trouble the Senate by again reading the articles from the respective treaties. They would be recollected, and no one would controvert the fact that, when the treaties were made, these articles were intended to contain mutual, reciprocal, and equal obligations. By the first we gave to France the liberty of our ports for her armed vessels, privateers, and prizes, and prohibited all other powers from the enjoyment of the same privilege; and France gave to us the liberty of her ports for our armed vessels, privateers, and prizes, and guarded the privilege by the same prohibition to other powers; and by the second we guaranteed to France, for ever, her possessions in America, and France guaranteed to us, for ever, 'our liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce.' Such were the obligations in their original inception. Will it be contended that they were not mutual, reciprocal, and equal, and that, in each instance, the one did not form the consideration for the other? Surely no one will take this ground.

"If, then, said Mr. W., the obligations imposed upon each government by these articles of the respective treaties were mutual, reciprocal, and equal, when undertaken, they must have remained equal until abrogated by war, or changed by treaty stipulation. No treaty, subsequent to those which contain the obligations, had affected them in any manner whatever. If, as he had attempted to show, war had existed from July, 1778, to 1800, that would not have rendered the obligations unequal, but would have abrogated them altogether. If, as the friends of the bill contend, there had been no war, and the treaties were in full force up to the signing of the convention of the 30th of September, 1800, what was the effect of that treaty, as originally signed by the negotiators, upon these mutual, reciprocal, and equal obligations? The second original article of that treaty will answer. It did not attempt to disturb their mutuality, reciprocity, or equality, but suspended them as they were, past, present, or future, and made all the subject of future negotiation 'at a convenient time.'

"But, Mr. W. said, the Senate of the United States expunged this article of the treaty of 1800, and refused to advise and consent to ratify it as a part of the treaty; and hence it was contended the United States had discharged themselves from the 'onerous obligations' of these articles in the respective treaties, and had, by that act, incurred, to the claimants under this bill, the heavy liability which it recognizes. If the expunging of that article discharged the United States from obligations thus onerous, did it not discharge France from the fellow obligations? Was not the discharge, made in that manner, as mutual, reciprocal, and equal, as the obligations in their inception, and in all their subsequent stages up to that act? How, then, could it be contended that the discharge of the one was not a full and adequate consideration for the discharge of the other? Nothing upon the face of the treaties authorized the introduction of this inequality at this step in the official proceedings. Nothing in the record of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting upon the article, indicates that they intended to pay five millions of dollars to render this mutual release equal between the two powers. The obligations and responsibilities were reserved as subjects of future negotiation, upon terms of equality, and the striking out of that reservation was but a mutual and reciprocal and equal release from the obligation further to negotiate. This much for the reciprocity of these obligations as derived from the action of the sovereign powers themselves.

"What was to be learned from the action of their respective negotiators? He did not doubt but that attempts had been made on the part of France to exhibit an inequality in the obligations under the treaty, and to set up that inequality against the claims of our citizens; but had our negotiators ever admitted the inequality to exist, or ever attempted to compromise the rights of the claimants under this bill for such a consideration? He could not find that they had. He did not hear it contended that they had: and, from the evidence of their acts, remaining upon record, as a part of the diplomatic correspondence of the period, he could not suppose they had ever entertained the idea. He had said that the American negotiators had always treated these obligations as mutual, reciprocal, and equal; and he now proposed to read to the Senate a part of a letter from Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, addressed to the French negotiators, and containing the project of a treaty, to justify his assertion. The letter was dated 20th August, 1800, and it would be recollected that its authors were the negotiators, on the part of the United States, of the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800. The extract is as follows:

"'1. Let it be declared that the former treaties are renewed and confirmed, and shall have the same effect as if no misunderstanding between the two powers had intervened, except so far as they are derogated from by the present treaty.

"'2. It shall be optional with either party to pay to the other, within seven years, three millions of francs, in money or securities which may be issued for indemnities, and thereby to reduce the rights of the other as to privateers and prizes, to those of the most favored nation, And during the said term allowed for option, the right of both parties shall be limited by the line of the most favored nation.

"'3. The mutual guaranty in the treaty of alliance shall be so specified and limited, that its future obligation shall be, on the part of France, when the United States shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at her own ports military stores to the amount of one million of francs; and, on the part of the United States, when the French possessions in America, in any future war, shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at their own ports a like amount in provisions. It shall, moreover, be optional for either party to exonerate itself wholly of its obligation, by paying to the other, within seven years, a gross sum of five millions of francs, in money or such securities as may be issued for indemnities.'

"Mr. W. asked if he needed further proofs that not only the American government, but the American negotiators, treated these obligations under the treaty as, in all respects, mutual, reciprocal, and equal; and if the fallacy of the argument that the United States had obtained to itself a valuable consideration for the release of these private claims in the release of itself from these obligations, was not utterly and entirely disproved by these facts? Was not the release of the obligations on the one side the release of them on the other? And was not the one release the necessary consideration for the other? How, then, could it be said, with any justice, that we sought our release at the expense of the claimants? There was no reasonable ground for such an allegation, either from the acts of our government or of our negotiators. When the latter fixed a value upon our obligations as to the privateers and prizes, and as to the guaranty, in the same article they fixed the same price, to a franc, upon the reciprocal obligations of France; and when the former discharged our liability, by expunging the second article of the treaty of 1800, the same act discharged the corresponding liability of the French government.

"Here, then, Mr. W. said, must end all pretence of a valuable consideration for these claims passing to the United States from this source. The onerous obligations were mutual, reciprocal, and equal, and the respective releases were mutual, reciprocal, and equal, and simultaneous, and nothing could be fairly drawn from the act which operated these mutual releases to benefit these claimants.

"Mr. W. said he was, then, necessarily brought back to the proposition with which he started in the commencement of his argument, that, if the United States were liable to pay these claimants, that liability must rest upon the broad ground of a failure by the government, after ordinary, and, in this instance, extraordinary efforts to collect the money. The idea of a release of the claims for a valuable consideration passing to the government had been exploded, and, if a liability was to be claimed on account of a failure to collect the money, upon what ground did it rest? What had the government done to protect the rights of these claimants? It had negotiated from 1793 to 1798, with a vigilance and zeal and talent almost unprecedented in the history of diplomacy. It had sent to France minister after minister, and, upon several occasions, extraordinary missions composed of several individuals. Between 1798 and 1800, it had equipped fleets and armies, expended millions in warlike preparation, and finally sent forth its citizens to battle and death, to force the payment of the claims. Were we now to be told, that our failure in these efforts had created a liability against us to pay the money? That the same citizens who had been taxed to pay the expenses of these long negotiations, and of this war for the claims, were to be further taxed to pay such of the claims as we had failed to collect? He could never consent to such a deduction from such premises.

"But, Mr. President, said Mr. W., there is another view of this subject, placed upon this basis, which renders this bill of trifling importance in the comparison. If the failure to collect these claims has created the liability to pay them, that liability goes to the extent of the claims proved, and the interest upon them, not to a partial, and perhaps trifling, dividend. Who, then, would undertake to say what amount of claims might not be proved during the state of things he had described, from the breaking out of the war between France and England, in 1793, to the execution of the treaty, in 1800? For a great portion of the period, the municipal regulations of France required the captured cargoes to be not confiscated, but paid for at the market value at the port to which the vessel was destined. Still the capture would be proved, the value of the cargo ascertained, before the commission which the bill proposes to establish; and who would adduce the proof that the same cargo was paid for by the French government?

"This principle, however, Mr. W. said, went much further than the whole subject of the old French claims. It extended to all claims for spoliations upon our commerce, since the existence of the government, which we had failed to collect. Who could say where the liability would end? In how many cases had claims of this character been settled by treaty, what had been collected in each case, and what amount remained unpaid, after the release of the foreign government? He had made an unsuccessful effort to answer these inquiries, so far as the files of the state department would furnish the information, as he had found that it could only be collected by an examination of each individual claim; and this would impose a labor upon the department of an unreasonable character, and would occupy more time than remained to furnish the information for his use upon the present occasion. He had, however, been favored by the Secretary of State with the amounts allowed by the commissioners, the amounts paid, and the rate of pay upon the principal, in two recent cases, the Florida treaty, and the treaty with Denmark. In the former instance, the payment was ninety-one and two thirds per centum upon the principal, while in the latter it was but thirty-one and one eighth per centum. Assume that these two cases are the maximum and minimum of all the cases where releases have been given for partial payments; and he begged the Senate to reflect upon the amounts unpaid which might be called from the national treasury, if the principle were once admitted that a failure to collect creates a liability to pay.

"That in his assumption that a liability of this sort must go to the whole amount of the claims, he only took the ground contended for by the friends of this bill, he would trouble the Senate with another extract from the report of Mr. Livingston, from which he had before read. In speaking of the amount which should be appropriated, Mr. Livingston says:

"'The only remaining inquiry is the amount; and on this point the committee have had some difficulty. Two modes of measuring the compensation suggested themselves:

"'1. The actual loss sustained by the petitioners.

"'2. The value of the advantages received, as the consideration, by the United States.

"'The first is the one demanded by strict justice; and is the only one that satisfies the word used by the constitution, which requires just compensation, which cannot be said to have been made when any thing less than the full value is given. But there were difficulties which appeared insurmountable, to the adoption of this rule at the present day, arising from the multiplicity of the claims, the nature of the depredations which occasioned them, the loss of documents, either by the lapse of time, or the wilful destruction of them by the depredators. The committee, therefore, could not undertake to provide a specific relief for each of the petitioners. But they have recommended the institution of a board, to enter into the investigation, and apportion a sum which the committee have recommended to be appropriated, pro rata, among the several claimants.'

"'The committee could not believe that the amount of compensation to the sufferers should be calculated by the advantages secured to the United States, because it was not, according to their ideas, the true measure. If the property of an individual be taken for public use, and the government miscalculate, and find that the object to which they have applied it has been injurious rather than beneficial, the value of the property is still due to the owner, who ought not to suffer for the false speculations which have been made. A turnpike or canal may be very unproductive; but the owner of the land which has been taken for its construction is not the less entitled to its value. On the other hand, he can have no manner of right to more than the value of his property, be the object to which it has been applied ever so beneficial.'

"Here, Mr. W. said, were two proposed grounds of estimating the extent of the liability of the government to the claimants; and that which graduated it by the value received by the government was distinctly rejected, while that making the amount of the claims the measure of liability, was as distinctly asserted to be the true and just standard. He hoped he had shown, to the satisfaction of the Senate, that the former rule of value received by the government would allow the claimants nothing at all, while he was compelled to say that, upon the broad principle that a failure to collect creates a liability to pay, he could not controvert the correctness of the conclusion that the liability must be commensurate with the claim. He could controvert, he thought, successfully, the principle, but he could not the measure of damages when the principle was conceded. He would here conclude his remarks upon the points he had noticed, by the earnest declaration that he believed the passage of this bill would open more widely the doors of the public treasury than any legislation of which he had any knowledge, or to which Congress had ever yielded its assent.

"Mr. W. said he had a few observations to offer relative to the mode of legislation proposed, and to the details of the bill, and he would trouble the Senate no further.

"His first objection, under this head, was to the mode of legislation. If the government be liable to pay these claims, the claimants are citizens of the country, and Congress is as accessible to them as to other claimants who have demands against the treasury. Why were they not permitted, individually, to apply to Congress to establish their respective claims, as other claimants were bound to do, and to receive such relief, in each case, as Congress, in its wisdom, should see fit to grant? Why were these claims, more than others, grouped together, and attempted to be made a matter of national importance? Why was a commission to be established to ascertain their validity, a duty in ordinary cases discharged by Congress itself? Were the Senate sure that much of the importance given to those claims had not proceeded from this association, and from the formidable amount thus presented at one view? Would any gentleman be able to convince himself that, acting upon a single claim in this immense mass, he should have given it his favorable consideration? For his part, he considered the mode of legislation unusual and objectionable. His principal objections to the details were, that the second section of the bill prescribed the rules which should govern the commission in deciding upon the claims, among which 'the former treaties between the United States and France' were enumerated; and that the bill contained no declaration that the payments made under it were in full of the claims, or that the respective claimants should execute a release, as a condition of receiving their dividends.

"The first objection was predicated upon the fact that the bill covered the whole period from the making of the treaties of 1778, to that of the 30th September, 1800, and made the former treaties the rule of adjudication, when Congress on the 7th July, 1798, by a deliberate legislative act, declared those treaties void, and no longer binding upon the United States or their citizens. It is a fact abundantly proved by the documents, that a large portion of the claims now to be paid, arose within the period last alluded to; and that treaties declared to be void should be made the law in determining what were and what were not illegal captures, during the time that they were held to have no force, and when our citizens were authorized by law to go upon the high seas, regardless of their provisions, Mr. W. said, would seem to him to be an absurdity which the Senate would not legalize. He was fully aware that the first section of the bill purported to provide for 'valid claims to indemnity upon the French government, arising out of illegal captures, detentions, forcible seizures, illegal condemnations, and confiscations;' but it could not be overlooked that illegal captures, condemnations, and confiscations, must relate entirely to the law which was to govern the adjudication; and if that law was a void treaty which the claimants were not bound to observe, and did not observe, was it not more than possible that a capture, condemnation, or confiscation, might, by compulsion, be adjudged illegal under the rule fixed by the bill, while that same capture, condemnation, or confiscation, was strictly legal under the laws which governed the commerce of the claimant when the capture was made? He must say that it appeared clear to his mind that the rule of adjudication upon the validity of claims of this description, should, in all cases, be the same rule which governed the commerce out of which the claims have arisen.

"His second objection, Mr. W. said, was made more as a wish that a record of the intentions of the present Congress should be preserved upon the face of the bill, than from any idea that the provision suggested would afford the least protection to the public treasury. Every day's legislation showed the futility of the insertion in an act of Congress of a declaration that the appropriation made should be in full of a claim; and in this, as in other like cases, should this bill pass, he did not expect that it would be, in practice, any thing more than an instalment upon the claims which would be sustained before the commission. The files of the state department would contain the record evidence of the balance, with the admission of the government, in the passage of this bill, that an equal liability remained to pay that balance, whatever it might be. Even a release from the respective claimants he should consider as likely to have no other effect than to change their future applications from a demand of legal right, which they now assume to have, to one of equity and favor; and he was yet to see that the latter would not be as successful as the former. He must give his vote against the bill, whether modified in that particular or not, and he should do so under the most full and clear conviction, that it was a proposition fraught with greater dangers to the public treasury, than any law which had ever yet received the assent of Congress."

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CHAPTER CXIX.

FRENCH SPOLIATIONS—MR. WEBSTER'S SPEECH.

"The question, sir, involved in this case, is essentially a judicial question. It is not a question of public policy, but a question of private right; a question between the government and the petitioners: and, as the government is to be judge in its own case, it would seem to be the duty of its members to examine the subject with the most scrupulous good faith, and the most solicitous desire to do justice.

"There is a propriety in commencing the examination of these claims in the Senate, because it was the Senate which, by its amendment of the treaty of 1800, and its subsequent ratification of that treaty, and its recognition of the declaration of the French government, effectually released the claims as against France, and for ever cut off the petitioners from all hopes of redress from that quarter. The claims, as claims against our own government, have their foundation in these acts of the Senate itself; and it may certainly be expected that the Senate will consider the effects of its own proceedings, on private rights and private interests, with that candor and justice which belong to its high character.

"It ought not to be objected to these petitioners, that their claim is old, or that they are now reviving any thing which has heretofore been abandoned. There has been no delay which is not reasonably accounted for. The treaty by which the claimants say their claims on France for these captures and confiscations were released was concluded in 1800. They immediately applied to Congress for indemnity, as will be seen by the report made in 1802, in the House of Representatives, by a committee of which a distinguished member from Virginia, not now living [Mr. Giles], was chairman.

"In 1807, on the petition of sundry merchants and others, citizens of Charleston, in South Carolina, a committee of the House of Representatives, of which Mr. Marion, of that State, was chairman, made a report, declaring that the committee was of opinion that the government of the United States was bound to indemnify the claimants. But at this time our affairs with the European powers at war had become exceedingly embarrassed; our government had felt itself compelled to withdraw our commerce from the ocean; and it was not until after the conclusion of the war of 1812, and after the general pacification of Europe, that a suitable opportunity occurred of presenting the subject again to the serious consideration of Congress. From that time the petitioners have been constantly before us, and the period has at length arrived proper for a final decision of their case.

"Another objection, sir, has been urged against these claims, well calculated to diminish the favor with which they might otherwise be received, and which is without any substantial foundation in fact. It is, that a great portion of them has been bought up, as a matter of speculation, and it is now holden by these purchasers. It has even been said, I think, on the floor of the Senate, that nine tenths, or ninety hundredths, of all the claims are owned by speculators.

"Such unfounded statements are not only wholly unjust towards these petitioners themselves, but they do great mischief to other interests. I have observed that a French gentleman of distinction, formerly a resident in this country, is represented in the public newspapers as having declined the offer of a seat in the French administration, on the ground that he could not support the American treaty; and he could not support the treaty because he had learned, or heard, while in America, that the claims were no longer the property of the original sufferers, but had passed into unworthy hands. If any such thing has been learned in the United States, it has been learned from sources entirely incorrect. The general fact is not so; and this prejudice, thus operating on a great national interest—an interest in regard to which we are in danger of being seriously embroiled with a foreign state—was created, doubtless, by the same incorrect and unfounded assertions which have been made relative to this other class of claims.

"In regard to both classes, and to all classes of claims of American citizens on foreign governments, the statement is at variance with the facts. Those who make it have no proof of it. On the contrary, incontrovertible evidence exists of the truth of the very reverse of this statement. The claims against France, since 1800, are now in the course of adjudication. They are all, or very nearly all, presented to the proper tribunal. Proofs accompany them, and the rules of the tribunal require that, in each case, the true ownership should be fully and exactly set out, on oath; and be proved by the papers, vouchers, and other evidence. Now, sir, if any man is acquainted, or will make himself acquainted, with the proceedings of this tribunal, so far as to see who are the parties claiming the indemnity, he will see the absolute and enormous error of those who represent these claims to be owned, in great part, by speculators.

"The truth is, sir, that these claims, as well those since 1800 as before, are owned and possessed by the original sufferers, with such changes only as happen in regard to all other property. The original owner of ship and cargo; his representative, where such owner is dead; underwriters who have paid losses on account of captures and confiscations; and creditors of insolvents and bankrupts who were interested in the claims—these are the descriptions of persons who, in all these cases, own vastly the larger portion of the claims. This is true of the claims on Spain, as is most manifest from the proceedings of the commissioners under the Spanish treaty. It is true of the claims on France arising since 1800, as is equally manifest by the proceedings of the commissioners now sitting; and it is equally true of the claims which are the subject of this discussion, and provided for in this bill. In some instances claims have been assigned from one to another, in the settlement of family affairs. They have been transferred, in other instances, to secure or to pay debts; they have been transferred, sometimes, in the settlement of insurance accounts; and it is probable there are a few cases in which the necessities of the holders have compelled them to sell them. But nothing can be further from the truth than that they have been the general subjects of purchase and sale, and that they are now holden mainly by purchasers from the original owners. They have been compared to the unfunded debt. But that consisted in scrip, of fixed amount, and which passed from hand to hand by delivery. These claims cannot so pass from hand to hand. In each case, not only the value but the amount is uncertain. Whether there be any claim, is in each case a matter for investigation and proof; and so is the amount, when the justice of the claim itself is established. These circumstances are of themselves quite sufficient to prevent the easy and frequent transfer of the claims from hand to hand. They would lead us to expect that to happen which actually has happened; and that is, that the claims remain with their original owners, and their legal heirs and representatives, with such exceptions as I have already mentioned. As to the portion of the claims now owned by underwriters, it can hardly be necessary to say that they stand on the same equity and justice as if possessed and presented by the owners of ships and goods. There is no more universal maxim of law and justice, throughout the civilized and commercial world, than that an underwriter, who has paid a loss on ships or merchandise to the owner, is entitled to whatever may be received from the property. His right accrues by the very act of payment; and if the property, or its proceeds, be afterwards recovered, in whole or in part, whether the recovery be from the sea, from captors, or from the justice of foreign states, such recovery is for the benefit of the underwriter. Any attempt, therefore, to prejudice these claims, on the ground that many of them belong to insurance companies, or other underwriters, is at war with the first principles of justice.

