13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and change, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor according to the changeableness of men’s minds, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction, do convene. Insomuch as the laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.
For want of secrecy.
14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and will is as soon known abroad, as to the people itself commanding at home.
These inconveniences do adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit.
15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies, do so far forth evince monarchy to be better than democracy, as in democracy affairs of great consequence are oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a monarchy. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own private, than the public business, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother. But if the people in a democracy would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular democracy and monarchy would be equal.
The inconveniences of government proceeding from a king who is a child.
16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence, namely, because the government itself, or the administration of its affairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other side, to many than to some few. For government is the power, the administration of it is the act. Now the power in all kinds of government is equal; the acts only differ, that is to say, the actions and motions of a commonweal, as they flow from the deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any government depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on his officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal may be well governed, although the monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with the public offices and charges. And that which is said, woe to the land whose king is a child, doth not signify the condition of a monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the king being a child, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding themselves into public councils, the government comes to be administered in a democratical manner; and that thence arise those infelicities, which for the most part accompany the dominion of the people.
The power of generals is an argument of the excellency of monarchy.
17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute monarchy is the best state of government, that not only kings, but even those cities which are subject to the people or to nobles, give the whole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing can be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no king can give a general greater authority over his army, than he himself by right may exercise over all his subjects. Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else are many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms and men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature; which is the state of war.
The best state of a commonweal, is that where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance.