[2]. The mutual fear.] It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each others looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each others power, and lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth they know each other’s spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth from the victory; if they agree, from their agreement.
[3]. In the bare state of nature. This is thus to be understood: what any man does in the bare state of nature, is injurious to no man; not that in such a state he cannot offend God, or break the laws of nature; for injustice against men presupposeth human laws, such as in the state of nature there are none. Now the truth of this proposition thus conceived, is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing; but because in certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises, I will contract this argument, and make it most evident to a single view. Every man hath right to protect himself, as appears by the [seventh article]. The same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end, by the [eighth article]. But those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such, by the [ninth article]. He therefore hath a right to make use of, and to do all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation; wherefore by the judgment of him that doth it, the thing done is either right or wrong, and therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare state of nature, &c. But if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of nature, as in the third chapter of this book is more at large declared. It hath been objected by some: if a son kill his father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father’s or his mother’s, or him that nourished him; as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.
CHAPTER II
OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS.
[1.] That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason. [2.] That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend ourselves. [3.] That the first special law of nature, is not to retain our right to all things. [4.] What it is to quit our right: what to transfer it. [5.] That in the transferring of our right, the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. [6.] No words but those of the present tense, transfer any right. [7.] Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify the will, are valid in the translation of right. [8.] In matters of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of the future. [9.] The definition of contract and compact. [10.] In compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future. [11.] Compacts of mutual faith, in the state of nature are of no effect and vain; but not so in civil government. [12.] That no man can make compacts with beasts, nor yet with God without revelation. [13.] Nor yet make a vow to God. [14.] That compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour. [15.] By what means we are freed from our compacts. [16.] That promises extorted through fear of death, in the state of nature are valid. [17.] A later compact contradicting the former, is invalid. [18.] A compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. [19.] A compact to accuse one’s self, is invalid. [20.] The definition of swearing. [21.] That swearing is to be conceived in that form which he useth that takes the oath. [22.] An oath superadds nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. [23.] An oath ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.
That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason.
1. All authors agree not concerning the definition of the natural law, who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in their writings. The method therefore wherein we begin from definitions and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary disputes. For the rest, if any man say that somewhat is done against the law of nature, one proves it hence; because it was done against the general agreement of all the most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another hence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind; which definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were impossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a law; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men actually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought against it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent, and therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in truth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly commend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions more by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it comes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things with the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But since all do grant, that is done by right, which is not done against reason, we ought to judge those actions only wrong, which are repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some certain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles. But that which is done wrong, we say it is done against some law. Therefore true reason is a certain law; which, since it is no less a part of human nature, than any other faculty or affection of the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the law of nature, that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,[[4]] conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.
That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace where it may be had, and, where not, to defend ourselves.
2. But the first and fundamental law of nature is, that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war. For we showed in the last article of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the dictates of right reason are natural laws, that hath been newly proved above. But this is the first, because the rest are derived from this, and they direct the ways either to peace or self-defence.
The first special law of nature is, that our rights to all things ought not to be retained.