Lastly, the doctrine of God's worship is excluded from philosophy, as being not to be known by natural reason, but by the authority of the Church; and as being the object of faith, and not of knowledge.
Parts of Philosophy.
9. The principal parts of philosophy are two. For two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from one another, offer themselves to such as search after their generation and properties; one whereof being the work of nature, is called a natural body, the other is called a commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreement of men. And from these spring the two parts of philosophy, called natural and civil. But seeing that, for the knowledge of the properties of a commonwealth, it is necessary first to know the dispositions, affections, and manners of men, civil philosophy is again commonly divided into two parts, whereof one, which treats of men's dispositions and manners, is called ethics; and the other, which takes cognizance of their civil duties, is called politics, or simply civil philosophy. In the first place, therefore (after I have set down such premises as appertain to the nature of philosophy in general), I will discourse of bodies natural; in the second, of the dispositions and manners of men; and in the third, of the civil duties of subjects.
Epilogue.
10. To conclude; seeing there may be many who will not like this my definition of philosophy, and will say, that, from the liberty which a man may take of so defining as seems best to himself, he may conclude any thing from any thing (though I think it no hard matter to demonstrate that this definition of mine agrees with the sense of all men); yet, lest in this point there should be any cause of dispute betwixt me and them, I here undertake no more than to deliver the elements of that science by which the effects of anything may be found out from the known generation of the same, or contrarily, the generation from the effects; to the end that they who search after other philosophy, may be admonished to seek it from other principles.
CHAPTER II.
OF NAMES.
[1.] The necessity of sensible Moniments or Marks for the help of Memory: a Mark defined.—[2.] The necessity of Marks for the signification of the conceptions of the Mind.—[3.] Names supply both those necessities.—[4.] The Definition of a Name.—[5.] Names are Signs not of Things, but of our Cogitations.—[6.] What it is we give Names to.—[7.] Names Positive and Negative.—[8.] Contradictory Names.—[9.] A Common Name.—[10.] Names of the First and Second Intention.—[11.] Universal, Particular, Individual, and Indefinite Names.—[12.] Names Univocal and Equivocal.—[13.] Absolute and Relative Names.—[14.] Simple and Compounded Names.—[15.] A Predicament described.—[16.] Some things to be noted concerning Predicaments.
Necessity of sensible Moniments or Marks for the help of Memory.
1. How unconstant and fading men's thoughts are, and how much the recovery of them depends upon chance, there is none but knows by infallible experience in himself. For no man is able to remember quantities without sensible and present measures, nor colours without sensible and present patterns, nor number without the names of numbers disposed in order and learned by heart. So that whatsoever a man has put together in his mind by ratiocination without such helps, will presently slip from him, and not be revocable but by beginning his ratiocination anew. From which it follows, that, for the acquiring of philosophy, some sensible moniments are necessary, by which our past thoughts may be not only reduced, but also registered every one in its own order.| A Mark defined| These moniments I call MARKS, namely, sensible things taken at pleasure, that, by the sense of them, such thoughts may be recalled to our mind as are like those thoughts for which we took them.