But in view of these strong personal consequences to his (Mr. Tyler's) own character in the event of signing the bill, Mr. Clay pointed out a course which the President might have taken which would have saved his consistency—conformed to the constitution—fulfilled his obligations to the party that elected him—and permitted the establishment of that sound currency, and that relief from the public distress, which his inaugural address, and his message to Congress, and his veto message, all so earnestly declared to be necessary. It was to have let the bill lie in his hands without approval or disapproval: in which case it would have become a law without any act of his. The constitution had made provision for the case in that clause in which it declares that—"If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law." In this case there was no danger of Congress adjourning before the lapse of the ten days; and Mr. Clay adverted to this course as the one, under his embarrassing circumstances the President ought to have adopted, and saved both his consistency and faith to his party. He urged it as a proper course—saying:

"And why should not President Tyler have suffered the bill to become a law without his signature? Without meaning the slightest possible disrespect to him (nothing is further from my heart than the exhibition of any such feeling towards that distinguished citizen, long my personal friend), it cannot be forgotten that he came into his present office under peculiar circumstances. The people did not foresee the contingency which has happened. They voted for him as Vice-President. They did not, therefore, scrutinize his opinions with the care which they probably ought to have done, and would have done, if they could have looked into futurity. If the present state of the fact could have been anticipated—if at Harrisburg, or at the polls, it had been foreseen that General Harrison would die in one short month after the commencement of his administration; that Vice-President Tyler would be elevated to the presidential chair; that a bill, passed by decisive majorities of the first whig Congress, chartering a national bank, would be presented for his sanction; and that he would veto the bill, do I hazard any thing when I express the conviction that he would not have received a solitary vote in the nominating convention, nor one solitary electoral vote in any State in the Union?"

Not having taken this course with the bill, Mr. Clay pointed out a third one, suggested by the conduct of the President himself under analogous circumstances, and which, while preserving his self-respect, would accomplish all the objects in view by the party which elected him, by simply removing the obstacle which stood between them and the object of their hopes; it was to resign the presidency. For this contingency—that of neither President nor Vice-President—the constitution had also made provision in declaring—"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and the Congress may by law provide for the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Congress had acted under this injunction and had devolved the duties of President, first on the president of the Senate pro tempore; and if no such temporary president, then on the speaker of the House of Representatives; and requiring a new election to be held on the first Wednesday of the ensuing December if there was time before it for a notification of two months; and if not, then the new election to take place (if the vacant term had not expired on the third day of March after they happened) on the like Wednesday of the next ensuing month of December. Here was provision made for the case, and the new election might have been held in less than four months—the temporary president of the Senate, Mr. Southard, acting as President in the mean time. The legal path was then clear for Mr. Tyler's resignation, and Mr. Clay thus enforced the propriety of that step upon him:

"But, sir, there was still a third alternative, to which I allude not because I mean to intimate that it should be embraced, but because I am reminded of it by a memorable event in the life of President Tyler. It will be recollected that, after the Senate had passed the resolution declaring the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States to have been derogatory from the constitution and laws of the United States, for which resolution President (then senator) Tyler had voted, the General Assembly of Virginia instructed the senators from that State to vote for the expunging of that resolution. Senator Tyler declined voting in conformity with that instruction, and resigned his seat in the Senate of the United States. This he did because he could not conform, and did not think it right to go counter to the wishes of those who had placed him in the Senate. If, when the people of Virginia, or the General Assembly of Virginia, were his only constituency, he would not set up his own particular opinion in opposition to theirs, what ought to be the rule of his conduct when the people of twenty-six States—a whole nation—compose his constituency? Is the will of the constituency of one State to be respected, and that of twenty-six to be wholly disregarded? Is obedience due only to the single State of Virginia? The President admits that the Bank question deeply agitated, and continues to agitate, the nation. It is incontestable that it was the great, absorbing, and controlling question, in all our recent divisions and exertions. I am firmly convinced, and it is my deliberate judgment, that an immense majority, not less than two-thirds of the nation, desire such an institution. All doubts in this respect ought to be dispelled by the recent decisions of the two Houses of Congress. I speak of them as evidence of popular opinion. In the House of Representatives, the majority was 131 to 100. If the House had been full, and but for the modification of the 16th fundamental condition, there would have been a probable majority of 47. Is it to be believed that this large majority of the immediate representatives of the people, fresh from amongst them, and to whom the President seemed inclined, in his opening message, to refer this very question, have mistaken the wishes of their constituents?"

The acting President did not feel it to be his duty to resign, although it may be the judgment of history (after seeing the expositions of his secretaries at the resignation of their places consequent upon a second veto to a second bank act), that he ought to have done so. In his veto message he seemed to leave the way open for his approval of a charter free from the exceptions he had taken; and rumor was positive in asserting that he was then engaged in arranging with some friends the details of a bill which he could approve. In allusion to this rumor, Mr. Clay remarked:

