Therefore, The hand, is, touching the paper;
where there are manifestly these four terms, the hand, touching the pen, the pen, and touching the the paper. But the danger of being deceived by sophisms of this kind, does not seem to be so great, as that I need insist longer upon them.
Of the fault which consists in equivocation.
12. And though there may be fallacy in equivocal terms, yet in those that be manifestly such, there is none at all; nor in metaphors, for they profess the transferring of names from one thing to another. Nevertheless, sometimes equivocals (and those not very obscure) may deceive; as in this argumentation:--It belongs to metaphysics to treat of principles; but the first principle of all, is, that the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time; and therefore it belongs to metaphysics to treat whether the same thing may both exist and not exist at the same time; where the fallacy lies in the equivocation of the word principle; for whereas Aristotle in the beginning of his Metaphysics, says, that the treating of principles belongs to primary science, he understands by principles, causes of things, and certain existences which he calls primary; but where he says a primary proposition is a principle, by principle, there, he means the beginning and cause of knowledge, that is, the understanding of words, which, if any man want, he is incapable of learning.
Sophistical captions are oftener faulty in the matter than in the form of syllogisms.
13. But the captions of sophists and sceptics, by which they were wont, of old, to deride and oppose truth, were faulty for the most part, not in the form, but in the matter of syllogism; and they deceived not others oftener than they were themselves deceived. For the force of that famous argument of Zeno against motion, consisted in this proposition, whatsoever may be divided into parts, infinite in number, the same is infinite; which he, without doubt, thought to be true, yet nevertheless is false. For to be divided into infinite parts, is nothing else but to be divided into as many parts as any man will. But it is not necessary that a line should have parts infinite in number, or be infinite, because I can divide and subdivide it as often as I please; for how many parts soever I make, yet their number is finite; but because he that says parts, simply, without adding how many, does not limit any number, but leaves it to the determination of the hearer, therefore we say commonly, a line may be divided infinitely; which cannot be true in any other sense.
Conclusion.
And thus much may suffice concerning syllogism, which is, as it were, the first pace towards philosophy; in which I have said as much as is necessary to teach any man from whence all true argumentation has its force. And to enlarge this treatise with all that may be heaped together, would be as superfluous, as if one should (as I said before) give a young child precepts for the teaching of him to go; for the art of reasoning is not so well learned by precepts as by practice, and by the reading of those books in which the conclusions are all made by severe demonstration. And so I pass on to the way of philosophy, that is, to the method of study.