5. That space, by which word I here understand imaginary space, which is coincident with the magnitude of any body, is called the place of that body; and the body itself is that which we call the thing placed. Now place, and the magnitude of the thing placed, differ. First in this, that a body keeps always the same magnitude, both when it is at rest, and when it is moved; but when it is moved, it does not keep the same place. Secondly in this, that place is a phantasm of any body of such and such quantity and figure; but magnitude is the peculiar accident of every body; for one body may at several times have several places, but has always one and the same magnitude. Thirdly in this, that place is nothing out of the mind, nor magnitude any thing within it. And lastly, place is feigned extension, but magnitude true extension; and a placed body is not extension, but a thing extended. Besides, place is immovable; for, seeing that which is moved, is understood to be carried from place to place, if place were moved, it would also be carried from place to place, so that one place must have another place, and that place another place, and so on infinitely, which is ridiculous. And as for those, that, by making place to be of the same nature with real space, would from thence maintain it to be immovable, they also make place, though they do not perceive they make it so, to be a mere phantasm. For whilst one affirms that place is therefore said to be immovable, because space in general is considered there; if he had remembered that nothing is general or universal besides names or signs, he would easily have seen that that space, which he says is considered in general, is nothing but a phantasm, in the mind or the memory, of a body of such magnitude and such figure. And whilst another says: real space is made immovable by the understanding; as when, under the superficies of running water, we imagine other and other water to come by continual succession, that superficies fixed there by the understanding, is the immovable place of the river: what else does he make it to be but a phantasm, though he do it obscurely and in perplexed words? Lastly, the nature of place does not consist in the superficies of the ambient, but in solid space; for the whole placed body is coextended with its whole place, and every part of it with every answering part of the same place; but seeing every placed body is a solid thing, it cannot be understood to be coextended with superficies. Besides, how can any whole body be moved, unless all its parts be moved together with it? Or how can the internal parts of it be moved, but by leaving their place? But the internal parts of a body cannot leave the superficies of an external part contiguous to it; and, therefore, it follows, that if place be the superficies of the ambient, then the parts of a body moved, that is, bodies moved, are not moved.
What is full and empty.
6. Space, or place, that is possessed by a body, is called full, and that which is not so possessed, is called empty.
Here, there, somewhere, what they signify.
7. Here, there, in the country, in the city, and other the like names, by which answer is made to the question where is it? are not properly names of place, nor do they of themselves bring into the mind the place that is sought; for here and there signify nothing, unless the thing be shewn at the same time with the finger or something else; but when the eye of him that seeks, is, by pointing or some other sign, directed to the thing sought, the place of it is not hereby defined by him that answers, but found out by him that asks the question. Now such shewings as are made by words only, as when we say, in the country, or in the city, are some of greater latitude than others, as when we say, in the country, in the city, in such a street, in a house, in the chamber, in bed, &c. For these do, by little and little, direct the seeker nearer to the proper place; and yet they do not determine the same, but only restrain it to a lesser space, and signify no more, than that the place of the thing is within a certain space designed by those words, as a part is in the whole. And all such names, by which answer is made to the question where? have, for their highest genus, the name somewhere. From whence it may be understood, that whatsoever is somewhere, is in some place properly so called, which place is part of that greater space that is signified by some of these names, in the country, in the city, or the like.
Many bodies cannot be in one place, nor one body in many places.
8. A body, and the magnitude, and the place thereof, are divided by one and the same act of the mind; for, to divide an extended body, and the extension thereof, and the idea of that extension, which is place, is the same with dividing any one of them; because they are coincident, and it cannot be done but by the mind, that is by the division of space. From whence it is manifest, that neither two bodies can be together in the same place, nor one body be in two places at the same time. Not two bodies in the same place; because when a body that fills its whole place is divided into two, the place itself is divided into two also, so that there will be two places. Not one body in two places; for the place that a body fills being divided into two, the placed body will be also divided into two; for, as I said, a place and the body that fills that place, are divided both together; and so there will be two bodies.
Contiguous and continual, what they are.
9. Two bodies are said to be contiguous to one another, and continual, in the same manner as spaces are; namely, those are contiguous, between which there is no space. Now, by space I understand, here as formerly, an idea or phantasm of a body. Wherefore, though between two bodies there be put no other body, and consequently no magnitude, or, as they call it, real space, yet if another body may be put between them, that is, if there intercede any imagined space which may receive another body, then those bodies are not contiguous. And this is so easy to be understood, that I should wonder at some men, who being otherwise skilful enough in philosophy, are of a different opinion, but that I find that most of those that affect metaphysical subtleties wander from truth, as if they were led out of their way by an ignis fatuus. For can any man that has his natural senses, think that two bodies must therefore necessarily touch one another, because no other body is between them? Or that there can be no vacuum, because vacuum is nothing, or as they call it, non ens? Which is as childish, as if one should reason thus; no man can fast, because to fast is to eat nothing; but nothing cannot be eaten. Continual, are any two bodies that have a common part; and more than two are continual, when every two, that are next to one another, are continual.
The definition of motion. No motion intelligible but with time.