"On a former occasion I stated that, in the event of an unfortunate difference of opinion between the legislative and executive departments, the point of difference might be developed, and it would be then seen whether they could be brought to coincide in any measure corresponding with the public hopes and expectations. I regret that the President has not, in this message, favored us with a more clear and explicit exhibition of his views. It is sufficiently manifest that he is decidedly opposed to the establishment of a new Bank of the United States formed after two old models. I think it is fairly to be inferred that the plan of the Secretary of the Treasury could not have received his sanction. He is opposed to the passage of the bill which he has returned; but whether he would give his approbation to any bank, and, if any, what sort of a bank, is not absolutely clear. I think it may be collected from the message, with the aid of information derived through other sources, that the President would concur in the establishment of a bank whose operations should be limited to dealing in bills of exchange to deposits, and to the supply of a circulation, excluding the power of discounting promissory notes. And I understand that some of our friends are now considering the practicability of arranging and passing a bill in conformity with the views of President Tyler. Whilst I regret that I can take no active part in such an experiment, and must reserve to myself the right of determining whether I can or cannot vote for such a bill after I see it in its matured form, I assure my friends that they shall find no obstacle or impediment in me. On the contrary, I say to them, go on: God speed you in any measure which will serve the country, and preserve or restore harmony and concert between the departments of government. An executive veto of a Bank of the United States, after the sad experience of late years, is an event which was not anticipated by the political friends of the President; certainly not by me. But it has come upon us with tremendous weight, and amidst the greatest excitement within and without the metropolis. The question now is, what shall be done? What, under this most embarrassing and unexpected state of things, will our constituents expect of us? What is required by the duty and the dignity of Congress? I repeat that if, after a careful examination of the executive message, a bank can be devised which will afford any remedy to existing evils, and secure the President's approbation, let the project of such a bank be presented. It shall encounter no opposition, if it should receive no support, from me."

The speech of Mr. Clay brought out Mr. Rives in defence of the President, who commenced with saying:

"He came to the Senate that morning to give a silent vote on the bill, and he should have contented himself with doing so but for the observations which had fallen from the senator from Kentucky in respect to the conduct of the President of the United States. Mr. R. had hoped the senator would have confined himself strictly to the merits of the question before the Senate. He told us, said Mr. R., that the question was this: the President having returned the bill for a fiscal bank with his exceptions thereto, the bill was such an one as ought to pass by the constitutional majority of two-thirds; and thus become a law of the land. Now what was the real issue before the Senate? Was it not the naked question between the bill and the objections to it, as compared with each other? I really had hoped that the honorable senator, after announcing to us the issue in this very proper manner, would have confined his observations to it alone; and if he had done so I should not have troubled the Senate with a single word. But what has been the course of the honorable senator? I do not reproach him with it. He, no doubt, felt it necessary, in order to vindicate his own position before the country, to inculpate the course taken by the President: and accordingly about two-thirds of his speech, howsoever qualified by expressions of personal kindness and respect, were taken up in a solemn arraignment of the President of the United States. Most of the allegations put forth by the senator seem to arrange themselves under the general charge of perfidy—of faithlessness to his party, and to the people."

Mr. Rives went on to defend the President at all points, declaring the question of a bank was not an issue in the election—repelling the imputation of perfidy—scouting the suggestions of resignation and of pocketing the bill to let it become law—arguing that General Harrison himself would have disapproved the same bill if he had lived and it had been presented to him. In support of this opinion he referred to the General's early opposition to the national bank of 1816, and to his written answer given during the canvass—"that he would not give his sanction to a Bank of the United States, unless by the failure of all other expedients, it should be demonstrated to be necessary to carry on the operations of government; and unless there should be a general and unequivocal manifestation of the will of the Union in favor of such an institution; and then only as a fiscal, and not as a commercial bank." But this authentic declaration seemed to prove the contrary of that for which it was quoted. It contained two conditions, on the happening of which General Harrison would sign a bank charter—first, the failure of all other plans for carrying on the financial operations of the government; and, secondly, the manifestation of public opinion in favor of it. That the first of these conditions had been fulfilled was well shown by Mr. Rives himself in the concluding passages of his speech where he said: "All previous systems have been rejected and condemned—the sub-treasury—the pet banks—an old-fashioned Bank of the United States—a new-fashioned fiscal agent." The second condition was fulfilled in the presidential election in the success of the whig party, whose first object was a bank; and in the election of members of the House and the Senate, where the majorities were in favor of a bank. The conditions were fulfilled then on which General Harrison was to approve a bank charter; and the writer of this View has no doubt that he would have given his signature to a usual bank charter if he had lived; and from an obligatory sense of duty, and with no more dishonor than Mr. Madison had incurred in signing the act for the second bank charter after having been the great opponent of the first one; and for which signing, as for no act of his life, was dishonor imputed to him. The writer of this View believes that General Harrison would have signed a fair bank charter, and under its proper name; and he believes it, not from words spoken between them, but from public manifestations, seen by every body. 1. His own declaration, stating the conditions on which he would do it; and which conditions were fulfilled. 2. The fact that he was the presidential candidate of the party which was emphatically the bank party. 3. The selection of his cabinet, every member of which was in favor of a national bank. 4. The declaration of Mr. Clay at the head of the list of measures proposed by him for the consideration of Congress at its extra session, in which a national bank was included; and which measures he stated were probably those for which the extraordinary session had been convened by President Harrison—a point on which Mr. Clay must be admitted to be well informed, for he was the well reputed adviser of President Harrison on the occasion.

Mr. Clay rejoined to Mr. Rives, and became more close and pointed in his personal remarks upon Mr. Tyler's conduct, commencing with Mr. Rives' lodgment in the "half-way house," i.e. the pet bank system—which was supposed to have been a camping station in the transition from the democratic to the whig camp. He began thus: