11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one, whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions[[9]] and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.
Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.
12. Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right hath not sufficient power.
That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto him.
13. It is most manifest by what hath been said, that in every perfect city, that is, where no citizen hath right to use his faculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself, or where the right of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme power in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred by men, or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself. But that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a man, we call absolute.[[10]] For whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing, make laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of men, and all this by right; truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted. This same may be confirmed by experience, in all the cities which are or ever have been. For though it be sometimes in doubt what man or council hath the chief command, yet ever there is such a command and always exercised, except in the time of sedition and civil war; and then there are two chief commands made out of one. Now, those seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority, do not so much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others: for removing this power, they together take away civil society, and a confusion of all things returns. There is so much obedience joined to this absolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily required for the government of the city, that is to say, so much as that right of his may not be granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience, although for some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied, yet because a greater cannot be performed, we will call it simple. But the obligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract, by which we have conveyed all our right on the city; but immediately from hence, that without obedience the city’s right would be frustrate, and by consequence there would be no city constituted. For it is one thing if I say, I give you right to command what you will; another, if I say, I will do whatsoever you command. And the command may be such, as I would rather die than do it. Forasmuch, therefore, as no man can be bound to will being killed, much less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death. If therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it. For though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not frustrated; since others may be found, who being commanded will not refuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which I have contracted to do. In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man to kill him, he is not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a parent, whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law; since there are others who being commanded will do that, and a son will rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world. There are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed by these, and refused by those; and this without breach of that absolute right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no case is the right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is, against God.
That he is not tied to observe the laws of the city.
14. Neither can any man give somewhat to himself; for he is already supposed to have what he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to himself; for the same party being both the obliged and the obliger, and the obliger having power to release the obliged, it were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself; because he can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is already actually free. Whence it is plain, that the city is not tied to the civil laws; for the civil laws are the laws of the city, by which, if she were engaged, she should be engaged to herself. Neither can the city be obliged to her citizen; because, if he will, he can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills; for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the city; the city therefore is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free. But the will of a council, or one who hath supreme authority given him, is the will of the city: he therefore contains the wills of all particular citizens. Therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws; for this is to be bound to himself; nor to any of his citizens.
That no man can challenge a propriety in aught against him who hath the supreme power.
15. Now because, as hath been shown above, before the constitution of a city all things belonged to all men; nor is there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same right, claim as his own; for where all things are common, there can be nothing proper to any man; it follows, that propriety received its beginning[[11]] when cities received their’s, and that that only is proper to each man, which he can keep by the laws and the power of the whole city, that is, of him on whom its chief command is conferred. Whence we understand, that each particular citizen hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-citizens hath right, because they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no propriety in which the chief ruler (whose commands are the laws, whose will contains the will of each man, and who by every single person is constituted the supreme judge) hath not a right. But although there be many things which the city permits to its citizens, and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their chief; yet is not that action belonging to civil right, but to natural equity. Neither is it concerning what[[12]] by right he may do who hath the supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be done; and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.
It is known by the civil laws what theft, murder, adultery, and injury are.