Mr. Benton, after sustaining Mr. King in his view of the rules and the practice, told him that he was deceived in his memory in supposing there had never been a one-sided committee in the Senate before: and remarked:
"That senator is very correct at all times; but he will not take it amiss if I shall suggest to him that he is in error now—that there has been one other occasion in which a one-sided committee was employed—and that in a very important case—concerning no less a power than Mr. Biddle's bank, and even Mr. Biddle himself. I speak of the committee which was sent by this Senate to examine the Bank of the United States in the summer of 1834, when charged with insolvency and criminality by General Jackson—charges which time have proved to be true—and when the whole committee were of one party, and that party opposed to General Jackson, and friendly to the bank. And what became then of the rule of British parliamentary law, which has just been read? It had no application then, though it would have cut off every member of the committee; for not one of them was favorable to the inquiry, but the contrary; and the thing ended as all expected. I mention this as an instance of a one-sided committee, which the senator from Alabama has overlooked, and which deserves to be particularly remembered on this occasion, for a reason which I will mention; and which is, that both these committees were appointed in the same case—for the same Bank of the United States—one to whitewash it—which it did; the other to smuggle it into existence under a charter in which it cannot be named. And thus, whenever that bank is concerned, we have to look out for tricks and frauds (to say no more), even on the high floors of national legislation."
Mr. Buchanan animadverted with justice and severity upon the tyranny with which the majority in the House of Representatives had forced the bill through, and marked the fact that not a single democratic member had succeeded in getting an opportunity to speak against it. This was an unprecedented event in the history of parties in America, or in England, and shows the length to which a bank party would go in stifling the right of speech. In all great measures, before or since, and in all countries possessing free institutions, the majority has always allowed to the adversary the privilege of speaking to the measures which were to be put upon them: here for the first time it was denied; and the denial was marked at the time, and carried at once into parliamentary history to receive the reprobation due to it. This was the animadversion of Mr. Buchanan:
"The present bill to establish a fiscal corporation was hurried through the House of Representatives with the celerity, and, so far as the democracy was concerned, with the silence of despotism. No democratic member had an opportunity of raising his voice against it. Under new rules in existence there, the majority had predetermined that it should pass that body within two days from the commencement of the discussion. At first, indeed, the determination was that it should pass the first day; but this was felt to be too great an outrage; and the mover was graciously pleased to extend the time one day longer. Whilst the bill was in Committee of the Whole, it so happened that, in the struggle for the floor, no democratic member succeeded in obtaining it; and at the destined hour of four in the afternoon of the second day, the committee rose, and all further debate was arrested by the previous question. The voice of that great party in this country to which I am proud to belong, was, therefore, never heard through any of its representatives in the House against this odious measure. Not even one brief hour, the limit prescribed by the majority to each speaker, was granted to any democratic member."
The bill went to the committee which had been appointed, without the additional two members which Mr. King had suggested; and which suggestion, not being taken up by the majority, was no further pressed. Mr. Berrien, chairman of that committee, soon reported it back to the Senate—without alteration; as had been foreseen. He spoke two hours in its favor—concluding with the expression that the President would give it his approval—founding that opinion on the President's message at the commencement of the session—on his veto message of the first fiscal bill—on the report of the Secretary of the Treasury—and on this Secretary's subsequent plan for a bank framed with the view to avoid his constitutional objections. Mr. Clay declared his intention to vote for the bill, not that it went as far as he could wish, but that it would go a good distance—would furnish a sound national currency, and regulate exchanges. Mr. Archer, who had voted against the first bank, and who was constitutionally opposed to a national bank, made a speech chiefly to justify his vote in favor of the present bill. It was well known that no alteration would be permitted in the bill—that it had been arranged out of doors, and was to stand as agreed upon: but some senators determined to offer amendments, merely to expose the character of the measure, to make attacks upon the most vulnerable points; and to develope the spirit which conducted it. In this sense Mr. Benton acted in presenting several amendments, deemed proper in themselves, and which a foreknowledge of their fate would not prevent him from offering. The whole idea of the institution was, that it was to be a treasury bank; and hence the pertinacity with which "fiscal," synonymous with treasury, was retained in all the titles, and conformed to in all its provisions: and upon this idea the offered amendments turned.
"Mr. Benton said he had an amendment to offer, which the Senate would presently see was of great importance. It was, to strike out from the ninth line of the first section the word 'States.' It was in that provision assigning seventy thousand shares to individual companies, corporations, or States. This was a new kind of stockholders: a new description of co-partners with stockjobbers in a banking corporation. States had no right to be seduced into such company; he would therefore move to have them struck out: let the word "States" be taken out of that line. To comprehend the full force and bearing of this amendment it would be necessary to keep in view that the sixteenth section of this charter designates the Fiscal Corporation the Treasury of the United States. It expressly says that—
"'All public moneys in deposit in said corporation, or standing on its books to the credit of the Treasurer, shall be taken and deemed to be in the Treasury of the United States, and all payments made by the Treasurer shall be in checks drawn on said corporation.'
"Yes, sir! this Fisc is to be the Treasury of the United States; and the Treasury of the United States is to be converted into a corporation, and not only forced into partnership with individuals, companies, and corporations, but into joint stock co-partnership with the States. The general government is to appoint three directors, and the rest of the partners will have the appointment of the other six. The corporators will be two to one against the general government, and they will of course have the control of the Treasury of this Union in their hands. Now he was for sticking to the constitution, not only in spirit and meaning, but to the letter; and the constitution gives no authority to individuals, companies, corporations, and States, to take the public Treasury of the Union out of the hands of the general government. The general government alone, and acting independently of any such control, is required by the constitution to manage its own fiscal affairs. Here it is proposed to retain only one-third of the control of this Treasury in the hands of the general government—the other two-thirds may fall exclusively into the hands of the States, and thus the Treasury of the whole Union may be at the disposal of such States as can contrive to possess themselves of the two-thirds of the stock they are authorized to take. If it is the object to let those States have the funds of the Treasury to apply to their own use, the scheme is well contrived to attain that end. He, however, was determined not to let that plan be carried without letting the people know who were its supporters; he should, therefore, demand the yeas and nays on his amendment."
"Mr. Berrien explained that the objection raised against the sixteenth section was merely technical. The words did not convert the bank into the United States Treasury; they merely provided for a conformity with laws regulating the lodgment and withdrawal of Treasury funds. The question was then taken on the amendment, which was rejected as follows: Yeas—Messrs. Allen, Benton, Buchanan, Clay of Alabama, King, Linn, McRoberts, Mouton, Nicholson, Pierce, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Sturgeon, Tappan, Walker, Woodbury, Wright, and Young—18. Nays—Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Berrien, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Dixon, Evans, Graham, Henderson, Huntington, Kerr, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, White, and Woodbridge—28."
Mr. Benton then moved to strike out "corporations" from the enumeration of persons and powers which should possess the faculty of becoming stockholders in this institution, with the special view of keeping out the Pennsylvania Bank of the United States, and whose name could not be presented openly for a charter, or re-charter:
"The late United States Bank had means yet to keep a cohort of lawyers, agents, cashiers, and directors, who would not lose sight of the hint, and who were panting to plunge their hands into Uncle Sam's pocket. There was nothing to prevent the corporators of the late United States Bank becoming the sole owners of these two-thirds of the stock in the new Fiscality. The sixteenth fundamental rule of the eleventh section is the point where we are to find the constitutionality of this Fiscality. The little pet banks of every State may be employed as agents. This is a tempting bait for every insolvent institution in want of Treasury funds to strain every nerve and resort to every possible scheme for possessing themselves of the control of the funds of the United States. This object was to defeat such machinations. On this amendment he would demand the yeas and nays. The question was then taken on the amendment, and decided in the negative as follows: Yeas—Messrs. Allen, Benton, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, King, Linn, McRoberts, Mouton, Nicholson, Pierce, Rives, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Sturgeon, Tappan, Walker, Woodbury, Wright, and Young—21. Nays—Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Berrien, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Dixon, Evans, Graham, Henderson, Huntington, Kerr, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Tallmadge, White, and Woodbridge—26."
Mr. Rives objected to the exchange dealings which this fiscal corporation was to engage in, as being discounts when the exchange had some time to run. He referred to his former opinions, and corrected a misapprehension of Mr. Berrien. He was opposed to discounts in every form; while this bill authorizes discounts to any amount on bills of exchange. He offered no amendment, but wished to correct the misunderstanding of Mr. Berrien, who held that this bill, in this particular, was identical with the amendment offered to the first bill by Mr. Rives, and that it was in strict conformity with the President's message.
"Mr. Benton fully concurred with the senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives], that cashing bills of exchange was just as much a discounting operation as discounting promissory notes; it was, in fact, infinitely worse. It was the greatest absurdity in the world, to suppose that the flimsy humbug of calling the discounting of bills of exchange—gamblers' kites, and race-horse bills of exchange—a 'dealing in exchanges' within the meaning of the terms used in the President's veto message. As if the President could be bamboozled by such a shallow artifice. Only look at the operation under this bill. A needy adventurer goes to one of these agencies, and offers his promissory note with securities, in the old-fashioned way, but is told it cannot be discounted—the law is against it. The law, however, may be evaded if he put his note into another shape, making one of his sureties the drawer, and making the other, who lives beyond the State line, his drawee, in favor of himself, as endorser; and in that shape the kite will be cashed, deducting the interest and a per centage besides in the shape of exchange. Here is discount added to usury; and is not that worse than discounting promissory notes?"