23. To exact an oath where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where the party compacted withal wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto self-defence, and shews a mind desirous not so much to benefit itself, as to prejudice another. For an oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of God’s anger, that is to say, of him that is omnipotent, against those who therefore violate their faith, because they think that by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is omniscient, against those who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.
[4]. Right reason.] By right reason in the natural state of men, I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his, which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar, because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this civil government, in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with his own, every man’s own reason is to be accounted, not only the rule of his own actions, which are done at his own peril, but also for the measure of another man’s reason, in such things as do concern him. I call it true, that is, concluding from true principles rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the laws of nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men, who see not those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others in order to their own conservation. But the principles of right reasoning about such like duties, are those which are explained in the [second], [third], [fourth], [fifth], [sixth], and [seventh] articles of the first chapter.
[5]. Arise.] For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to perform from the other part, it cannot be judged to be a just fear; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being made.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.
[1.] The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. [2.] That trust is to be held with all men without exception. [3.] What injury is. [4.] Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract. [5.] The distinction of justice into that of men, and that of actions. [6.] The distinction of commutative and distributive justice examined. [7.] No injury can be done to him that is willing. [8.] The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. [9.] The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful. [10.] The fifth law, of mercy. [11.] The sixth law, that punishments regard the future only. [12.] The seventh law, against reproach. [13.] The eighth law, against pride. [14.] The ninth law, of humility. [15.] The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of persons. [16.] The eleventh, of things to be had in common. [17.] The twelfth, of things to be divided by lot. [18.] The thirteenth, of birthright and first possession. [19.] The fourteenth, of the safeguard of them who are mediators for peace. [20.] The fifteenth, of constituting an umpire. [21.] The sixteenth, that no man is judge in his own cause. [22.] The seventeenth, that umpires must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be judged. [23.] The eighteenth, of witnesses. [24.] The nineteenth, that there can no contract be made with the umpire. [25.] The twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the use of reason. [26.] The rule by which we may presently know, whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not. [27.] The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience. [28.] The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things agreeable to those laws. [29.] The laws of nature are unchangeable. [30.] Whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is a just man. [31.] The natural and moral law are one. [32.] How it comes to pass, that what hath been said of the laws of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered concerning the virtues. [33.] The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is delivered in Holy Writ.
The second law of nature, to perform contracts.
1. Another of the laws of nature is, to perform contracts, or to keep trust. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that the law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that this, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract. But this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or omitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to them. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by the second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the natural law.
That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.