"He was pleased with it, again, because it settled the question of slavery. These resolutions went to re-establish the Missouri compromise, by fixing a line within which slavery was to be in future confined. That controversy had nearly shaken this Union to its centre in an earlier and better period of our history; but this compromise, should it be now re-established, would prevent the recurrence of similar dangers hereafter. Should this question be now left open for one or two years, the country could be involved in nothing but one perpetual struggle. We should witness a feverish excitement in the public mind; parties would divide on the dangerous and exciting question of abolition; and the irritation might reach such an extreme as to endanger the existence of the Union itself. But close it now, and it would be closed for ever.
"Mr. B. said he anticipated no time when the country would ever desire to stretch its limits beyond the Rio del Norte; and, such being the case, ought any friend of the Union to desire to see this question left open any longer? Was it desirable again to have the Missouri question brought home to the people to goad them to fury? That question between the two great interests in our country had been well discussed and well decided; and from that moment Mr. B. had set down his foot on the solid ground then established, and there he would let the question stand for ever. Who could complain of the terms of that compromise?
"It was then settled that north of 36° 30' slavery should be for ever prohibited. The same line was fixed upon in the resolutions recently received from the House of Representatives, now before us. The bill from the House for the establishment of a territorial government in Oregon excluded slavery altogether from that vast country. How vain were the fears entertained in some quarters of the country that the slaveholding States would ever be able to control the Union! While, on the other hand, the fears entertained in the south and south-west as to the ultimate success of the abolitionists, were not less unfounded and vain. South of the compromise line of 36° 30' the States within the limits of Texas applying to come into the Union were left to decide for themselves whether they would permit slavery within their limits or not. And under this free permission, he believed, with Mr. Clay (in his letter on the subject of annexation), that if Texas should be divided into five States, two only of them would be slaveholding, and three free States. The descendants of torrid Africa delighted in the meridian rays of a burning sun; they basked and rejoiced in a degree of heat which enervated and would destroy the white man. The lowlands of Texas, therefore, where they raised cotton, tobacco, and rice, and indigo, was the natural region for the slave. But north of San Antonio, where the soil and climate were adapted to the culture of wheat, rye, corn, and cattle, the climate was exactly adapted to the white man of the North; there he could labor for himself without risk or injury. It was, therefore, to be expected that three out of the five new Texian States would be free States—certainly they would be so, if they but willed it. Mr. B. was willing to leave that question to themselves, as they applied for admission into the Union. He had no apprehensions of the result. With that feature in the bill, as it came from the House, he was perfectly content; and, whatever bill might ultimately pass, he trusted this would be made a condition in it."
It was in the last days of his senatorial service that Mr. Buchanan crowned his long devotion to the Missouri compromise by celebrating its re-enactment where it had been abrogated, taking a stand upon it as the solid ground on which the Union rested, and invoking a perpetuity of duration for it.
This resolution, thus adopted by the House, would make the admission a legislative act, but in the opinion of many members of the Senate that was only a step in the right direction: another in their opinion required to be taken: and that was to combine the treaty-making power with it—the Congress taking the initiative in the question, and the President and Senate finishing it by treaty, as done in the case of Louisiana and Florida. With this view Mr. Benton had brought in a bill for commissioners to treat for annexation, and so worded as to authorize negotiations with Mexico at the same time, and get her acquiescence to the alienation in the settlement of boundaries with her. His bill was in these terms:
"That a State, to be formed out of the present republic of Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two representatives in Congress until the next apportionment of representation, shall be admitted into the Union by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the existing States, as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission, and the cession of the remaining Texian territory to the United States shall be agreed upon by the government of Texas and the United States.
"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the sum of one hundred thousand dollars be, and the same is hereby appropriated, to defray the expenses of missions and negotiations to agree upon the terms of said admission and cession, either by treaty, to be submitted to the Senate, or by articles to be submitted to the two Houses of Congress, as the President may direct."
In support of this bill, Mr. Benton said:
"It was a copy, substantially, of the bill which he had previously offered, with the omission of all the terms and conditions which that bill contained. He had been induced to omit all these conditions because of the difficulty of agreeing upon them, and because it was now clear that whatever bill was passed upon the subject of Texas, the execution of it must devolve upon the new President, who had been just elected by the people with a view to this object. He had confidence in Mr. Polk, and was willing to trust the question of terms and conditions to his untrammelled discretion, certain that he would do the best that he could for the success of the object, the harmony of the Union, and the peace and honor of the country.
