Nays—Messrs. Julius C. Alford, Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G. Atherton, Linn Banks, Henry W. Beeson, Benjamin A. Bidlack, Samuel S. Bowne, Linn Boyd, David P. Brewster, Aaron V. Brown, Milton Brown, Joseph Egbert, Charles G. Ferris, John G. Floyd, Joseph Fornance, Thomas F. Foster, Roger L. Gamble, Thomas W. Gilmer, William O. Goode, Samuel Gordon, James Graham, Amos Gustine, Richard W. Habersham, William A. Harris, John Hastings, Samuel L. Hays, Isaac E. Holmes, George W. Hopkins, Jacob Houck, jr., George S. Houston, Edmund W. Hubard, Robert M. T. Hunter, William Jack, Cave Johnson, John W. Jones, George M. Keim, Edmund Burke, Sampson H. Butler, William Butler, William O. Butler, Green W. Caldwell, Patrick C. Caldwell, John Campbell, William B. Campbell, George B. Cary, Reuben Chapman, Nathan Clifford, Andrew Kennedy, Thomas Butler King, Dixon H. Lewis, Nathaniel S. Littlefield, Joshua A. Lowell, Abraham McClellan, Robert McClellan, James J. McKay, John McKeon, Francis Mallory, Albert G. Marchand, Alfred Marshall, John Thompson Mason, James Mathews, William Medill, James A. Meriwether, John Miller, Peter Newhard, Eugenius A. Nisbet, William M. Oliver, William Parmenter, Samuel Patridge, William W. Payne, Francis W. Pickens, Arnold Plumer, James G. Clinton, Walter Coles, John R. J. Daniel, Richard D. Davis, John B. Dawson, Ezra Dean, Davis Dimock, jr., William Doan, Andrew W. Doig, Ira A. Eastman, John C. Edwards, John R. Reding, Abraham Rencher, R. Barnwell Rhett, Lewis Riggs, James Rogers, James I. Roosevelt, John Sanford, Romulus M. Saunders, Tristram Shaw, Augustine H. Shepperd, Benjamin G. Shields, John Snyder, Lewis Steenrod, Thomas D. Sumter, George Sweney, Hopkins L. Turney, John Van Buren, Aaron Ward, Lott Warren, Harvey M. Watterson, John B. Weller, John Westbrook, James W. Williams, Henry A. Wise, Fernando Wood.
The progress of the abuse inherent in a measure so vicious, was fully illustrated in the course of these distribution-bills. First, they were merely to relieve the distresses of the people: now they were to make payment of State debts, and to enhance the price of State stocks in the hands of London capitalists. In the beginning they were to divide a surplus on hand, for which the government had no use, and which ought to be returned to the people who had paid it, and who now needed it: afterwards it was to divide the land-money years ahead without knowing whether there would be any surplus or not: now they are for dividing money when there is none to divide—when there is a treasury deficit—and loans and taxes required to supply it. Originally, they were for short and limited terms—first, for one year—afterwards for five years: now for perpetuity. This bill provides for eternity. It is a curiosity in human legislation, and contained a clause which would be ridiculous if it had not been impious—an attempt to manacle future Congresses, and to bind posterity through unborn generations. The clause ran in these words: That if, at any time during the existence of this act, duties on imported goods should be raised above the rate of the twenty per centum on the value as provided in the compromise act of 1833, then the distribution of the land revenue should be suspended, and continue so until reduced to that rate; and then be resumed. Fallacious attempt to bind posterity! It did not even bind those who made it: for the same Congress disregarded it. But it shows to what length the distribution spirit had gone; and that even protective tariff—that former sovereign remedy for all the wants of the people—was sacrificed to it. Mr. Clay undertaking to bind all the Congresses for ever to uniform twenty per centum ad valorem duties. And while the distribution-bill thus undertook to protect and save the compromise of 1833, the new tariff-bill of this session, undertook to return the favor by assuming to protect and save the distribution-bill. Its second section contained this proviso: That if any duty exceeding twenty per centum on the value shall be levied before the 30th day of June, 1842, it should not stop the distribution of the land revenue, as provided for in the distribution act of the present session. Thus, the two acts were made mutual assurers, each stipulating for the life of the other, and connecting things which had no mutual relation except in the coalitions of politicians; but, like other assurers, not able to save the lives they assured. Both acts were gone in a year! And the marvel is how such flimsy absurdities could be put into a statute? And the answer, from the necessity of conciliating some one's vote, without which the bills could not pass. Thus, some Southern anti-tariff men would not vote for the distribution bill unless the compromise of 1833 was protected; and some distribution men of the West would not vote for the anti-tariff act unless the distribution bill was protected. And hence the ridiculous, presumptuous, and idle expedient of mutually insuring each other.
[CHAPTER LXIX.]
INSTITUTION OF THE HOUR RULE IN DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ITS ATTEMPT, AND REPULSE IN THE SENATE.
