The 18th of August—the day on which Mr. Clay was to have spoken in the Senate on the first veto message, and which subject was then postponed on the motion of Mr. Berrien for reasons which he declined to state—Mr. Tyler had a meeting with his cabinet, in which the provisions of the new bill were discussed, and agreed upon—the two members picked out (one in each House—Mr. Sergeant and Mr. Berrien) to conduct it—the cabinet invited to stand by him (the President) and see that the bill passed. Mr. Ewing gives this account, of this days' work, in his letter of resignation addressed to the President.
"I then said to you, 'I have no doubt that the House having ascertained your views will pass a bill in conformity to them, provided they can be satisfied that it would answer the purposes of the Treasury, and relieve the country.' You then said, 'cannot my cabinet see that this is brought about? You must stand by me in this emergency. Cannot you see that a bill passes Congress such as I can approve without inconsistency?' I declared again my belief that such a bill might be passed. And you then said to me, 'what do you understand to be my opinions? State them: so that I may see that there is no misapprehension about them.' I then said that I understood you to be of opinion that Congress might charter a bank in the District of Columbia, giving it its location here. To this you assented. That they might authorize such bank to establish offices of discount and deposit in the several States, with the assent of the States. To this you replied, 'don't name discounts: they have been the source of the most abominable corruptions, and are wholly unnecessary to enable the bank to discharge its duties to the country and the government.' I observed in reply that I was proposing nothing, but simply endeavoring to state what I had understood to be your opinion as to the powers which Congress might constitutionally confer on a bank; that on that point I stood corrected. I then proceeded to say that I understood you to be of opinion that Congress might authorize such bank to establish agencies in the several States, with power to deal in bills of exchange, without the assent of the States, to which you replied, 'yes, if they be foreign bills, or bills drawn in one State and payable in another. That is all the power necessary for transmitting the public funds and regulating exchanges and the currency.' Mr. Webster then expressed, in strong terms, his opinion that such a charter would answer all just purposes of government and be satisfactory to the people; and declared his preference for it over any which had been proposed, especially as it dispensed with the assent of the States to the creation of an institution necessary for carrying on the fiscal operations of government. He examined it at some length, both as to its constitutionality and its influence on the currency and exchanges, in all which views you expressed your concurrence, desired that such a bill should be introduced, and especially that it should go into the hands of some of your friends. To my inquiry whether Mr. Sergeant would be agreeable to you, you replied that he would. You especially requested Mr. Webster and myself to communicate with Messrs. Berrien and Sergeant on the subject, to whom you said you had promised to address a note, but you doubted not that this personal communication would be equally satisfactory. You desired us, also, in communicating with those gentlemen, not to commit you personally, lest, this being recognized as your measure, it might be made a subject of comparison to your prejudice in the course of discussion. You and Mr. Webster then conversed about the particular wording of the 16th fundamental article, containing the grant of power to deal in exchanges, and of the connection in which that grant should be introduced; you also spoke of the name of the institution, desiring that that should be changed. To this I objected, as it would probably be made a subject of ridicule, but you insisted that there was much in a name, and this institution ought not to be called a bank. Mr. Webster undertook to adapt it in this particular to your wishes. Mr. Bell then observed to Mr. Webster and myself that we had no time to lose; that if this were not immediately attended to, another bill, less acceptable, might be got up and reported. We replied that we would lose no time. Mr. Webster accordingly called on Messrs. Berrien and Sergeant immediately, and I waited on them by his appointment at 5 o'clock on the same day, and agreed upon the principles of the bill in accordance with your expressed wishes. And I am apprised of the fact, though it did not occur in my presence, that after the bill was drawn up, and before it was reported, it was seen and examined by yourself; that your attention was specially called to the 16th fundamental article: that on full examination you concurred in its provisions: that at the same time its name was so modified as to meet your approbation: and the bill was reported and passed, in all essential particulars, as it was when it came through your hands."
