[CHAPTER CLXXV.]
MR. CALHOUN'S NEW DOGMA ON TERRITORIAL SLAVERY: SELF-EXTENSION OF THE SLAVERY PART OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE TERRITORIES.
The resolutions of 1847 went no further than to deny the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in a territory, and that was enough while Congress alone was the power to be guarded against: but it became insufficient, and even a stumbling-block, when New Mexico and California were acquired, and where no Congress prohibition was necessary because their soil was already free. Here the dogma of '47 became an impediment to the territorial extension of slavery; for, in denying power to legislate upon the subject, the denial worked both ways—both against the admission and exclusion. It was on seeing this consequence as resulting from the dogmas of 1847, that Mr. Benton congratulated the country upon the approaching cessation of the slavery agitation—that the Wilmot Proviso being rejected as unnecessary, the question was at an end, as the friends of slavery extension could not ask Congress to pass a law to carry it into a territory. The agitation seemed to be at an end, and peace about to dawn upon the land. Delusive calculation! A new dogma was invented to fit the case—that of the transmigration of the constitution—(the slavery part of it)—into the territories, overriding and overruling all the anti-slavery laws which it found there, and planting the institution there under its own wing, and maintaining it beyond the power of eradication either by Congress or the people of the territory. Before this dogma was proclaimed efforts were made to get the constitution extended to these territories by act of Congress: failing in those attempts, the difficulty was leaped over by boldly assuming that the constitution went of itself—that is to say, the slavery part of it. In this exigency Mr. Calhoun came out with his new and supreme dogma of the transmigratory function of the constitution in the ipso facto, and the instantaneous transportation of itself in its slavery attributes, into all acquired territories. This dogma was thus broached by its author in his speech upon the Oregon territorial bill:
"But I deny that the laws of Mexico can have the effect attributed to them (that of keeping slavery out of New Mexico and California). As soon as the treaty between the two countries is ratified, the sovereignty and authority of Mexico in the territory acquired by it become extinct, and that of the United States is substituted in its place, carrying with it the constitution, with its overriding control over all the laws and institutions of Mexico inconsistent with it."
History cannot class higher than as a vagary of a diseased imagination this imputed self-acting and self-extension of the constitution. The constitution does nothing of itself—not even in the States, for which it was made. Every part of it requires a law to put it into operation. No part of it can reach a territory unless imparted to it by act of Congress. Slavery, as a local institution, can only be established by a local legislative authority. It cannot transmigrate—cannot carry along with it the law which protects it: and if it could, what law would it carry? The code of the State from which the emigrant went? Then there would be as many slavery codes in the territory as States furnishing emigrants, and these codes all varying more or less; and some of them in the essential nature of the property—the slave, in many States, being only a chattel interest, governed by the laws applicable to chattels—in others, as in Louisiana and Kentucky, a real-estate interest, governed by the laws which apply to landed property. In a word, this dogma of the self-extension of the slavery part of the constitution to a territory is impracticable and preposterous, and as novel as unfounded.
It was in this same debate, on the Oregon territorial bill, that Mr. Calhoun showed that he had forgotten the part which he had acted on the Missouri compromise question, and also forgotten its history, and first declared that he held that compromise to be unconstitutional and void. Thus:
"After an arduous struggle of more than a year, on the question whether Missouri should come into the Union, with or without restrictions prohibiting slavery, a compromise line was adopted between the North and the South; but it was done under circumstances which made it nowise obligatory on the latter. It is true, it was moved by one of her distinguished citizens (Mr. Clay), but it is equally so, that it was carried by the almost united vote of the North against the almost united vote of the South; and was thus imposed on the latter by superior numbers, in opposition to her strenuous efforts. The South has never given her sanction to it, or assented to the power it asserted. She was voted down, and has simply acquiesced in an arrangement which she has not had the power to reverse, and which she could not attempt to do without disturbing the peace and harmony of the Union—to which she has ever been adverse."
All this is error, and was immediately shown to be so by Senator Dix of New York, who produced the evidence that Mr. Monroe's cabinet, of which Mr. Calhoun was a member, had passed upon the question of the constitutionality of that compromise, and given their opinions in its favor. It has also been seen since that, as late as 1838, Mr. Calhoun was in favor of that compromise, and censured Mr. Randolph for being against it; and, still later, in 1845, he acted his part in re-enacting that compromise, and re-establishing its line, in that part of it which had been abrogated by the laws and constitution of Texas, and which, if not re-established, would permit slavery in Texas, to spread south of 36° 30'. Forgetting his own part in that compromise, Mr. Calhoun equally forgot that of others. He says Mr. Clay moved the compromise—a clear mistake, as it came down to the House from the Senate, as an amendment to the House restrictive bill. He says it was carried by the almost united voice of the North against the almost united voice of the South—a clear mistake again, for it was carried in the Senate by the united voice of the South, with the aid of a few votes from the North; and in the House, by a majority of votes from each section, making 134 to 42. He says it was imposed on the South: on the contrary, it was not only voted for, but invoked and implored by its leading men—by all in the Senate, headed by Mr. Pinkney of Maryland; by all in the House, headed by Mr. Lowndes, with the exception of Mr. Randolph, whom Mr. Calhoun has since authentically declared he blamed at the time for his opposition. So far from being imposed on the South, she re-established it when she found it down at the recovery of Texas. Every member of Congress that voted for the legislative admission of Texas in 1845, voted for the re-establishment of the prostrate Missouri compromise line: and that vote comprehended the South, with Mr. Calhoun at its head—not as a member of Congress, but as Secretary of State, promoting that legislative admission of Texas, and seizing upon it in preference to negotiation, to effect the admission. This was on the third day of March, 1845; so that up to that day, which was only two years before the invention of the "no power" dogma, Mr. Calhoun is estopped by his own act from denying the constitutionality of the Missouri compromise: and in that estoppel is equally included every member of Congress that then voted for that admission. He says the South never gave her sanction to it: on the contrary, she did it twice—at its enactment in 1820, and at its re-establishment in 1845. He says she was voted down: on the contrary, she was voted up, and that twice, and by good help added to her own exertions—and for which she was duly grateful both times. All this the journals and legislative history of the times will prove, and which any person may see that will take the trouble to look. But admit all these errors of fact, Mr. Calhoun delivered a sound and patriotic sentiment which his disciples have disregarded and violated: He would not attempt to reverse the Missouri compromise, because it would disturb the peace and harmony of the Union. What he would not attempt, they have done: and the peace and harmony of the Union are not only disturbed, but destroyed.
In the same speech the dogma of squatter sovereignty was properly repudiated and scouted, though condemnation was erroneously derived from a denial, instead of an assertion, of the power of Congress over it. "Of all the positions ever taken on the subject, he declared this of squatter sovereignty to be the most absurd:" and, going on to trace the absurdity to its consequences, he said:
"The first half-dozen of squatters would become the sovereigns, with full dominion and sovereignty over the territories; and the conquered people of New Mexico and California would become the sovereigns of the country as soon as they become territories of the United States, vested with the full right of excluding even their conquerors."