Names Positive and Negative.
7. The first distinction of names is, that some are positive, or affirmative, others negative, which are also called privative and indefinite. Positive are such as we impose for the likeness, equality, or identity of the things we consider; negative, for the diversity, unlikeness, or inequality of the same. Examples of the former are, a man, a philosopher; for a man denotes any one of a multitude of men, and a philosopher, any one of many philosophers, by reason of their similitude; also, Socrates is a positive name, because it signifies always one and the same man. Examples of negatives are such positives as have the negative particle not added to them, as not-man, not-philosopher. But positives were before negatives; for otherwise there could have been no use at all of these. For when the name of white was imposed upon certain things, and afterwards upon other things, the names of black, blue, transparent, &c. the infinite dissimilitudes of these with white could not be comprehended in any one name, save that which had in it the negation of white, that is to say, the name not-white, or some other equivalent to it, in which the word white is repeated, such as unlike to white, &c. And by these negative names, we take notice ourselves, and signify to others what we have not thought of.
Contradictory names.
8. Positive and negative names are contradictory to one another, so that they cannot both be the name of the same thing. Besides, of contradictory names, one is the name of anything whatsoever; for whatsoever is, is either man, or not-man, white or not-white, and so of the rest. And this is so manifest, that it needs no farther proof or explication; for they that say the same thing cannot both be, and not be, speak obscurely; but they that say, whatsoever is, either is, or is not, speak also absurdly and ridiculously. The certainty of this axiom, viz. of two contradictory names, one is the name of anything whatsoever, the other not, is the original and foundation of all ratiocination, that is, of all philosophy; and therefore it ought to be so exactly propounded, that it may be of itself clear and perspicuous to all men; as indeed it is, saving to such, as reading the long discourses made upon this subject by the writers of metaphysics (which they believe to be some egregious learning) think they understand not, when they do.
A common name.
9. Secondly, of names, some are common to many things, as a man, a tree; others proper to one thing, as he that writ the Iliad, Homer, this man, that man. And a common name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not collectively of all together (as man is not the name of all mankind, but of every one, as of Peter, John, and the rest severally) is therefore called an universal name; and therefore this word universal is never the name of any thing existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when a living creature, a stone, a spirit, or any other thing, is said to be universal, it is not to be understood, that any man, stone, &c. ever was or can be universal, but only that these words, living creature, stone, &c. are universal names, that is, names common to many things; and the conceptions answering them in our mind, are the images and phantasms of several living creatures, or other things. And therefore, for the understanding of the extent of an universal name, we need no other faculty but that of our imagination, by which we remember that such names bring sometimes one thing, sometimes another, into our mind. Also of common names, some are more, some less common. More common, is that which is the name of more things; less common, the name of fewer things; as living creature is more common than man, or horse, or lion, because it comprehends them all: and therefore a more common name, in respect of a less common, is called the genus, or a general name; and this in respect of that, the species, or a special name.
Names of the first and second intention.
10. And from hence proceeds the third distinction of names, which is, that some are called names of the first, others of the second intention. Of the first intention are the names of things, a man, stone, &c.: of the second are the names of names and speeches, as universal, particular, genus, species, syllogism, and the like. But it is hard to say why those are called names of the first, and these of the second intention, unless perhaps it was first intended by us to give names to those things which are of daily use in this life, and afterwards to such things as appertain to science, that is, that our second intention was to give names to names. But whatsoever the cause hereof may be, yet this is manifest, that genus, species, definition, &c. are names of words and names only; and therefore to put genus and species for things, and definition for the nature of any thing, as the writers of metaphysics have done, is not right, seeing they be only significations of what we think of the nature of things.
Universal, particular, individual, and indefinite names.
11. Fourthly, some names are of certain and determined, others of uncertain and undetermined signification. Of determined and certain signification is, first, that name which is given to any one thing by itself, and is called an individual name; as Homer, this tree, that living creature, &c. Secondly that which has any of these words, all, every, both, either, or the like added to it; and it is therefore called an universal name, because it signifies every one of those things to which it is common; and of certain signification for this reason, that he which hears, conceives in his mind the same thing that he which speaks would have him conceive. Of indefinite signification is, first, that name which has the word some, or the like added to it, and is called a particular name; secondly, a common name set by itself without any note either of universality or particularity, as man, stone, and is called an indefinite name; but both particular and indefinite names are of uncertain signification, because the hearer knows not what thing it is the speaker would have him conceive; and therefore in speech, particular and indefinite names are to be esteemed equivalent to one another. But these words, all, every, some, &c. which denote universality and particularity, are not names, but parts only of names; so that every man, and that man which the hearer conceives in his mind, are all one; and some man, and that man which the speaker thought of, signify the same. From whence it is evident, that the use of signs of this kind, is not for a man's own sake, or for his getting of knowledge by his own private meditation (for every man has his own thoughts sufficiently determined without such helps as these) but for the sake of others; that is, for the teaching and signifying of our conceptions to others; nor were they invented only to make us remember, but to make us able to discourse with others.