"Instead of uniting with the whole population, headed by their venerable bishop, in joy and thankfulness for a deliverance almost miraculous, achieved by the wisdom and energy of the General and the gallantry of his army, he was brooding over his own imaginary wrongs, and planning some method to repair his wounded dignity. On this day, twenty-seven years ago, he caused a rule of the district court to be served on General Jackson, to appear before him and show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for:—1st. Refusing to obey a writ issued by Judge Hall. 2d. Detaining an original paper belonging to the court. And 3d, for imprisoning the Judge. The first cause was for the General refusing to obey a writ of habeas corpus in the case of Louallier; the second for detaining the writ. The whole of these three causes assigned are founded on the hypothesis, that instead of General Jackson having command of his camp, he exercised a limited authority under the control of the civil magistracy. I trust I have satisfied you that martial law did in fact exist, and of necessary consequence, that Judge Hall's authority was suspended. If he was injured by it, surely he was not the proper person to try General Jackson for that injury. The principal complaint against General Jackson was for imprisoning the Judge. The imprisonment consisted in sending an officer to escort him out of camp; and for this, instead of taking the regular legal remedy, by an action for assault and false imprisonment, in the State court, which was open to him as well as every other citizen, he called the General to answer before himself. He went before the Judge and proffered to show cause; the Judge would not permit him to do this, nor would he allow him to assign his reasons in writing for his conduct, but, without trial, without a hearing of his defence, he fined him one thousand dollars. You all know the conduct of the General on that occasion; he saved the Judge from the rising indignation of the people and paid his fine to the United States marshal. These proceedings of Judge Hall were not only exceedingly outrageous, but they were wholly illegal and void; for, as says an eminent English jurist, 'even an act of parliament cannot make a man a judge in his own cause.' This was truly and wholly the cause of the Judge himself. If a law of Congress had existed which authorized him to sit in judgment upon any man for an injury inflicted upon himself, such a law would have been a mere dead letter, and the Judge would have been bound to disregard it. It was the violation of this principle of jurisprudence which aroused the indignation of the people and endangered the life of his contemptible judge. I am aware of the law of contempt; it is the power of self-preservation given to the courts; it results from necessity alone, and extends no further than necessity strictly requires; it has no power to avenge the wrongs and injuries done to the judge, unless those wrongs obstruct the regular course of justice. I am aware also of the manner in which the law of contempt has been administered in our courts where no statute law regulated it, and it was left to the discretion of the judges to determine what was or was not a contempt. In one case a man was fined for contempt for reviewing the opinion of a judge in a newspaper. This judge was impeached before this body and acquitted, because not quite two-thirds of the Senate voted him guilty. Some senators, thinking probably that as Congress had neglected to pass a law on the subject of contempt, the judge had nothing to govern his discretion in the matter, and therefore ought not to be convicted. Congress immediately passed such a law, and no contempts have occurred since in the United States courts."
The speech of Judge Tappan covered the facts of the case, upon which, and other speeches delivered, the Senate made up its mind, and the bill was passed, though upon a good division, and a visible development of party lines. The yeas were:
"Messrs. Allen, Bagby, Benton, Buchanan, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Fulton, Graham, Henderson, King, Linn, McDuffie, McRoberts, Mangum, Rives, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Smith of Indiana, Sprague, Sturgeon, Tallmadge, Tappan, Walker, Wilcox, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, Young—28."
The nays were:
"Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Choate, Clayton, Conrad, Crafts, Crittenden, Dayton, Evans, Huntington, Kerr, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, White, Woodbridge—20."
In the House it was well supported by Mr. Charles Jared Ingersoll, and others, and passed at the ensuing session by a large majority—158 to 28. This gratifying result took place before the death of General Jackson, so that he had the consolation of seeing the only two acts which impugned the legality of any part of his conduct—the senatorial condemnation for the removal of the deposits, and the proceedings in New Orleans under martial law—both condemned by the national representation, and the judicial record as well as the Senate journal, left free from imputation upon him.