The sixteenth fundamental article, here declared to have been especially examined and approved by the President, was the part of the bill on which he afterwards rested his objections to its approval, and the one that had been previously adjusted to suit him in the interview with Mr. Stuart: Mr. Sergeant, and Mr. Berrien (mentioned as the President's choice to conduct the bill through the two Houses), were the two members that actually did it; and they did it with a celerity which subjected themselves to great censure; but which corresponded with the President's expressed desire to have it back in three days. Every part of the bill was made to suit him. The title, about which he was so solicitous to preserve his consistency, and about which his cabinet was so fearful of incurring ridicule, was also adjusted to his desire. Mr. Bell says of this ticklish point: "A name, he (the President) said, was important. What should it be? Fiscal Institute would do." It was objected to by a member of the cabinet, and Fiscal Bank preferred. He replied, "there was a great deal in a name, and he did not want the word bank to appear in the bill." Finally, Fiscal Corporation was agreed upon. Other members of the cabinet, in their letters of resignation, who were present on the 18th, when the bill was agreed upon, corroborated the statement of Mr. Ewing, in all particulars. Mr. Badger said, "It was then distinctly stated and understood that such an institution (the plan before the cabinet) met the approbation of the President, and was deemed by him free from constitutional objections; that he desired (if Congress should deem it necessary to act upon the subject during the session) that such an institution should be adopted by that body, and that the members of his cabinet should aid in bringing about that result: and Messrs. Webster and Ewing were specially requested by the President to have a communication on the subject with certain members of Congress. In consequence of what passed at this meeting I saw such friends in Congress as I deemed it proper to approach, and urged upon them the passage of a bill to establish such an institution (the one agreed upon), assuring them that I did not doubt it would receive the approbation of the President. Mr. Bell is full and particular in his statement, and especially on the point of constitutionality in the 16th fundamental article—the reference to Mr. Webster on that point—his affirmative opinion, and the concurrence of the President in it. A part of the statement is here given—enough for the purpose."
"The President then gave the outline of such a bank, or fiscal institution, as he thought he could sanction. It was to be in the District of Columbia, to have the privilege of issuing its own notes, receive moneys on deposit, and to deal in bills of exchange between the States, and between the United States and foreign states. But he wished to have the opinion of his cabinet upon it. His own consistency and reputation must be looked to. He considered his cabinet his friends, who must stand by and defend whatever he did upon the subject. He appealed particularly to Mr. Webster, for his opinion on the point of consistency; and whether there was not a clear distinction between the old bank of the United States—a bank of discount and deposit—and the one he now thought of proposing; and whether the constitutional question was not different. He reminded us that in all his former speeches and reports, he had taken the ground that Congress had no constitutional power to charter a bank which had the power of local discount. Mr. Webster pointed out the distinction between the two plans, which appeared to be satisfactory to him."
On the point of having himself understood, and all chance for misunderstanding obviated, the President was very particular, and requested Mr. Ewing to repeat what he (the President) had said. Mr. Ewing did so; and having at one point deviated from the President's understanding, he was stopped—corrected—set right; and then allowed to go on to the end. Mr. Bell's own words must tell the rest.
"The President said he was then understood. He requested Mr. Webster particularly to communicate with the gentlemen (Messrs. Sergeant and Berrien), who had waited upon him that morning, and to let them know the conclusions to which he had come. He also requested Mr. Ewing to aid in getting the subject properly before Congress. He requested that they would take care not to commit him by what they said to members of Congress, to any intention to dictate to Congress. They might express their confidence and belief that such a bill as had just been agreed upon would receive his sanction; but it should be as matter of inference from his veto message and his general views. He thought he might request that the measure should be put into the hands of some friend of his own upon whom he could rely. Mr. Sergeant was named, and he expressed himself satisfied that he should have charge of it. He also expressed a wish to see the bill before it was presented to the House, if it could be so managed."
Thus instructed and equipped, the members of the cabinet went forth as requested, and had such success in preparing a majority of the members of each House for the reception of this Fiscal Corporation bill, and for its acceptance also that it was taken up to the exclusion of all business, hurried along, and passed incontinently—as shown in the public history of the bill in the preceding chapter; and with such disregard of decent appearances, as drew upon the President's two conductors of the bill (Messrs. Sergeant and Berrien) much censure at the time—to be vetoed, like the first; and upon objections to that 16th fundamental rule, which had been the subject of such careful consideration—of autographic correction—clear understanding—and solemn ratification. And here the opportunity occurs, and the occasion requires, the correction of a misapprehension into which senators fell (and to the prejudice of Mr. Berrien), the day he disappointed the public and the Senate in putting off the debate on the first veto message, and taking up the bankrupt bill. He declined to give a reason for that motion, and suspicion assigned it to an imperious requisition on the part of the senators who had taken the bankrupt act to their bosoms, and who held the fate of Mr. Clay's leading measures in their hands. It was afterwards known that this was a mistake, and that this postponement, as well as the similar one the day before, were both yielded to conciliate Mr. Tyler—to save him from irritation (for he had a nervous terror of Mr. Clay's impending speech) while the new bill was in process of concoction. This process was commenced on the 16th of August, continued on the 17th, and concluded on the 18th. Mr. Clay consented to the postponement of his anti-veto speech both on the 17th and on the 18th, not to disturb this concoction; and spoke on the 19th—being the day after the prepared bill had been completed, and confided to its sponsors in the House and the Senate. All this is derived from Mr. Alexander A. Stuart's subsequent publication, to comprehend which fully, his account of his connection with the subject must be taken up from the moment of his leaving the President's house, that night of the 16th; and premising, that the whig joint committee of which he speaks, was a standing little body of eminent whigs, whose business it was to fix up measures for the action of the whole party in Congress. With this preliminary view, the important statement of Mr. Stuart will be given.
