This compromise act of 1833, was drawing towards the close of its career, and was proving itself to have been a complete illusion in all the good it had promised, and a sad reality in all the ill that had been predicted of it. It had been framed on the principle of helping manufactures for nine years, and then to be a free trade measure for ever after. The first part succeeded, and so well, in keeping up high duties as to raise far more revenue than the government needed: the second part left the government without revenue for its current uses, and under the necessity of giving up that uniform twenty per centum duty on the value of imports, which was to have been the permanent law of our tariff; and which never became law at all. In the meanwhile, the compromise having provided for periodical reductions in the duties on imported sugars and molasses, made no provision for proportionate reductions of the drawback upon these articles when exported in the changed shape of rum and refined sugars: and enormous sums were drawn from the treasury by this omission in the compromise act—the great refiners and rum distillers driving an immense capital into their business for the mere purpose of getting the gratuitous drawbacks. The author of this View endeavored to supply the omission at the time, and repeatedly afterwards; but these efforts were resisted by the advocates of the compromise until these gratuities becoming enormous, rising from $2,000 per annum, to hundreds of thousands per annum, and finally reaching five hundred thousand, they roused the alarm of the government, and sunk under the enormity of their abuse. Yet it was this compromise which was held too sacred to have its palpable defects corrected, and the inviolability of which was recommended to be preserved, that in addition to its other faults, was making an annual present of some hundreds of thousands of dollars to two classes of manufacturers.
A bank of some kind was recommended, under the name of fiscal agent, as necessary to facilitate the operations of the Treasury, to promote the collection and disbursement of the public revenue, and to supply a currency of uniform value. The message said:
"In intimate connection with the question of revenue, is that which makes provision for a suitable fiscal agent, capable of adding increased facilities in the collection and disbursement of the public revenues, rendering more secure their custody, and consulting a true economy in the great multiplied and delicate operations of the Treasury department. Upon such an agent depends in an eminent degree, the establishment of a currency of uniform value, which is of so great importance to all the essential interests of society; and on the wisdom to be manifested in its creation, much depends."
These are the reasons which General Hamilton gave for asking the establishment of the first national bank, in 1791, and which have been given ever since, no matter with what variation of phraseology, for the creation of a similar institution. This preference for a bank, under a new name, was confirmed by the rejection of the sub-treasury and hard-money currency, assumed by the message to have been condemned by the people in the result of the presidential election. Speaking of this system, it said: "If carried through all the stages of its transmutation, from paper and specie to nothing but the precious metals, to say nothing of the insecurity of the public moneys its injurious effects have been anticipated by the country, in its unqualified condemnation." The justice and wisdom of this condemnation, thus inferred from the issue of the presidential election, and carried as that election was (and as has been described), has been tested by the experience of many years, without finding that insecurity of the public moneys, and those injurious effects which the message assumed. On the contrary those moneys have been safely kept, and the public prosperity never as great as under the Independent Treasury and the gold and silver currency of the federal government: and long has it been since any politician has allowed himself to be supposed to be against them. Up to the date of that message then—up to the first day of the extra session, 1841—Mr. Tyler may be considered as in favor of a national bank, with its paper currency, and opposed to the gold and silver currency, and the sub-treasury. A distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands was recommended as a means of assisting the States in the payment of their debts, and raising the price of their stocks in foreign markets. Repudiating as unconstitutional, the federal assumption of the State debts, he still recommended a grant of money from the public funds to enable them to meet these debts. In this sense the message said:
"And while I must repudiate, as a measure founded in error, and wanting constitutional sanction, the slightest approach to an assumption by this government of the debts of the States, yet I can see in the distribution adverted to much to recommend it. The compacts between the proprietor States and this government expressly guarantee to the States all the benefits which may arise from the sales. The mode by which this is to be effected addresses itself to the discretion of Congress as the trustee for the States, and its exercise, after the most beneficial manner, is restrained by nothing in the grants or in the constitution so long as Congress shall consult that equality in the distribution which the compacts require. In the present condition of some of the States, the question of distribution may be regarded as substantially a question between direct and indirect taxation. If the distribution be not made in some form or other, the necessity will daily become more urgent with the debtor States for a resort to an oppressive system of direct taxation, or their credit, and necessarily their power and influence, will be greatly diminished. The payment of taxes, often the most inconvenient and oppressive mode, will be exacted in place of contributions for the most part voluntarily made, and therefore comparatively unoppressive. The States are emphatically the constituents of this government, and we should be entirely regardless of the objects held in view by them, in the creation of this government, if we could be indifferent to their good. The happy effects of such a measure upon all the States, would immediately be manifested. With the debtor States it would effect the relief to a great extent of the citizens from a heavy burden of direct taxation, which presses with severity on the laboring classes, and eminently assist in restoring the general prosperity. An immediate advance would take place in the price of the State securities, and the attitudes of the States would become once more, as it should ever be, lofty and erect. Whether such distribution should be made directly to the States in the proceeds of the sales, or in the form of profits by virtue of the operations of any fiscal agency having those proceeds as its basis, should such measure be contemplated by Congress, would well deserve its consideration."
Mr. Tyler, while a member of the democratic party, had been one of the most strict in the construction of the constitution, and one of the most vigilant and inflexible in bringing proposed measures to the test of that instrument—repulsing the most insignificant if they could not stand it. He had been one of the foremost against the constitutionality of a national bank, and voting for a scire facias to vacate the charter of the last one soon after it was established. Now, in recommending the grant of money to the family of General Harrison—in recommending a bank under the name of fiscal agent—in preferring a national paper currency—in condemning the currency of the constitution—in proposing a distribution of the land revenue—in providing for the payment of the State debts: in all these recommendations he seemed to have gone far beyond any other President, however latitudinarian. Add to this, he had instituted an inquisition to sit upon the conduct of officers, to hear and adjudge in secret; to the encouragement of informers and debaters, and to the infringement of the liberty of speech, and the freedom of opinion in the subordinates of the government. In view of all this, the author of this work immediately exclaimed:
"What times we have fallen upon! what wonders we witness! how strange are the scenes of the day! We have a President, who has been the foremost in the defence of the constitution, and in support of the rights of the States—whose walk has been on the outward wall of the constitution—his post in the front line of its defenders—his seat on the topmost branches of the democratic tree. I will not disparage the President by saying that he fought side by side with me in defence of the constitution and the States, and against the latitudinarians. It would be to wrong him to place him by my side. His position, as guard of the constitution, was far ahead, and far above mine. He was always in the advance—on the look-out—listening and watching—snuffing danger in the first tainted breeze, and making anticipated battle against the still invisible invader. Hardly any thing was constitutional enough for him. This was but a few brief years ago. Now we see the measures brought forward in the very bud and first blossom of this administration, which leave all former unconstitutional measures far in the rear—which add subterfuge and evasion to open violence, and aim more deadly wounds at the constitution than the fifty previous years of its existence had brought upon it. I know not the sentiment of the President upon these measures, except as disclosed by himself, and say nothing to reach him; but I know the measures themselves—their desperate character, and fatal issues: and I am free to say, if such things can come to pass—if they can survive the double ordeal of the House and the Senate—then there is an end of all that our fathers contended for in the formation of the federal government. To be sure, the machinery of government would still stand. We should still have President, Congress, and a Judiciary—an army, a navy—a taxing power, the tax-payers, the tax-gatherers, and the tax-consumers. But, if such measures as these are to pass—a bill to lavish the public lands on the (indebted) States in order to pay their debts, supply their taxes, and raise the market price of their stock—a contrivance to defraud the constitution, and to smuggle and bribe a bank, though a national bank, through Congress, under the alius dictus of fiscal agent—the bill to commence the career of civil pensions and family gratuities—the inquisitorial committee, modelled on the plan of Sir Robert Walpole's committees of secrecy, now sitting in the custom-house of New York, the terror of the honest and the hope of the corrupt—the ex post facto edict for the creation of political offences, to be punished on suspicion in exparte trials—the schemes for the infringement of the liberty of speech, and for the suppression of freedom of opinion, and for the encouragement and reward of debaters and informers: if such schemes and measures as these are to come to pass, then do I say that all the guards and limitations upon our government are broken down! that our limited government is gone! and a new, wild, and boundless authority, substituted in its place. The new triumvirate—Bank, Congress, and President—will then be supreme. Fraud and corruption, more odious than arms and force, will rule the land. The constitution will be covered with a black veil: and that derided and violated instrument will never be referred to, except for the mock sanction of a fraudulent interpretation, or the insulting ceremony of a derisory adjuration."
Mr. Tyler had delivered a message: Mr. Clay virtually delivered another. In the first week of the session, he submitted a programme of measures, in the form of a resolve, to be adopted by the Senate, enumerating and declaring the particular subjects, to which he thought the attention of Congress should be limited at this extra session. The following was his programme:
"Resolved, as the opinion of the Senate, That at the present session of Congress, no business ought to be transacted, but such as being of an important or urgent nature, may be supposed to have influenced the extraordinary convention of Congress, or such as that the postponement of it might be materially detrimental to the public interest.
"Resolved, therefore, as the opinion of the Senate, That the following subjects ought first, if not exclusively, to engage the deliberation of Congress, at the present session—
"1st. The repeal of the sub-treasury.
"2d. The incorporation of a bank adapted to the wants of the people and of the government.
"3d. The provision of an adequate revenue for the government by the imposition of duties, and including an authority to contract a temporary loan to cover the public debt created by the last administration.
"4th. The prospective distribution of the proceeds of the public lands.
"5th. The passage of necessary appropriation bills; and
"6th. Some modification of the banking system of the District of Columbia, for the benefit of the people of the District.
"Resolved, That it is expedient to distribute the business proper to be done this session, between the Senate and House of Representatives, so as to avoid both Houses acting on the same subject, and at the same time."
It was, probably, to this assumption over the business of Congress—this recommendation of measures which Mr. Clay thought ought to be adopted—that Mr. Cushing alluded in the House, when, in urging the instant repeal of the sub-treasury act, he made occasion to say that he recognized no administration but that of John Tyler. As for the "public debt," here mentioned as being "created by the last administration," it consisted of the treasury notes and loans resorted to to supply the place of the revenue lost under the descending scale of the compromise, and the amount taken from the Treasury to bestow upon the States, under the fraudulent name of a deposit.