CHAPTER XIII.
CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE.
[1.] The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise. [2.] The safety of the people is the supreme law. [3.] It behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man. [4.] That by safety is understood all manner of conveniences. [5.] A query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best according to their own consciences. [6.] Wherein the safety of the people consists. [7.] That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. [8.] That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness, in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the people. [9.] A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace. [10.] Equal distributions of public offices conduces much to the preservation of peace. [11.] It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses. [12.] It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down ambitious men. [13.] And to break factions. [14.] Laws whereby thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce to the enriching of the subject. [15.] That more ought not to be defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his subjects requires. [16.] That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. [13.] Subjects must have right done them against corrupt judges.
The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise.
1. By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of citizens and subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the power of the supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said nothing of the duties of rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between the right and the exercise of supreme authority; for they can be divided. As for example, when he who hath the right, either cannot or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of affairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order their affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their officers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where the right and exercise are severed, there the government of the commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which God, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means of secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth belong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and public actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto all matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties, who exercise authority, whether by their own or other’s right. Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things, which being diverse from others, some princes may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of each commonweal.
The safety of the people is the supreme law.
2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, the safety of the people is the supreme law. For although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But because dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was sought after for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws of nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which princes know their duty, so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the power of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in any state.
It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.
3. By the people in this place we understand, not one civil person, namely, the city itself which governs, but the multitude of subjects which are governed. For the city was not instituted for its own, but for the subjects’ sake: and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man. For the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety of his people, than by his laws, which are universal; and therefore he hath fully discharged himself, if he have thoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer ill, but by his own default, or by some chance which could not be prevented. But it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part, that wicked men do suffer.
By safety is understood all manner of benefits.
4. But by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government, that they might, as much as their human condition would afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kind of government, would sin against the law of nature, (because against their trust, who had committed that power unto them), if they should not study, as much as by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired dominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that they may serve them the better. Wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.