"Upon leaving the President, I took a hack, and drove immediately to Mr. Webster's lodgings, which were at the opposite end of the city; but, unfortunately he was not at home. I then returned to my boarding-house, where I told what had transpired to my messmates, Mr. Summers, and others. After tea I went to the meeting of the joint committee, of which I have already spoken. I there communicated to Mr. Sergeant, before the committee was called to order, what had occurred between the President and myself. When the committee was first organized there was a good deal of excitement, and difference of opinion; and an animated debate ensued on various propositions which were submitted. Finally I was invited by Mr. Sergeant to state to the committee what had passed between the President and myself; which I did, accompanied by such remarks as I thought would have a tendency to allay excitement, and lead to wise and dispassionate conclusions. After much deliberation, the committee concluded to recommend to the whig party, in both Houses of Congress, to accede to the President's views. A difficulty was then suggested, that the veto message had been made the order of the day at noon, and Mr. Clay had the floor; and it was supposed that the debate might possibly assume such a character as to defeat our purposes of conciliation. Mr. Mangum at once pledged himself that Mr. Clay should offer no obstacle to the adjustment of our difficulties; and engaged to obtain his assent to the postponement of the orders of the day, until we should have an opportunity of reporting to a general meeting of the whig party, and ascertaining whether they would be willing to accept a bank on the basis agreed on by Mr. Tyler and myself—with this understanding the committee adjourned. On the next day (17th of August) Mr. Mangum, with Mr. Clay's assent, moved the postponement of the discussion of the veto, and it was agreed to (see Senate Journal, p. 170): and on the 18th of August the subject was again, with Mr. Clay's concurrence, postponed, on the motion of Mr. Berrien. (Senate Journal, p. 173.) During this time the whigs held their general meeting, and agreed to adopt a bill on the President's plan; and Mr. Sergeant and Mr. Berrien were requested to see that it was properly drawn; and, if necessary, to seek an interview with the President to be certain that there was no misunderstanding as to his opinions. From this statement, confirmed by the journals of the Senate, it will be seen with how much truth Mr. Tyler has charged Mr. Clay with an intolerant and dictatorial spirit, and a settled purpose to embarrass his administration. So far from such being the fact, I state upon my own personal knowledge, that Mr. Clay made every sacrifice consistent with honor and patriotism, to avoid a rupture with Mr. Tyler. The result of the labors of Messrs. Sergeant and Berrien, was the second bank bill, which these distinguished jurists supposed to be in conformity with the President's views."