"The occasion is an extraordinary one, and requires an extraordinary mission. The voluntary union of two independent nations is a rare occurrence, and is worthy to be attended by every circumstance which lends it dignity, promotes its success, and makes it satisfactory. When England and Scotland were united, at the commencement of the last century, no less than thirty-one commissioners were employed to agree upon the terms; and the terms they agreed upon received the sanction of the Parliaments of the two kingdoms, and completed a union which had been in vain attempted for one hundred years. Extraordinary missions, nationally constituted, have several times been resorted to in our own country, and always with public approbation, whether successful or not. The first Mr. Adams sent Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney to the French directory in 1798: Mr. Jefferson sent Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray to the French consular government of 1800: Mr. Madison sent Adams, Bayard, Gallatin, Clay, and Russell to Ghent in 1814. All these missions, and others which might be named, were nationally constituted—composed of eminent citizens taken from each political party, and from different sections of the Union; and, of course, all favorable to the object for which they were employed. An occasion has occurred which, in my opinion, requires a mission similarly constituted—as numerous as the missions to Paris or to Ghent—and composed of citizens from both political parties, and from the non-slaveholding as well as the slaveholding States. Such a commission could hardly fail to be successful, not merely in agreeing upon the terms of the union, but in agreeing upon terms which would be satisfactory to the people and the governments of the two countries. And here, to avoid misapprehension and the appearance of disrespect where the contrary is felt, I would say that the gentleman now in Texas as the chargé of the United States, is, in my opinion, eminently fit and proper to be one of the envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary which my bill contemplates.
"In withdrawing from my bill the terms and conditions which had been proposed as a basis of negotiation, I do not withdraw them from the consideration of those who may direct the negotiation. I expect them to be considered, and, as far as judged proper, to be acted on. The compromise principle between slave and non-slaveholding territory is sanctioned by the vote of the House of Representatives, and by the general voice of the country. In withdrawing it from the bill, I do not withdraw it from the consideration of the President: I only leave him free and untrammelled to do the best he can for the harmony of the Union on a delicate and embarrassing point.
"The assent of Mexico to the annexation is judged to be unnecessary, but no one judges her assent to a new boundary line to be unnecessary: no one judges it unnecessary to preserve her commerce and good will; and, therefore, every consideration of self-interest and national policy requires a fair effort to be made to settle this boundary and to preserve this trade and friendship; and I shall consider all this as remaining just as fully in the mind of the President as if submitted to him in a bill.
"The bill which I now offer is the same which I have presented heretofore, divested of its conditions, and committing the subject to the discretion of the President to accomplish the object in the best way that he can, and either negotiate a treaty to be submitted to the Senate, or to agree upon articles of union to be submitted to the two Houses of Congress. I deem this the best way of proceeding under every aspect. It is the safest way; for it will settle all questions beforehand, and leave no nest-eggs to hatch future disputes. It is the most speedy way; for commissioners conferring face to face will come to conclusions much sooner than two deliberative bodies sitting in two different countries, at near two thousand miles apart, and interchanging categorical propositions in the shape of law. It is the most satisfactory way; for whatever such a commission should agree upon, would stand the best chance to be satisfactory to all parts of the Union. It is the most respectful way to Texas, and the mode for which she has shown a decided preference. She has twice sent envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary here to treat with us; and the actual President, Mr. Jones, has authentically declared his willingness to engage in further negotiations. Ministers sent to confer and agree—to consult and to harmonize—is much more respectful than the transmission, by mail or messenger, of an inflexible proposition, in the shape of law, to be accepted or rejected in the precise words in which we send it. In every point of view, the mode which I propose seems to me to be the best; and as its execution will devolve upon a President just elected by the people with a view to this subject, I have no hesitation in trusting it to him, armed with full power, and untrammelled with terms and conditions."
It was soon ascertained in the Senate, that the joint resolution from the House could not pass—that unless combined with negotiation, it would be rejected. Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, then proposed to join the two together—the bill of Mr. Benton and the resolution from the House—with a clause referring it to the discretion of the President to act under them as he deemed best. It being then the end of the session, and the new President arrived so as to be ready to act immediately; and it being fully believed that the execution of the bill was to be left to him, the conjunction was favored by the author of the bill, and his friends; and the proposal of Mr. Walker was agreed to. The bill was added as an amendment, and then the whole was passed—although by a close vote—27 to 25. The yeas were: Messrs. Allen, Ashley, Atchison, Atherton, Bagby, Benton, Breese, Buchanan, Colquitt, Dickinson, Dix, Fairfield, Hannegan, Haywood, Henderson, Huger, Johnson, Lewis, McDuffie, Merrick, Niles, Semple, Sevier, Sturgeon, Tappan, Walker, Woodbury,—27. The nays were: Messrs. Archer, Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Choate, Clayton, Crittenden, Dayton, Evans, Foster, Francis, Huntington, Jarnagin, Mangum, Miller, Morehead, Pearce, Phelps, Porter, Rives, Simmons, Upham, White, Woodbridge—25. The resolve of the House was thus passed in the Senate, and the validity of the Missouri compromise was asserted, and its re-enactment effected in the Senate, as well as in the House. But the amendment required the bill to go back to the House for its concurrence in that particular, which was found to increase the favor of the measure—an addition of thirty-six being added to the affirmative vote. Carried to Mr. Tyler for his approval, or disapproval, it was immediately approved by him, with the hearty concurrence of his Secretary of State (Mr. Calhoun), who even claimed the passage of the measure as a triumph of his own. And so the executive government, in the persons of the President and his cabinet, added their sanction to the validity of the Missouri compromise line, and the full power of Congress which it exercised, to permit or abolish slavery in territories. This was the month of March, 1845—so that a quarter of a century after the establishment of that compromise line, the dogmas of "squatter sovereignty"—"no power in Congress to legislate upon slavery in the territories"—and "the extension of slavery to the territories by the self-expansion of the constitution," had not been invented. The discovery of these dogmas was reserved for a later period, and a more heated state of the public mind.
The bill providing for the admission of Texas had undergone all its formalities, and became a law on Saturday, the first day of March; the second was Sunday, and a dies non. Congress met on Monday for the last day of its existence; and great was the astonishment of members to hear that the actual President had assumed the execution of the act providing for the admission of Texas—had adopted the legislative clause—and sent it off by a special messenger for the adoption of Texas. It was then seen that some senators had been cheated out of their votes, and that the passage of the act through the Senate had been procured by a fraud. At least five of the senators who voted affirmatively would have voted against the resolutions of the House, if Mr. Benton's bill had not been added, and if it had not been believed that the execution of the act would be left to the new President, and that he would adopt Mr. Benton's. The possibility of a contrary course had been considered, and, as it was believed, fully guarded against. Several senators and some citizens conversed with Mr. Polk, then in the city, and received his assurance that he would act on Mr. Benton's proposition, and in carrying it into effect would nominate for the negotiation a national commission, composed of safe and able men of both parties, such as Mr. Benton had suggested. Among those who thus conversed with Mr. Polk were two (senator Tappan, of Ohio, and Francis P. Blair, Esq., of Washington City), who published the result of their conversations, and the importance of which requires to be stated in their own words: which is here done. Mr. Tappan, writing to the editors of the New York Evening Post, says:
"When the joint resolution declaring the terms on which Congress will admit Texas into the Union as a State, was before the Senate, it was soon found that a number of the democratic members who were favorable to the admission of Texas, would vote against that resolution. I was one of them. In this stage of the matter it was proposed, that instead of rejecting the House resolution, we should amend it by adding, as an alternative proposition, the substance of Mr. Benton's bill to obtain Texas by negotiation. Mr. Polk was in the city; it was understood that he was very anxious that Congress should act on the subject before he came into office; it was also understood that the proposition to amend the House resolution originated with Mr. Polk. It had been suggested, that, if we did so amend the resolution, Mr. Calhoun would send off the House resolution to Texas, and so endeavor to forestall the action of Mr. Polk; but Mr. McDuffie, his friend, having met this suggestion by the declaration that he would not have the 'audacity' to do such a thing, it was no more thought of. One difficulty remained, and that was the danger of putting it into the power of Mr. Polk to submit the House resolution to Texas. We understood, indeed, that he intended to submit the Senate proposition to that government; but, without being satisfied that he would do this, I would not vote for the resolution, and it was well ascertained that, without my vote, it could not pass. Mr. Haywood, who had voted with me, and was opposed to the House resolution, undertook to converse with Mr. Polk on the subject, and did so. He afterwards told me that he was authorized by Mr. Polk to say to myself and other senators, that, if we could pass the resolution with the amendment proposed to be made, he would not use the House resolution, but would submit the Senate amendment as the sole proposition to Texas. Upon this assurance I voted for the amendment moved by Mr. Walker, containing the substance of Mr. Benton's bill, and voted for the resolution as it now stands on the statute book."
Mr. Francis P. Blair, in a letter addressed to Mr. Tappan, and conversing with Mr. Polk at a different time, gives his statement to the same effect: