55. In fact the theory of a state of nature governed by a law of nature, as preceding civil society, must be untrue either to the conception of law or to that of nature
56. Locke differs from Hobbes (1) in distinguishing the 'state of nature' from the 'state of war'
57. He implies (more consistently than Hobbes) that the 'state of nature' is one in which the 'law of nature' is observed
58. (2) He limits the supreme power in the state by the legislature, which holds its functions in trust from the community
59. And this distinction between the supreme community and the supreme executive enables him to distinguish between dissolution of the political society and dissolution of the government, which Hobbes had confused
60. He invests the community with the right of resuming the powers which they have delegated, and thus justifies revolution when it is the act of the whole community
61. The difficulty is to determine when it is the act of the whole community, and on this Locke's theory gives no help
62. The difficulty indeed is not so great as that of conceiving the act of original devolution of power, and is inherent in the theory of contract
63. In the particular case of the reform of the English representative system, Locke does not contemplate the carrying out of his own theory.
E. Rousseau.