From this array of testimony it would seem certain that the President was sincerely in favor of passing this second bill: but this account has a per contra side to it; and it is necessary to give the signs and facts on the other side which show him against it from the beginning. These items are:—1. The letters in the New York Herald; which, from the accuracy with which they told beforehand what the President was to do, had acquired a credit not to be despised; and which foreshadowed the veto, lauding the President and vituperating his cabinet. 2. A sinister rumor to that effect circulating in the city, and countenanced by the new friends who were intimate with the President. 3. The concourse of these at his house. 4. The bitter opposition to it from the same persons in the House and the Senate; a circumstance on which Mr. Clay often remarked in debate, with a significant implication. 5. What happened to Mr. Bell; and which was this: on the 17th day of August Mr. Tyler requested him to make up a statement from the operations of the war department (its receipts and disbursements) to show the advantage of such a bank as they had agreed upon, and to be used as an argument for it. Mr. Bell complied with alacrity, and carried the statement to the President himself the same evening—expecting to be thanked for his zeal and activity. Quite the contrary. "He received the statements which I gave him (writes Mr. Bell) with manifest indifference, and alarmed me by remarking that he began to doubt whether he would give his assent (as I understood him) to any bill." 6. What happened to Mr. Webster and Mr. Ewing, and which is thus related by the latter in his letter of resignation to the President: "You asked Mr. Webster and myself each to prepare and present you an argument touching the constitutionality of the bill (as agreed upon); and before those arguments could be prepared and read by you, you declared, as I heard and believe, to gentlemen, members of the House, that you would cut off your right hand rather than approve it." 7. What passed between Mr. Wise and Mr. Thompson of Indiana in the debate on the veto of this bill, and which thus appears on the Congress Register: "Mr. Wise rose and said, that he had always felt perfectly assured that the President would not sign a bank: that if he had been waked up at any hour of the night he would have declared his opposition to a bank." To which Mr. Thompson: "Then why not tell us so at once? Why all this subterfuge and prevarication—this disingenuous and almost criminal concealment? What labor, care, and anxiety he would have saved us." 8. Rumors that Mr. Tyler was endeavoring to defeat the bill while on its passage. 9. Proof point blanc to that effect. As this is a most responsible allegation, it requires a clear statement and exact proof; and they shall both be given. On the 25th of August, after the bill had passed the House and was still before the Senate, Mr. Webster wrote a letter to Messrs. Choate and Bates (the two senators from Massachusetts) in which, speaking in the interest of the President, and of his personal knowledge, he informed them that the President had seen the rapid progress of the bill in the House with regret, and wished it might have been postponed;—and advised the whigs to press it no further; and justified this change in the President on Mr. Botts' letter, which had just appeared. This is the allegation, and here is the proof in the letter itself—afterwards furnished for publication by Mr. Webster to the editors of the Madisonian:
"Gentlemen:—As you spoke last evening of the general policy of the whigs, under the present posture of affairs, relative to the bank bill, I am willing to place you in full possession of my opinion on that subject.
"It is not necessary to go further back, into the history of the past, than the introduction of the present measure into the House of Representatives.
"That introduction took place, within two or three days, after the President's disapproval of the former bill; and I have not the slightest doubt that it was honestly and fairly intended as a measure likely to meet the President's approbation. I do not believe that one in fifty of the whigs had any sinister design whatever, if there was an individual who had such design.
"But I know that the President had been greatly troubled, in regard to the former bill, being desirous, on one hand, to meet the wishes of his friends, if he could, and on the other, to do justice to his own opinions.
"Having returned this first bill with objections, a new one was presented in the House, and appeared to be making rapid progress.
"I know the President regretted this, and wished the whole subject might have been postponed. At the same time, I believed he was disposed to consider calmly and conscientiously whatever other measure might be presented to him. But in the mean time Mr. Botts' very extraordinary letter made its appearance. Mr. Botts is a whig of eminence and influence in our ranks. I need not recall to your mind the contents of the letter. It is enough to say, that it purported that the whigs designed to circumvent their own President, to 'head him' as the expression was and to place him in a condition of embarrassment. From that moment, I felt that it was the duty of the whigs to forbear from pressing the bank bill further, at the present time. I thought it was but just in them to give decisive proof that they entertained no such purpose, as seemed to be imputed to them. And since there was reason to believe, that the President would be glad of time, for information and reflection, before being called on to form an opinion on another plan for a bank—a plan somewhat new to the country—I thought his known wishes ought to be complied with. I think so still. I think this is a course, just to the President, and wise on behalf of the whig party. A decisive rebuke ought, in my judgment, to be given to the intimation, from whatever quarter, of a disposition among the whigs to embarrass the President. This is the main ground of my opinion; and such a rebuke, I think, would be found in the general resolution of the party to postpone further proceedings on the subject to the next session, now only a little more than three months off.
"The session has been fruitful of important acts.—The wants of the Treasury have been supplied; provisions have been made for fortifications, and for the navy; the repeal of the sub-treasury has passed; the bankrupt bill, that great measure of justice and benevolence, has been carried through; and the land bill seems about to receive the sanction of Congress.
"In all these measures, forming a mass of legislation, more important, I will venture to say, than all the proceedings of Congress for many years past, the President has cordially concurred.
"I agree, that the currency question is, nevertheless, the great question before the country; but considering what has already been accomplished, in regard to other things; considering the difference of opinion which exists upon this remaining one; and, considering, especially, that it is the duty of the whigs effectually to repel and put down any supposition, that they are endeavoring to put the President in a condition, in which he must act under restraint or embarrassment, I am fully and entirely persuaded, that the bank subject should be postponed to the next session. I am gentlemen, your friend and obedient servant. (Signed, Daniel Webster, and addressed to Messrs. Choate and Bates, senators from Massachusetts, and dated, August 25th, 1841.)"