In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession.
19. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession. For if the first-born die before the father, it will be judged that he transferred his right of succession unto his children; unless the father have otherwise decreed it. And therefore the nephews will have a fairer pretence to the succession, than the uncles. I say all these things will be thus, if the custom of the place (which the father by not contradicting will be judged to have consented to) do not hinder them.
CHAPTER X.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT
ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES.
[1.] A comparison of the natural state with the civil. [2.] The conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are alike. [3.] The praise of monarchy. [4.] The government under one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest. [5.] A rejection of their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot make a city. [6.] Exactions are more grievous under a popular state, than a monarchy. [7.] Innocent subjects are less exposed to penalties under a monarch, than under the people. [8.] The liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a people. [9.] It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to public deliberations. [10.] Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: [11.] In regard of eloquence: [12.] In regard of faction: [13.] In regard of the unstableness of the laws: [14.] In regard of the want of secrecy. [15.] That these inconveniences adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit. [16.] The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a child. [17.] The power of generals is an evident sign of the excellence of monarchy. [18.] The best state of a city is that, where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance. [19.] The nearer aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it keeps from it, the worse.
A comparing the state of nature with the civil.
1. What democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy are, hath already been spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects’ peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages and disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will, than to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others suffer all at another’s will. But in a constituted city, every subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live well and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.
The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are alike.
2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his Politics, saith, that there are two sorts of governments; whereof the one relates to the benefit of the ruler, the other to that of the subjects. As if where subjects are severely dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another form of government. Which opinion may by no means be subscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the ruler and the subject. The damages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But those relate not to the government itself, being such as may happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first institution of the city, they will then be truly called the inconveniences of government; but they will be common to the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But the first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy, both the commander and the parties commanded are equally concerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the disadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a stock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to a common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way public treasures can be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the ill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all manner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the ill-administration of a well-established government.
The praise of monarchy.