"A short, but accurate, general view of the history and character of these claims is presented in the report of the Secretary of State, on the 20th of May, 1826, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate. Allow me, sir, to read the paragraphs:

"'The Secretary can hardly suppose it to have been the intention of the resolution to require the expression of an argumentative opinion as to the degree of responsibility to the American sufferers from French spoliations, which the convention of 1800 extinguished, on the part of France, or devolved on the United States, the Senate itself being most competent to decide that question. Under this impression, he hopes that he will have sufficiently conformed to the purposes of the Senate, by a brief statement, prepared in a hurried moment, of what he understands to be the question.

"'The second article of the convention of 1800 was in the following words: "The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties, not being able to agree, at present, respecting the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of the 14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on these subjects, at a convenient time; and, until they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows."

"'When that convention was laid before the Senate, it gave its consent and advice that it should be ratified, provided that the second article be expunged, and that the following article be added or inserted: "It is agreed that the present convention shall be in force for the term of eight years from the time of the exchange of the ratifications;" and it was accordingly so ratified by the President of the United States, on the 18th day of February, 1801. On the 31st of July of the same year, it was ratified by Bonaparte, First Consul of the French Republic, who incorporated in the instrument of his ratification the following clause as part of it: "The government of the United States, having added to its ratification that the convention should be in force for the space of eight years, and having omitted the second article, the government of the French Republic consents to accept, ratify, and confirm the above convention, with the addition, importing that the convention shall be in force for the space of eight years, and with the retrenchment of the second article: Provided, That, by this retrenchment, the two states renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article."

"'The French ratification being thus conditional, was, nevertheless, exchanged against that of the United States, at Paris, on the same 31st of July. The President of the United States considering it necessary again to submit the convention, in this state, to the Senate, on the 19th day of December, 1801, it was resolved by the Senate that they considered the said convention as fully ratified, and returned it to the President for the usual promulgation. It was accordingly promulgated, and thereafter regarded as a valid and binding compact. The two contracting parties thus agreed, by the retrenchment of the second article, mutually to renounce the respective pretensions which were the object of that article. The pretensions of the United States, to which allusion is thus made, arose out of the spoliations under color of French authority, in contravention of law and existing treaties. Those of France sprung from the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of the 14th of November, 1788. Whatever obligations or indemnities, from these sources, either party had a right to demand, were respectively waived and abandoned; and the consideration which induced one party to renounce his pretensions, was that of renunciation by the other party of his pretensions. What was the value of the obligations and indemnities, so reciprocally renounced, can only be matter of speculation. The amount of the indemnities due to the citizens of the United States was very large; and, on the other hand, the obligation was great (to specify no other French pretensions), under which the United States were placed, in the eleventh article of the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, by which they were bound for ever to guarantee from that time the then possessions of the Crown of France in America, as well as those which it might acquire by the future treaty of peace with Great Britain; all these possessions having been, it is believed, conquered at, or not long after, the exchange of the ratifications of the convention of September, 1800, by the arms of Great Britain, from France.

"'The fifth article of the amendments to the constitution provides: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." If the indemnities to which citizens of the United States were entitled for French spoliations prior to the 30th of September, 1800, have been appropriated to absolve the United States from the fulfilment of an obligation which they had contracted, or from the payment of indemnities which they were bound to make to France, the Senate is most competent to determine how far such an appropriation is a public use of private property within the spirit of the constitution, and whether equitable considerations do not require some compensation to be made to the claimants. The Senate is also best able to estimate the probability which existed of an ultimate recovery from France of the amount due for those indemnities, if they had not been renounced; in making which estimate, it will, no doubt, give just weight to the painful consideration that repeated and urgent appeals have been, in vain, made to the justice of France for satisfaction of flagrant wrongs committed upon property of other citizens of the United States, subsequent to the period of the 30th of September, 1800.'

"Before the interference of our government with these claims, they constituted just demands against the government of France. They were not vague expectations of possible future indemnity for injuries received, too uncertain to be regarded as valuable, or be esteemed property. They were just demands, and, as such, they were property. The courts of law took notice of them as property. They were capable of being devised, of being distributed among heirs and next of kin, and of being transferred and assigned, like other legal and just debts. A claim or demand for a ship unjustly seized and confiscated is property, as clearly as the ship itself. It may not be so valuable, or so certain; but it is as clear a right, and has been uniformly so regarded by the courts of law. The papers show that American citizens had claims against the French government for six hundred and fifteen vessels unlawfully seized and confiscated. If this were so, it is difficult to see how the government of the United States can release these claims for its own benefit, with any more propriety than it could have applied the money to its own use, if the French government had been ready to make compensation, in money, for the property thus illegally seized and confiscated; or how the government could appropriate to itself the just claims which the owners of these six hundred and fifteen vessels held against the wrong-doers, without making compensation, any more than it could appropriate to itself, without making compensation, six hundred and fifteen ships which had not been seized. I do not mean to say that the rate of compensation should be the same in both cases; I do not mean to say that a claim for a ship is of as much value as a ship; but I mean to say that both the one and the other are property, and that government cannot, with justice, deprive a man of either, for its own benefit, without making a fair compensation.

"It will be perceived at once, sir, that these claims do not rest on the ground of any neglect or omission, on the part of the government of the United States, in demanding satisfaction from France. That is not the ground. The government of the United States, in that respect, performed its full duty. It remonstrated against these illegal seizures; it insisted on redress; it sent two special missions to France, charged expressly, among other duties, with the duty of demanding indemnity. But France had her subjects of complaint, also, against the government of the United States, which she pressed with equal earnestness and confidence, and which she would neither postpone nor relinquish, except on the condition that the United States would postpone or relinquish these claims. And to meet this condition, and to restore harmony between the two nations, the United States did agree, first to postpone, and afterwards to relinquish, these claims of its own citizens. In other words, the government of the United States bought off the claims of France against itself, by discharging claims of our own citizens against France.

"This, sir, is the ground on which these citizens think they have a claim for reasonable indemnity against their own government. And now, sir, before proceeding to the disputed part of the case, permit me to state what is admitted.

"In the first place, then, it is universally admitted that these petitioners once had just claims against the government of France, on account of these illegal captures and condemnations.

"In the next place, it is admitted that these claims no longer exist against France; that they have, in some way, been extinguished or released, as to her; and that she is for ever discharged from all duty of paying or satisfying them, in whole or in part.

"These two points being admitted, it is then necessary, in order to support the present bill, to maintain four propositions:

"1. That these claims subsisted against France up to the time of the treaty of September, 1800, between France and the United States.

"2. That they were released, surrendered, or extinguished by that treaty, its amendment in the Senate, and the manner of its final ratification.

"3. That they were thus released, surrendered, or extinguished, for political and national considerations, for objects and purposes deemed important to the United States, but in which these claimants had no more interest than any other citizens.

"4. That the amount or measure of indemnity proposed by this bill is no more than a fair and reasonable compensation, so far as we can judge by what has been done in similar cases.

"1. Were these subsisting claims against France up to the time of the treaty? It is a conclusive answer to this question, to say that the government of the United States insisted that they did exist, up to the time of the treaty, and demanded indemnity for them, and that the French government fully admitted their existence, and acknowledged its obligation to make such indemnity.

"The negotiation, which terminated in the treaty, was opened by a direct proposition for indemnity, made by our ministers, the justice and propriety of which was immediately acceded to by the ministers of France.

"On the 7th of April, 1800, in their first letter to the ministers of France, Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, say:

"'Citizen ministers:—The undersigned, appreciating the value of time, and wishing by frankness to evince their sincerity, enter directly upon the great object of their mission—an object which they believe may be best obtained by avoiding to retrace minutely the too well-known and too painful incidents which have rendered a negotiation necessary.

"'To satisfy the demands of justice, and render a reconciliation cordial and permanent, they propose an arrangement, such as shall be compatible with national honor and existing circumstances, to ascertain and discharge the equitable claims of the citizens of either nation upon the other, whether founded on contract, treaty, or the law of nations. The way being thus prepared, the undersigned will be at liberty to stipulate for that reciprocity and freedom of commercial intercourse between the two countries which must essentially contribute to their mutual advantage.

"'Should this general view of the subject be approved by the ministers plenipotentiary to whom it is addressed, the details, it is presumed, may be easily adjusted, and that confidence restored which ought never to have been shaken.'

"To this letter the French ministers immediately returned the following answer:

"'The ministers plenipotentiary of the French Republic have read attentively the proposition for a plan of negotiation which was communicated to them by the envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

"'They think that the first object of the negotiation ought to be the determination of the regulations, and the steps to be followed for the estimation and indemnification of injuries for which either nation may make claim for itself, or for any of its citizens. And that the second object is to assure the execution of treaties of friendship and commerce made between the two nations, and the accomplishment of the views of reciprocal advantages which suggested them.'

"It is certain, therefore, that the negotiation commenced in the recognition, by both parties, of the existence of individual claims, and of the justice of making satisfaction for them; and it is equally clear that, throughout the whole negotiation, neither party suggested that these claims had already been either satisfied or extinguished; and it is indisputable that the treaty itself, in the second article, expressly admitted their existence, and solemly recognized the duty of providing for them at some future period.

"It will be observed, sir, that the French negotiators, in their first letter, while they admit the justice of providing indemnity for individual claims, bring forward, also, claims arising under treaties; taking care, thus early, to advance the pretensions of France on account of alleged violations by the United States of the treaties of 1778. On that part of the case, I shall say something hereafter; but I use this first letter of the French ministers at present only to show that, from the first, the French government admitted its obligation to indemnify individuals who had suffered wrongs and injuries.

"The honorable member from New-York [Mr. Wright] contends, sir, that, at the time of concluding the treaty, these claims had ceased to exist. He says that a war had taken place between the United States and France, and by the war the claims had become extinguished. I differ from the honorable member, both as to the fact of war, and as to the consequences to be deduced from it, in this case, even if public war had existed. If we admit, for argument sake, that war had existed, yet we find that, on the restoration of amity, both parties admit the justice of these claims and their continued existence, and the party against which they are preferred acknowledges her obligation, and expresses her willingness to pay them. The mere fact of war can never extinguish any claim. If, indeed, claims for indemnity be the professed ground of a war, and peace be afterwards concluded without obtaining any acknowledgment of the right, such a peace may be construed to be a relinquishment of the right, on the ground that the question has been put to the arbitration of the sword, and decided. But, if a war be waged to enforce a disputed claim, and it be carried on till the adverse party admit the claim, and agree to provide for its payment, it would be strange, indeed, to hold that the claim itself was extinguished by the very war which had compelled its express recognition. Now, whatever we call that state of things which existed between the United States and France from 1798 to 1800, it is evident that neither party contended or supposed that it had been such a state of things as had extinguished individual claims for indemnity for illegal seizures and confiscations.

"The honorable member, sir, to sustain his point, must prove that the United States went to war to vindicate these claims; that they waged that war unsuccessfully; and that they were therefore glad to make peace, without obtaining payment of the claims, or any admission of their justice. I am happy, sir, to say that, in my opinion, facts do not authorize any such record to be made up against the United States. I think it is clear, sir, that whatever misunderstanding existed between the United States and France, it did not amount, at any time, to open and public war. It is certain that the amicable relations of the two countries were much disturbed; it is certain that the United States authorized armed resistance to French captures, and the captures of French vessels of war found hovering on our coast; but it is certain, also, not only that there was no declaration of war, on either side, but that the United States, under all their provocations, did never authorize general reprisals on French commerce. At the very moment when the gentleman says war raged between the United States and France, French citizens came into our courts, in their own names, claimed restitution for property seized by American cruisers, and obtained decrees of restitution. They claimed as citizens of France and obtained restoration, in our courts, as citizens of France. It must have been a singular war, sir, in which such proceedings could take place. Upon a fair view of the whole matter, Mr. President, it will be found, I think, that every thing done by the United States was defensive. No part of it was ever retaliatory. The United States do not take justice into their own hands.

"The strongest measure, perhaps, adopted by Congress, was the act of May 28, 1798. The honorable member from New-York has referred to this act, and chiefly relies upon it, to prove the existence, or the commencement, of actual war. But does it prove either the one or the other?

"It is not an act declaring war; it is not an act authorizing reprisals; it is not an act which, in any way, acknowledges the actual existence of war. Its whole implication and import is the other way. Its title is, 'An act more effectually to protect the commerce and coasts of the United States.'

"This is its preamble:

"'Whereas armed vessels, sailing under authority, or pretence of authority, from the Republic of France, have committed depredations on the commerce of the United States, and have recently captured the vessels and property of citizens thereof, on and near the coasts, in violation of the law of nations, and treaties between the United States and the French nation: therefore'—

"And then follows its only section, in these words:

"'Sec. 1. Be it enacted, &c., That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, and he is hereby authorized, to instruct and direct the commanders of the armed vessels belonging to the United States, to seize, take, and bring into any port of the United States, to be proceeded against according to the laws of nations, any such armed vessel which shall have committed, or which shall be found hovering on the coasts of the United States for the purpose of committing, depredations on the vessels belonging to citizens thereof; and also retake any ship or vessel, of any citizen or citizens of the United States, which may have been captured by any such armed vessel.'

"This act, it is true, authorized the use of force, under certain circumstances, and for certain objects, against French vessels. But there may be acts of authorized force, there may be assaults, there may be battles, there may be captures of ships and imprisonment of persons, and yet no general war. Cases of this kind may occur under that practice of retortion which is justified, when adopted for just cause, by the laws and usages of nations, and which all the writers distinguish from general war.

"The first provision in this law is purely preventive and defensive; and the other hardly goes beyond it. Armed vessels hovering on our coast, and capturing our vessels, under authority, or pretence of authority, from a foreign state, might be captured and brought in, and vessels already seized by them retaken. The act is limited to armed vessels; but why was this, if general war existed? Why was not the naval power of the country let loose at once, if there were war, against the commerce of the enemy? The cruisers of France were preying on our commerce; if there was war, why were we restrained from general reprisals on her commerce? This restraining of the operation of our naval marine to armed vessels of France, and to such of them only as should be found hovering on our coast, for the purpose of committing depredations on our commerce, instead of proving a state of war, proves, I think, irresistibly, that a state of general war did not exist. But even if this act of Congress left the matter doubtful, other acts passed at and near the same time demonstrate the understanding of Congress to have been, that although the relations between the two countries were greatly disturbed, yet that war did not exist. On the same day (May 28, 1798) in which this act passed, on which the member from New-York lays so much stress, as proving the actual existence of war with France, Congress passed another act, entitled 'An act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional army;' and the first section declared that the President should be authorized, 'in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of actual invasion of their territory by a foreign power, or of imminent danger of such invasion, to cause to be enlisted,' &c., ten thousand men.

"On the 16th of July following, Congress passed the law for augmenting the army, the second section of which authorized the President to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry, and six troops of light dragoons, 'to be enlisted for and during the continuance of the existing differences between the United States and the French Republic, unless sooner discharged,' &c.

"The following spring, by the act of the 2d of March, 1799, entitled 'An act giving eventual authority to the President of the United States to augment the army,' Congress provided that it should be lawful for the President of the United States, in case war should break out between the United States and a foreign European power, &c., to raise twenty-four regiments of infantry, &c. And in the act for better organizing the army, passed the next day, Congress repeats the declaration, contained in a former act, that certain provisions shall not take effect unless war shall break out between the United States and some European prince, potentate, or state.

"On the 20th of February, 1800, an act was passed to suspend the act for augmenting the army; and this last act declared that further enlistments should be suspended until the further order of Congress, unless in the recess of Congress and during the continuance of the existing differences between the United States and the French Republic, war should break out between the United States and the French Republic, or imminent danger of an invasion of their territory by the said Republic should be discovered.

"On the 14th of May, 1800, four months before the conclusion of the treaty, Congress passed an act authorizing the suspension of military appointments, and the discharge of troops under the provisions of the previous laws. No commentary is necessary, sir, on the texts of these statutes, to show that Congress never recognized the existence of war between the United States and France. They apprehended war might break out; and they made suitable provision for that exigency, should it occur; but it is quite impossible to reconcile the express and so often repeated declarations of these statutes, commencing in 1798, running through 1799, and ending in 1800, with the actual existence of war between the two countries at any period within those years.

"The honorable member's second principal source of argument, to make out the fact of a state of war, is the several non-intercourse acts. And here again it seems to me an exactly opposite inference is the true one. In 1798, 1799, and 1800, acts of Congress were passed suspending the commercial intercourse between the United States, each for one year. Did any government ever pass a law of temporary non-intercourse with a public enemy? Such a law would be little less than an absurdity. War itself effectually creates non-intercourse. It renders all trade with the enemy illegal, and, of course, subjects all vessels found so engaged, with their cargoes, to capture and condemnation as enemy's property. The first of these laws was passed June 13, 1798, the last, February 27, 1800. Will the honorable member from New-York tell us when the war commenced? When did it break out? When did those 'differences,' of which the acts of Congress speak, assume a character of general hostility? Was there a state of war on the 13th of June, 1798, when Congress passed the first non-intercourse act; and did Congress, in a state of public war, limit non-intercourse with the enemy to one year? Or was there a state of peace in June, 1798? and, if so, I ask again, at what time after that period, and before September, 1800, did the war break out? Difficulties of no small magnitude surround the gentleman, I think, whatever course he takes through these statutes, while he attempts to prove from them a state of war. The truth is, they prove, incontestably, a state of peace; a state of endangered, disturbed, agitated peace; but still a state of peace. Finding themselves in a state of great misunderstanding and contention with France, and seeing our commerce a daily prey to the rapacity of her cruisers, the United States preferred non-intercourse to war. This is the ground of the non-intercourse acts. Apprehending, nevertheless, that war might break out, Congress made prudent provision for it by augmenting the military force of the country. This is the ground of the laws for raising a provisional army. The entire provisions of all these laws necessarily suppose an existing state of peace; but they imply also an apprehension that war might commence. For a state of actual war they were all unsuited; and some of them would have been, in such a state, preposterous and absurd. To a state of present peace, but disturbed, interrupted, and likely to terminate in open hostilities, they were all perfectly well adapted. And as many of these acts, in express terms, speak of war as not actually existing, but as likely or liable to break out, it is clear, beyond all reasonable question, that Congress never, at any time, regarded the state of things existing between the United States and France as being a state of war.

"As little did the executive government so regard it, as must be apparent from the instructions given to our ministers, when the mission was sent to France. Those instructions, having recurred to the numerous acts of wrong committed on the commerce of the United States, and the refusal of indemnity by the government of France, proceed to say: 'This conduct of the French Republic would well have justified an immediate declaration of war on the part of the United States; but, desirous of maintaining peace, and still willing to leave open the door of reconciliation with France, the United States contented themselves with preparations for defence, and measures calculated to protect their commerce.'

"It is equally clear, on the other hand, that neither the French government nor the French ministers acted on the supposition that war had existed between the two nations. And it was for this reason that they held the treaties of 1778 still binding. Within a month or two of the signature of the treaty, the ministers plenipotentiary of the French Republic write thus to Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray: 'In the first place, they will insist upon the principle already laid down in their former note, viz.: that the treaties which united France and the United States are not broken; that even war could not have broken them; but that the state of misunderstanding which existed for some time between France and the United States, by the act of some agents rather than by the will of the respective governments, has not been a state of war, at least on the side of France.'

"Finally, sir, the treaty itself, what is it? It is not called a treaty of peace; it does not provide for putting an end to hostilities. It says not one word of any preceding war; but it does say that 'differences' have arisen between the two states, and that they have, therefore, respectively, appointed their plenipotentiaries, and given them full powers to treat upon those 'differences,' and to terminate the same.

"But the second article of the treaty, as negotiated and agreed on by the ministers of both governments, is, of itself, a complete refutation of the whole argument which is urged against this bill, on the ground that the claims had been extinguished by war, since that article distinctly and expressly acknowledges the existence of the claims, and contains a solemn pledge that the two governments, not being able to agree on them at present, will negotiate further on them, at convenient time thereafter. Whether we look, then, to the decisions of the American courts, to the acts of Congress, to the instructions of the American executive government, to the language of our ministers, to the declarations of the French government and the French ministers, or to the unequivocal language of the treaty itself, as originally agreed to, we meet irresistible proof of the truth of the declaration, that the state of misunderstanding which had existed between the two countries was not war.

"If the treaty had remained as the ministers on both sides agreed upon it, the claimants, though their indemnity was postponed, would have had no just claim on their own government. But the treaty did not remain in this state. This second article was stricken out by the Senate; and, in order to see the obvious motive of the Senate in thus striking out the second article, allow me to read the whole article. It is in these words:

"'The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties not being able to agree, at present, respecting the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of the 14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time, and until they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows.'

"The article thus stipulating to make the claims of France, under the old treaties, matter of further negotiation, in order to get rid of such negotiation, and the whole subject, the Senate struck out the entire article, and ratified the treaty in this corrected form. France ratified the treaty, as thus amended, with the further declaration that, by thus retrenching the second article, the two nations renounce the respective pretensions which were the object of the article. In this declaration of the French government, the Senate afterwards acquiesced; so that the government of France, by this retrenchment, agreed to renounce her claims under the treaties of 1778, and the United States, in like manner, renounced the claims of their citizens for indemnities due to them.

"And this proves, sir, the second proposition which I stated at the commencement of my remarks, viz.: that these claims were released, relinquished, or extinguished, by the amendment of the treaty, and its ratification as amended. It is only necessary to add, on this point, that these claims for captures before 1800 would have been good claims under the late treaty with France, and would have come in for a dividend in the fund provided by that treaty, if they had not been released by the treaty of 1800. And they are now excluded from all participation in the benefit of the late treaty, because of such release or extinguishment by that of 1800.

"In the third place, sir, it is to be proved, if it be not proved already, that these claims were surrendered, or released by the government of the United States, on national considerations, and for objects in which these claimants had no more interest than any other citizens.

"Now, sir, I do not feel called on to make out that the claims and complaints of France against the government of the United States were well founded. It is certain that she put forth such claims and complaints, and insisted on them to the end. It is certain that, by the treaty of alliance of 1778, the United States did guaranty to France her West India possessions. It is certain that, by the treaty of commerce of the same date, the United States stipulated that French vessels of war might bring their prizes into the ports of the United States, and that the enemies of France should not enjoy that privilege; and it is certain that France contended that the United States had plainly violated this article, as well by their subsequent treaty with England as by other acts of the government. For the violation of these treaties she claimed indemnity from the government of the United States. Without admitting the justice of these pretensions, the government of the United States found them extremely embarrassing, and they authorized our ministers in France to buy them off by money.

"For the purpose of showing the justice of the present bill, it is not necessary to insist that France was right in these pretensions. Right or wrong, the United States were anxious to get rid of the embarrassments which they occasioned. They were willing to compromise the matter. The existing state of things, then, was exactly this:

"France admitted that citizens of the United States had just claims against her; but she insisted that she, on the other hand, had just claims against the government of the United States.

"She would not satisfy our citizens, till our government agreed to satisfy her. Finally, a treaty is ratified, by which the claims on both sides are renounced.

"The only question is, whether the relinquishment of these individual claims was the price which the United States paid for the relinquishment, by France, of her claims against our government? And who can doubt it? Look to the negotiation; the claims on both sides were discussed together. Look to the second article of the treaty, as originally agreed to; the claims on both sides are there reserved together. And look to the Senate's amendment, and to the subsequent declaration of the French government, acquiesced in by the Senate; and there the claims on both sides are renounced together. What stronger proof could there be of mutuality of consideration? Sir, allow me to put this direct question to the honorable member from New-York. If the United States did not agree to renounce these claims, in consideration that France would renounce hers, what was the reason why they surrendered thus the claims of their own citizens? Did they do it without any consideration at all? Was the surrender wholly gratuitous? Did they thus solemnly renounce claims for indemnity, so just, so long insisted on by themselves, the object of two special missions, the subjects of so much previous controversy, and at one time so near being the cause of open war—did the government surrender and renounce them gratuitously, or for nothing? Had it no reasonable motive in the relinquishment? Sir, it is impossible to maintain any such ground.

"And, on the other hand, let me ask, was it for nothing that France relinquished, what she had so long insisted on, the obligation of the United States to fulfil the treaties of 1778? For the extinguishment of this obligation we had already offered her a large sum of money, which she had declined. Was she now willing to give it up without any equivalent?

"Sir, the whole history of the negotiation is full of proof that the individual claims of our citizens, and the government claims of France against the United States, constituted the respective demands of the two parties. They were brought forward together, discussed together, insisted on together. The French ministers would never consent to disconnect them. While they admitted, in the fullest manner, the claims on our side, they maintained, with persevering resolution, the claims on the side of France. It would fatigue the Senate were I to go through the whole correspondence, and show, as I could easily do, that, in every stage of the negotiation, these two subjects were kept together. I will only refer to some of the more prominent and decisive parts.

"In the first place, the general instructions which our ministers received from our own government, when they undertook the mission, directed them to insist on the claims of American citizens against France, to propose a joint board of commissioners to state those claims, and to agree to refer the claims of France for infringements of the treaty of commerce to the same board. I will read, sir, so much of the instructions as comprehend these points:

"'1. At the opening of the negotiation you will inform the French ministers that the United States expect from France, as an indispensable condition of the treaty, a stipulation to make to the citizens of the United States full compensation for all losses and damages which they shall have sustained by reason of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels and other property, under color of authority or commissions from the French Republic or its agents. And all captures and condemnations are deemed irregular or illegal when contrary to the law of nations, generally received and acknowledged in Europe, and to the stipulations in the treaty of amity and commerce of the 6th of February, 1778, fairly and ingenuously interpreted, while that treaty remained in force.'

"'2. If these preliminaries should be satisfactorily arranged, then, for the purpose of examining and adjusting all the claims of our citizens, it will be necessary to provide for the appointment of a board of commissioners, similar to that described in the sixth and seventh articles of the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Great Britain.'

"'As the French government have heretofore complained of infringements of the treaty of amity and commerce, by the United States or their citizens, all claims for injuries, thereby occasioned to France or its citizens, are to be submitted to the same board; and whatever damages they award will be allowed by the United States, and deducted from the sums awarded to be paid by France.'

"Now, sir, suppose this board had been constituted, and suppose that it had made awards against France, in behalf of citizens of the United States, and had made awards also in favor of the government of France against the government of the United States; and then these last awards had been deducted from the amount of the former, and the property of citizens thus applied to discharge the public obligations of the country, would any body doubt that such citizens would be entitled to indemnity? And are they less entitled, because, instead of being first liquidated and ascertained, and then set off, one against the other, they are finally agreed to be set off against each other, and mutually relinquished in the lump?

"Acting upon their instructions, it will be seen that the American ministers made an actual offer to suspend the claim for indemnities till France should be satisfied as to her political rights under the treaties. On the 15th of July they made this proposition to the French negotiators:

"'Indemnities to be ascertained and secured in the manner proposed in our project of a treaty, but not to be paid until the United States shall have offered to France an article stipulating free admission, in the ports of each, for the privateers and prizes of the other, to the exclusion of their enemies.'

"This, it will be at once seen, was a direct offer to suspend the claims of our own citizens till our government should be willing to renew to France the obligation of the treaty of 1778. Was not this an offer to make use of private property for public purposes?

"On the 11th of August, the French plenipotentiaries thus write to the ministers of the United States:

"'The propositions which the French ministers have the honor to communicate to the ministers plenipotentiary of the United States are reduced to this simple alternative:

"'Either the ancient treaties, with the privileges resulting from priority, and a stipulation of reciprocal indemnities;

"'Or a new treaty, assuring equality without indemnity.'

"In other words, this offer is, 'if you will acknowledge or renew the obligation of the old treaties, which secure to us privileges in your ports which our enemies are not to enjoy, then we will make indemnities for the losses of your citizens; or, if you will give up all claim for such indemnities, then we will relinquish our especial privileges under the former treaties, and agree to a new treaty which shall only put us on a footing of equality with Great Britain, our enemy.'

"On the 20th of August our ministers propose that the former treaties, so far as they respect the rights of privateers, shall be renewed; but that it shall be optional with the United States, by the payment, within seven years, of three millions of francs, either in money or in securities issued by the French government for indemnities to our citizens, to buy off this obligation, or to buy off all its political obligations, under both the old treaties, by payment in like manner of five millions of francs.

"On the 4th of September the French ministers submit these propositions.

"'A commission shall regulate the indemnities which either of the two nations may owe to the citizens of the other.

"'The indemnities which shall be due by France to the citizens of the United States shall be paid for by the United States, and in return for which France yields the exclusive privilege resulting from the 17th and 22d articles of the treaty of commerce, and from the rights of guaranty of the 11th article of the treaty of alliance.'

"The American ministers considered these propositions as inadmissible. They, however, on their part, made an approach to them, by proposing, in substance, that it should be left optional with the United States, on the exchange of the ratification, to relinquish the indemnities, and in that case, the old treaties not to be obligatory on the United States, so far as they conferred exclusive privileges on France. This will be seen in the letter of the American ministers of the 5th of September.

"On the 18th of September the American ministers say to those of France;

"'It remains only to consider the expediency of a temporary arrangement. Should such an arrangement comport with the views of France, the following principles are offered as the basis of it:

"'1st. The ministers plenipotentiary of the respective parties not being able at present to agree respecting the former treaties and indemnities, the parties will, in due and convenient time, further treat on those subjects; and, until they shall have agreed respecting the same, the said treaties shall have no operation.'

"This, the Senate will see, is substantially the proposition which was ultimately accepted, and which formed the second article of the treaty. By that article, these claims, on both sides, were postponed for the present, and afterwards, by other acts of the two governments, they were mutually and for ever renounced and relinquished.

"And now, sir, if any gentleman can look to the treaty, look to the instructions under which it was concluded, look to the correspondence which preceded it, and look to the subsequent agreement of the two governments to renounce claims, on both sides, and not admit that the property of these private citizens has been taken to buy off embarrassing claims of France on the government of the United States, I know not what other or further evidence could ever force that conviction on his mind.

"I will conclude this part of the case by showing you how this matter was understood by the American administration which finally accepted the treaty, with this renouncement of indemnities. The treaty was negotiated in the administration of Mr. Adams. It was amended in the Senate, as already stated, and ratified on the third day of February, 1801, Mr. Adams being still in office. Being thus ratified, with the amendment, it was sent back to France, and on the thirty-first day of July, the first Consul ratified the treaty, as amended by striking out the second article, but accompanied the ratification with this declaration, 'provided that, by this retrenchment, the two states renounce their respective pretensions, which are the object of the said article.'

"With this declaration appended, the treaty came back to the United States. Mr. Jefferson had now become President, and Mr. Madison was Secretary of State. In consequence of the declaration of the French government, accompanying its ratification of the treaty and now attached to it, Mr. Jefferson again referred the treaty to the Senate, and on the 19th of December, 1801, the Senate resolved that they considered the treaty as duly ratified. Now, sir, in order to show what Mr. Jefferson and his administration thought of this treaty, and the effect of its ratification, in its then existing form, I beg leave to read an extract of an official letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Pinckney, then our minister in Spain. Mr. Pinckney was at that time negotiating for the adjustment of our claims on Spain; and, among others, for captures committed within the territories of Spain, by French subjects. Spain objected to these claims, on the ground that the United States had claimed redress of such injuries from France. In writing to Mr. Pinckney (under date of February 6th, 1804), and commenting on this plea of Spain, Mr. Madison says:

"'The plea on which it seems the Spanish government now principally relies, is the erasure of the second article from our late convention with France, by which France was released from the indemnities due for spoliations committed under her immediate responsibility to the United States. This plea did not appear in the early objections of Spain to our claims. It was an afterthought, resulting from the insufficiency of every other plea, and is certainly as little valid as any other.'

"'The injuries for which indemnities are claimed from Spain, though committed by Frenchmen, took place under Spanish authority. Spain, therefore, is answerable for them. To her we have looked, and continue to look for redress. If the injuries done to us by her resulted in any manner from injuries done to her by France, she may, if she pleases, resort to France as we resort to her. But whether her resort to France would be just or unjust is a question between her and France, not between either her and us, or us and France. We claim against her, not against France. In releasing France, therefore, we have not released her. The claims, again, from which France was released, were admitted by France, and the release was for a valuable consideration, in a correspondent release of the United States from certain claims on them. The claims we make on Spain were never admitted by France, nor made on France by the United States; they made, therefore, no part of the bargain with her, and could not be included in the release.'

"Certainly, sir, words could not have been used which should more clearly affirm that these individual claims, these private rights of property, had been applied to public uses. Mr. Madison here declares, unequivocally, that these claims had been admitted by France; that they were relinquished by the government of the United States; that they were relinquished for a valuable consideration; that that consideration was a correspondent release of the United States from certain claims on them; and that the whole transaction was a bargain between the two governments. This, sir, be it remembered, was little more than two years after the final promulgation of the treaty; it was by the Secretary of State under that administration which gave effect to the treaty in its amended form, and it proves, beyond mistake and beyond doubt, the clear judgment which that administration had formed upon the true nature and character of the whole transaction."

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CHAPTER CXX.

FRENCH SPOLIATIONS—MR. BENTON'S SPEECH.