There are three kinds of government only; democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
1. We have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is committed either to one man, or council, or some one court consisting of many men. Furthermore, a council of many men consists either of all the citizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affairs, if he will himself; or of a part only. From whence there arise three sorts of government; the one, when the power is in a council where every citizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a democracy. The other, when it is in a council, where not all, but some part only have their suffrages; and we call it an aristocracy. The third is that, when the supreme authority rests only in one; and it is styled a monarchy. In the first, he that governs is called δῆμος, the people; in the second, the nobles; in the third, the monarch.
Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.
2. Now, although ancient writers of politics have introduced three other kinds of government opposite to these; to wit, anarchy or confusion to democracy; oligarchy, that is, the command of some few, to aristocracy, and tyranny to monarchy; yet are not these three distinct forms of government, but three diverse titles given by those who were either displeased with that present government or those that bare rule. For men, by giving names, do usually not only signify the things themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like. Whence it happens that what one man calls a democracy, another calls an anarchy; what one counts an aristocracy, another esteems an oligarchy; and whom one titles a king, another styles him a tyrant. So as we see, these names betoken not a diverse kind of government, but the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning him who hath the supreme power. For first, who sees not that anarchy is equally opposite to all the aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that there is no government at all, that is, not any city. But how is it possible that no city should be the species of a city? Furthermore, what difference is there between an oligarchy, which signifies the command of a few or grandees, or an aristocracy, which is that of the prime or chief heads, more than that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seem not good to all men? Whence it happens that those persons, who by some are looked on as the best, are by others esteemed to be the worst of all men.
That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy.
3. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be persuaded that a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse kinds of cities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one than many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it accord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not by passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But first, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater power; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, that one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority is limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should, by force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the consent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this pass; that a king, legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a king; if not, they count him a tyrant. Wherefore we see a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse forms of government, but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a king given him in point of honour and reverence to him, and of a tyrant in way of contumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said against tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers, whose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical, and therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them.
That there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government.
4. There are, who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme command should be somewhere extant in a city; but if it should be in any one, either man or council, it would follow, they say, that all the citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certain form of government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular; which they call a mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent than the rest. For example, if the naming of magistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to the King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution of monies to the People, and the power of making laws to all together, this kind of state would they call a mixed monarchy forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a state, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as they all agree, each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be: but if they disagree, the state returns to a civil war and the right of the private sword; which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever. But that there can be no such kind of government,[[14]] hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, [art. 6-12.]
That democracy, except it have certain times and places of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.
5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of government what the constitutors do. Those who met together with intention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a democracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part; which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain days and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will is the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition given in the [first article] of this chapter. But if they depart and break up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when they shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the supreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place publicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer δῆμος, the people, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things therefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual prescription of convents, makes δῆμον, the people; the other, which is a plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or the power.