B. SPINOZA.
32. Spinoza is aware of this. In the Tractatus Politici, IT. 4, he says, 'Per jus itaque naturae intelligo … ipsam naturae potentiam.' [1] … 'Quicquid unusquisque homo ex legibus suae naturae agit, id summo naturae jure agit, tantumque in naturam habet juris, quantum potentia valet.' If only, seeing that the 'jus naturae' was mere 'potentia,' he had denied that it was 'jus' at all, he would have been on the right track. Instead of that, however, he treats it as properly 'jus,' and consistently with this regards all 'jus' as mere 'potentia': nor is any 'jus humanum' according to him guided by or the product of reason. It arises, in modern phrase, out of the 'struggle for existence.' As Spinoza says, 'homines magis caeca cupiditate quam ratione ducuntur; ac proinde hominum naturalis potentia sive jus non ratione, sed quocumque appetitu quo ad agendum determinantur, quoque se conservare conantur, definiri debet' (II. 5). The 'jus civile' is simply the result of the conflict of natural powers, which = natural rights, which arises from the effort of every man to gratify his passions and 'suum esse conservare.' Man is simply a 'pars naturae,' the most crafty of the animals. 'Quatenus homines ira, invidia aut aliquo odii affectu conflictantur, eatenus diverse trahuntur et invicem contrarii sunt, et propterea eo plus timendi, quo plus possunt, magisque callidi et astuti sunt, quam reliqua animalia; et quia homines ut plurimum his affectibus natura sunt obnoxii, sunt ergo homines ex natura hostes' (II. 14). Universal hostility means universal fear, and fear means weakness. It follows that in the state of nature there is nothing fit to be called 'potentia' or consequently 'jus'; 'atque adeo concludimus jus naturae vix posse concipi nisi ubi homines jura habent communia, qui simul terras, quas habitare et colere possunt, sibi vindicare, seseque munire, vimque omnem repellere et ex communi omnium sententia vivere possunt. Nam (per art. 13 hujus cap.) quo plures in unum sic conveniunt, eo omnes simul plus juris habent' (15). The collective body, i.e., has more 'jus in naturam,' i.e. 'potentiam,' than any individual could have singly (13). In the advantage of this increased 'jus in naturam' the individual shares. On the other hand (16), 'Ubi homines jura communia habent omnesque una veluti mente ducuntur, certum est (per art. 13 hujus cap.) eorum unumquemque tanto minus habere juris, quanto reliqui simul ipso potentiores sunt, hoc est, ilium revera jus nullum in naturam habere praeter id, quod ipsi commune concedit jus. Ceterum quicquid ex communi consensu ipsi imperatur, teneri exsequi vel (per art. 4 hujus cap.) jure ad id cogi.' This 'jus' by which the individual's actions are now to be regulated, is still simply 'potentia.' 'Hoc jus, quod multitudinis potentia definitur, imperium appellari solet' (17). It is not to be considered anything different from the 'jus naturae.' It is simply the 'naturalis potentia' of a certain number of men combined; 'multitudinis quae una veluti mente ducitur' (III. 2). Thus in the 'status civilis' the 'jus naturae' of the individual in one sense disappears, in another does not. It disappears in the sense that the individual member of the state has no mind to act or power to act against the mind of the state. Anyone who had such mind or power would not be a member of the state. He would be an enemy against whose 'potentia' the state must measure its own. On the other hand, 'in statu civili,' just as much as 'in statu naturali,' 'homo ex legibus suae naturae agit suaeque utilitati consulit' (3). He exercises his 'naturalis potentia' for some natural end of satisfying his wants and preserving his life as he did or would do outside the 'status civilis.' Only in the 'status civilis' these motives on the part of individuals so far coincide as to form the 'una veluti mens' which directs the 'multitudinis potentia.' According to this view, any member of a state will have just so much 'jus,' i.e. 'potentia,' against other members as the state allows him. If he can exercise any 'jus' or 'potentia' against another 'ex suo ingenio,' he is so far not a member of the state and the state is so far imperfect. If he could exercise any 'jus' or 'potentia' against the state itself, there would be no state, or, which is the same, the state would not be 'sui juris.'
[1] [Many of the Latin passages quoted in this chapter are translated in Bosanquet's Supplement. Tr]
33. Is there then no limit to the 'jus' which the state may exercise? With Spinoza this is equivalent to the question, is there no limit to the 'potentia' which it can exercise? As to this, he suggests three considerations.
(1). Its power is weakened by any action against right reason, because this must weaken the 'animorum unio' on which it is founded. 'Civitatis jus potentia multitudinis, quae una veluti mente ducitur, determinatur. At haec animorum unio concipi nulla ratione posset, nisi civitas id ipsum maxime intendat, quod sana ratio omnibus hominibus utile esse docet' (III. 7).
(2). The 'right' or 'power' of the state depends on its power of affecting the hopes and fears of individual citizens…. 'Subditi eatenus non sui, sed civitatis juris sint, quatenus ejus potentiam seu minas metuunt, vel quatenus statum civilem amant (per art. 10 praeced. cap.). Ex quo sequitur, quod ea omnia, ad quse agenda nemo praemiis aut minis induci potest, ad jura civitatis non pertineant' (III. 8). Whatever cannot be achieved by rewards and threats, is beyond the power and therefore beyond the 'right' of the state. Examples are given in the same section.
(3). 'Ad civitatis jus ea minus pertinere, quae plurimi indignantur' (III. 9). Severities of a certain kind lead to conspiracies against the state, and thus weaken it. 'Sicut unusquisque civis sive homo in statu naturali, sic civitas eo minus sui juris est, quo majorem timendi causam habet.'
Just so far then as there are certain things which the state cannot do, or by doing which it lessens its power, so far there are things which it has no 'right' to do.
34. Spinoza proceeds to consider the relation of states or sovereign powers to each other. Here the principle is simple. They are to each other as individuals in the state of nature, except that they will not be subject to the same weaknesses. 'Nam quandoquidem (per art. 2 hujus cap.) jus summae potestatis nihil est praeter ipsum naturae jus, sequitur duo imperia ad invicem sese habere, ut duo homines in statu naturali, excepto hoc, quod civitas sibi cavere potest, ne ab alia opprimatur, quod homo in statu naturali non potest, nimirum qui quotidie somno, saepe morbo aut animi aegritudine, et tandem senectute gravatur, et prater haec aliis incommodis est obnoxius, a quibus civitas securam se reddere potest' (III. 11). In other words, '… duae civitates natura hostes sunt. Homines enim in statu naturali hostes sunt. Qui igitur jus naturae extra civitatem retinent, hostes manent' (III. 13). The 'jura belli' are simply the powers of any one state to attack or defend itself against another. The 'jura pacis,' on the other hand, do not appertain to any single state, but arise out of the agreement of two at least. They last as long as the agreement, the 'foedus,' lasts; and this lasts as long as the fear or hope, which led to its being made, continues to be shared by the states which made it. As soon as this ceases to be the case, the agreement is necessarily at an end, 'nec dici potest, quod dolo vel perfidia agat, propterea quod fidem solvit, simulatque metus vel spei causa sublata est, quia haec conditio unicuique contrahentium aequalis fuit, ut scilicet quae prima extra metum esse potest, sui juris esset, eoque ex sui animi sententia uteretur, et praeterea quia nemo in futurum contrahit nisi positis prsecedentibus circumstantiis' (III. 14).
35. It would seem to follow from the above that a state can do no wrong, in the sense that there are no rights that it can violate. The same principle is applicable to it as to the individual. 'In statu naturali non dari peccatum, vel si quis peccat, is sibi, non alteri peccat: … nihil absolute naturae jure prohibetur, nisi quod nemo potest' (II. 18). A state is to any other state, and to its subjects, as one individual to another 'in statu naturali.' A wrong, a 'peccatum,' consists in a violation by individuals of the 'commune decretum.' There can be no 'peccare' on the part of the 'commune decretum' itself. But 'non id omne, quod jure fieri dicimus, optime fieri affirmamus. Aliud namque est agrum jure colere, aliud agrum optime colere; aliud, inquam, est sese jure defendere, conservare, judicium ferre, &c, aliud sese optime defendere, conservare, atque optimum judicium ferre; et consequenter aliud est jure imperare et reipublicae curam habere, aliud optime imperare et rempublicam optime gubernare. Postquam itaque de jure cujuscumque civitatis in genere egimus, tempus est, ut de optimo cujuscumque imperii statu agamus' (V. 1). Hence a further consideration 'de optimo cujusque imperii statu.' This is guided by reference to the 'finis status civilis,' which is 'pax vitaeque securitas.' Accordingly that is the best government under which men live in harmony, and of which the rights are kept inviolate. Where this is not the case, the fault lies with the government, not with any 'subditorum malitia.' 'Homines enim civiles non nascuntur, sed fiunt. Hominum praeterea naturales affectus ubique iidem sunt' (V. 2).