Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1 of 2) / or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850

by Thomas Hart Benton

Having read these passages, Mr. B. said they were the sentiments of an English whig of the old school. Mr. Fox was a whig of the old school. He acknowledged the right of the people to instruct their representatives. He yielded to the general voice himself, though not specially instructed; and he uses the remarkable expression which acknowledges the duty of Parliament to obey the will of the people. "They had declared their sentiments to Parliament, and had taught Parliament to listen to the voice of their constituents." This, said Mr. B., was fifty years ago; it was spoken by a member of Parliament, who, besides being the first debater of his age, was at that time Secretary at War. He acknowledged the duty of Parliament to obey the voice of the people. The son of a peer of the realm, and only not a peer himself because he was not the eldest son, he still acknowledged the great democratic principle which lies at the bottom of all representative government. After this, after such an example, will American Senators be unwilling to obey the people? Will they require people to teach Congress the lesson which Mr. Fox says the English people had taught their Parliament fifty years ago? The voice of the people of the United States had been heard on this subject. The elections declared it. The vote of many legislatures declared it. From the confines of the Republic the voice of the people came rolling in—a swelling tide, rising as it flowed—and covering the capitol with its mountain waves. Can that voice be disregarded? Will members of a republican Congress be less obedient to the voice of the people than were the representatives of a monarchical House of Commons?

Mr. B. then proceeded to the argument of his motion. He moved to expunge the resolution of March 28, 1834, from the journals of the Senate, because it was illegal and unjust; vague and indefinite; a criminal charge without specification; unwarranted by the constitution and laws; subversive of the rights of defence which belong to an accused and impeachable officer; of evil example; and adopted at a time and under circumstances to involve the political rights and the pecuniary interests of the people of the United States in peculiar danger and serious injury.

These reasons for expunging the criminating resolution from the journals, Mr. B. said, were not phrases collected and paraded for effect, or strung together for harmony of sound. They were each, separately and individually, substantive reasons; every word an allegation of fact, or of law. Without going fully into the argument now, he would make an exposition which would lay open his meaning, and enable each allegation, whether of law or of fact, to be fully understood, and replied to in the sense intended.

1. Illegal and unjust.—These were the first heads under which Mr. B. would develope his objections, he would say the outline of his objections, to the resolution proposed to be expunged. He held it to be illegal, because it contained a criminal charge, on which the President might be impeached, and for which he might be tried by the Senate. The resolution adopted by the Senate is precisely the first step taken in the House of Representatives to bring on an impeachment. It was a resolution offered by a member in his place, containing a criminal charge against an impeachable officer, debated for a hundred days; and then voted upon by the Senate, and the officer voted to be guilty. This is the precise mode of bringing on an impeachment in the House of Representatives; and, to prove it, Mr. B. would read from a work of approved authority on parliamentary practice; it was from Mr. Jefferson's Manual. Mr. B. then read from the Manual, under the section entitled Impeachment, and from that head of the section entitled accusation. The writer was giving the British Parliamentary practice, to which our own constitution is conformable. "The Commons, as the grand inquest of the nation, became suitors for penal justice. The general course is to pass a resolution containing a criminal charge against the supposed delinquent; and then to direct some member to impeach him by oral accusation at the bar of the House of Lords, in the name of the Commons."

Repeating a clause of what he had read, Mr. B. said the general course is to pass a criminal charge against the supposed delinquent. This is exactly what the Senate did; and what did it do next? Nothing. And why nothing? Because there was nothing to be done by them but to execute the sentence they had passed; and that they could not do. Penal justice was the consequence of the resolution; and a judgment of penalties could not be attempted on such an irregular proceeding. The only kind of penal justice which the Senate could inflict was that of public opinion; it was to ostracize the President, and to expose him to public odium, as a violator of the laws and constitution of his country. Having shown the resolution to be illegal, Mr. B. would pronounce it to be unjust; for he affirmed the resolution to be untrue; he maintained that the President had violated no law, no part of the constitution, in dismissing Mr. Duane from the Treasury, appointing Mr. Taney, or causing the deposits to be removed; for these were the specifications contained in the original resolution, also in the second modification of the resolution, and intended in the third modification, when stripped of specifications, and reduced to a vague and general charge. It was in this shape of a general charge that the resolution passed. No new specifications were even suggested in debate. The alterations were made voluntarily, by the friends of the resolution, at the last moment of the debate, and just when the vote was to be taken. And why were the specifications then dropped? Because no majority could be found to agree in them? or because it was thought prudent to drop the name of the Bank of the United States? or for both these reasons together? Be that as it may, said Mr. B., the condemnation of the President, and the support of the bank, were connected in the resolution, and will be indissolubly connected in the public mind; and the President was unjustly condemned in the same resolution that befriended and sustained the cause of the bank. He held the condemnation to be untrue in point of fact, and therefore unjust; for he maintained that there was no breach of the laws and constitution in any thing that President Jackson did, in removing Mr. Duane, or in appointing Mr. Taney, or in causing the deposits to be removed. There was no violation of law, or constitution, in any part of these proceedings; on the contrary, the whole country, and the government itself, was redeemed from the dominion of a great and daring moneyed corporation, by the wisdom and energy of these very proceedings.

2. Vague and indefinite; a criminal charge without specification. Such was the resolution, Mr. B. said, when it passed the Senate; but such it was not when first introduced, nor even when first altered; in its first and second forms it contained specifications, and these specifications identified the condemnation of the President with the defence of the bank; in its third form, these specifications were omitted, and no others were substituted; the bank and the resolution stood disconnected on the record, but as much connected, in fact, as ever. The resolution was reduced to a vague and indefinite form, on purpose, and in that circumstance, acquired a new character of injustice to President Jackson. His accusers should have specified the law, and the clause in the constitution, which was violated; they should have specified the acts which constituted the violation. This was due to the accused, that he might know on what points to defend himself; it was due to the public, that they might know on what points to hold the accusers to their responsibility, and to make them accountable for an unjust accusation. To sustain this position, Mr. B. had recourse to history and example, and produced the case of Mr. Giles's accusation of General Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, in the year 1793. Mr. Giles, he said, proceeded in a manly, responsible manner. He specified the law and the alleged violations of the law, so that the friends of General Hamilton could see what to defend, and so as to make himself accountable for the accusation. He specified the law, which he believed to be violated, by its date and its title; and he specified the two instances in which he held that law to have been infringed.

Mr. B. said he had a double object in quoting this resolution of Mr. Giles, which was intended to lay the foundation for an impeachment against General Hamilton; it was to show, first, the speciality with which these criminating resolutions should be drawn; next, to show the absence of any allegations of corrupt or wicked intention. The mere violation of law was charged as the offence, as it was in three of the articles of impeachment against Judge Chase; and thus, the absence of an allegation of corrupt intention in the resolution adopted against President Jackson, was no argument against its impeachment character, especially as exhibited in its first and second form, with the criminal averment, "dangerous to the liberties of the people."

For the purpose of exposing the studied vagueness of the resolution as passed, detecting its connection with the Bank of the United States, demonstrating its criminal character in twice retaining the criminal averment, "dangerous to the liberties of the people," and showing the progressive changes it had to undergo before it could conciliate a majority of the votes, Mr. B. would exhibit all three of the resolutions, and read them side by side of each other, as they appeared before the Senate, in the first, second, and third forms which they were made to wear. They appeared first in the embryo, or primordial form; then they assumed their aurelia, or chrysalis state; in the third stage, they reached the ultimate perfection of their imperfect nature.

First Form.—December 26, 1833.