This session is remarkable for the institution of the hour rule in the House of Representatives—the largest limitation upon the freedom of debate which any deliberative assembly ever imposed upon itself, and presents an eminent instance of permanent injury done to free institutions in order to get rid of a temporary annoyance. It was done at a time when the party, called whig, was in full predominance in both Houses of Congress, and in the impatience of delay in the enactment of their measures. It was essentially a whig measure—though with exceptions each way—the body of the whigs going for it; the body of the democracy against it—several eminent whigs voting with them: Mr. John Quincy Adams, William C. Dawson, James A. Pearce, Kenneth Rayner, Edward Stanly, Alexander H. H. Stuart, Edward D. White and others. Mr. Lott Warren moved the rule as an amendment to the body of the rules; and, in the same moment, moved the previous question: which was carried. The vote was immediately taken, and the rule established by a good majority—only seventy-five members voting against it. They were:
Messrs. John Quincy Adams, Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G. Atherton, Linn Banks, Daniel D. Barnard, John M. Botts, Samuel S. Bowne, Linn Boyd, David P. Brewster, Aaron V. Brown, Edmund Burke, Barker Burnell, Green W. Caldwell, John Campbell, Robert L. Caruthers, George B. Cary, Reuben Chapman, James G. Clinton, Walter Coles, John R. J. Daniel, Wm. C. Dawson, Ezra Dean, Andrew W. Doig, Ira A. Eastman, Horace Everett, Charles G. Ferris, John G. Floyd, Charles A. Floyd, William O. Goode, Samuel Gordon, Samuel L. Hays, George W. Hopkins, Jacob Houck, jr., Edmund W. Hubard, Charles Hudson, Hiram P. Hunt, William W. Irwin, William Jack, Cave Johnson, John W. Jones, George M. Keim, Andrew Kennedy, Thomas Butler King, Dixon H. Lewis, Nathaniel S. Littlefield, Joshua A. Lowell, Abraham McClellan, Robert McClellan, James J. McKay, Francis Mallory, Alfred Marshall, Samson Mason, John Thompson Mason, John Miller, Peter Newhard, William Parmenter, William W. Payne, James A. Pearce, Francis W. Pickens, Kenneth Rayner, John R. Reding, Lewis Riggs, Romulus M. Saunders, William Slade, John Snyder, Augustus R. Sollers, James C. Sprigg, Edward Stanly, Lewis Steenrod, Alexander H. H. Stuart, Hopkins L. Turney, Aaron Ward, John Westbrook, Edward D. White, Joseph L. Williams.
The Roman republic had existed four hundred and fifty years, and was verging towards its fall under the first triumvirate—(Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus)—before pleadings were limited to two hours before the Judices Selecti. In the Senate the speeches of senators were never limited at all; but even the partial limitation then placed upon judicial pleadings, but which were, in fact, popular orations, drew from Cicero an affecting deprecation of its effect upon the cause of freedom, as well as upon the field of eloquence. The reader of the admired treatise on oratory, and notices of celebrated orators, will remember his lamentation—as wise in its foresight of evil consequences to free institutions, as mournful and affecting in its lamentation over the decline of oratory. Little could he have supposed that a popular assembly should ever exist, and in a country where his writings were read, which would voluntarily impose upon itself a far more rigorous limitation than the one over which he grieved. Certain it is, that with our incessant use of the previous question, which cuts off all debate, and the hour rule which limits a speech to sixty minutes (constantly reduced by interruptions); and the habit of fixing an hour at which the question shall be taken, usually brief, and the intermediate little time not secure for that question: with all these limitations upon the freedom of debate in the House, certain it is that such an anomaly was never seen in a deliberative assembly, and the business of a people never transacted in the midst of such ignorance of what they are about by those who are doing it.
No doubt the license of debate has been greatly abused in our halls of Congress—as in those of the British parliament: but this suppression of debate is not the correction of the abuse, but the destruction of the liberty of speech: and that, not as a personal privilege, but as a representative right, essential to the welfare of the people. For fifty years of our government there was no such suppression: in no other country is there the parallel to it. Yet in all popular assemblies there is an abuse in the liberty of speech, inherent in the right of speech, which gives to faction and folly the same latitude as to wisdom and patriotism. The English have found the best corrective: it is in the House itself—its irregular power: its refusal to hear a member further when they are tired of him. A significant scraping and coughing warns the annoying speaker when he should cease: if the warning is not taken, a tempest drowns his voice: when he appeals to the chair, the chair recommends him to yield to the temper of the House. A few examples reduce the practice to a rule—insures its observance; and works the correction of the abuse without the destruction of debate. No man speaking to the subject, and giving information to the House, was ever scraped and coughed down, in the British House of Commons. No matter how plain his language, how awkward his manner, how confused his delivery, so long as he gives information he is heard attentively; while the practice falls with just, and relentless effect upon the loquacious members, who mistake volubility for eloquence, who delight themselves while annoying the House—who are insensible to the proprieties of time and place, take the subject for a point to stand on: and then speak off from it in all directions, and equally without continuity of ideas or disconnection of words. The practice of the British House of Commons puts an end to all such annoyance, while saving every thing profitable that any member can utter.
The first instance of enforcing this new rule stands thus recorded in the Register of Debates: