Also oblations must be clean, and presents sumptuous; and such as are significative either of submission or gratitude, or commemorative of benefits received. For all these proceed from a desire of honouring.
In the seventh, that God must be worshipped not privately only, but openly and publicly in the sight of all men; because that worship is so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour and esteem in others; as hath been declared before in [art. 13]. Unless others therefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship vanisheth.
In the last place, that we use our best endeavour to keep the laws of nature. For the undervaluing of our master’s command, exceeds all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, obedience is more acceptable than all other sacrifices.
And these are principally the natural laws concerning the worship of God; those, I mean, which reason dictates to every man. But to whole cities, every one whereof is one person, the same natural reason further commands an uniformity of public worship. For the actions done by particular persons, according to their private reasons, are not the city’s actions; and therefore not the city’s worship. But what is done by the city, is understood to be done by the command of him or them who have the sovereignty; wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects, that is to say, uniformly.
In the natural kingdom of God, the city may appoint what worship it pleaseth.
16. The natural laws set down in the foregoing article concerning the divine worship, only command the giving of natural signs of honour. But we must consider that there are two kinds of signs; the one natural; the other done upon agreement, or by express or tacit composition. Now because in every language the use of words and names come by appointment, it may also by appointment be altered; for that which depends on and derives its force from the will of men, can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again or abolished. Such names therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken away. Now what can be done by the appointment of men, that the city may do. The city therefore by right, that is to say, they who have the power of the whole city, shall judge what names or appellations are more, what less honourable for God; that is to say, what doctrines are to be held and professed concerning the nature of God and his operations. Now actions do signify not by men’s appointment, but naturally; even as the effects are signs of their causes. Whereof some are always signs of scorn to them before whom they are committed; as those whereby the body’s uncleanness is discovered, and whatsoever men are ashamed to do before those whom they respect. Others are always signs of honour, as to draw near and discourse decently and humbly, to give way or to yield in any matter of private benefit. In these actions the city can alter nothing. But there are infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour or reproach, are indifferent. Now these, by the institution of the city, may both be made signs of honour, and being made so, do in very deed become so. From whence we may understand, that we must obey the city in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring God, that is to say, for worship; provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour; because that is a sign of honour, which by the city’s command is used for such.
God ruling by nature only, the city, that is to say, that man or court which under God hath the sovereignty, is the interpreter of all the laws.
17. We have already declared which were the laws of God, as well sacred as secular, in his government by the way of nature only. Now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that it so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions; it may be demanded further, whom God would have to be the interpreter of right reason, that is to say, of his laws. And as for the secular laws, (I mean those which concern justice and the carriage of men towards men), by what hath been said before of the constitution of a city, we have demonstratively showed it agreeable to reason, that all judicature belongs to the city; and that judicature is nothing else but an interpretation of the laws; and by consequence, that every where cities, that is to say, those who have the sovereign power, are the interpreters of the laws. As for the sacred laws, we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in chap. V. [art. 13], that every subject hath transferred as much right as he could on him or them who had the supreme authority. But he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured; and therefore also he hath done it. That he could, it appears hence; that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a city, was to be fetched from every man’s private reason. But every man can subject his private reason to the reason of the whole city. Moreover, if each man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God, in so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge another’s worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem to the other to honour God. Even that therefore which were most consonant to reason, would not be a worship; because that the nature of worship consists in this, that it be the sign of inward honour. But there is no sign, but whereby somewhat becomes known to others; and therefore is there no sign of honour, but what seems so to others. Again, that is a true sign, which by the consent of men becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the city, becomes a sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God, declared by the way of reason only, to give him such signs of honour as the city shall command. Wherefore subjects can transfer their right of judging the manner of God’s worship, on him or them who have the sovereign power. Nay, they must do it; for else all manner of absurd opinions concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any nations, will be seen at once in the same city. Whence it will fall out, that every man will believe that all the rest do offer God an affront; so that it cannot be truly said of any, that he worships God; for no man worships God, that is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things, whereby he appears to others for to honour him. It may therefore be concluded, that the interpretation of all laws, as well sacred as secular, (God ruling by the way of nature only), depends on the authority of the city, that is to say, that man or counsel to whom the sovereign power is committed; and that whatsoever God commands, he commands by his voice. And on the other side, that whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of honouring God, and concerning secular affairs, is commanded by God himself.
Certain doubts removed.
18. Against this, some man may demand, first, whether it doth not follow that the city must be obeyed, if it command us directly to affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not follow, neither must we obey. For to affront, or not to worship at all, cannot by any man be understood for a manner of worshipping. Neither also had any one, before the constitution of a city, of those who acknowledge God to rule, a right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him; nor could he therefore transfer a right on the city of commanding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whether the city must be obeyed, if it command somewhat to be said or done, which is not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence by reasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived; as for example, if it were commanded to worship God in an image, before those who account that honourable: truly it is to be done.[[19]] For worship is instituted in sign of honour; but to worship him thus, is a sign of honour, and increaseth God’s honour among those who do so account of it. Or if it be commanded to call God by a name, which we know not what it signifies, or how it can agree with this word God; that also must be done. For what we do for honour’s sake, (and we know no better), if it be taken for a sign of honour, it is a sign of honour; and therefore if we refuse to do it, we refuse the enlarging of God’s honour. The same judgment must be had of all the attributes and actions about the merely rational worship of God, which may be controverted and disputed. For though this kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and therefore sins in them who command them; yet are they not against right reason, nor sins in subjects; whose right reason, in points of controversy, is that which submits itself to the reason of the city. Lastly, if that man or counsel who hath the supreme power, command himself to be worshipped with the same attributes and actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped; the question is, whether we must obey? There are many things, which may be commonly attributed both to God and men; for even men may be praised and magnified. And there are many actions, whereby God and men may be worshipped. But the significations of the attributes and actions are only to be regarded. Those attributes therefore, whereby we signify ourselves to be of an opinion, that there is any man endued with a sovereignty independent from God, or that he is immortal, or of infinite power, and the like; though commanded by princes, yet must they be abstained from. As also from those actions signifying the same; as prayer to the absent; to ask those things which God alone can give, as rain and fair weather; to offer him what God can only accept, as oblations, holocausts; or to give a worship, than which a greater cannot be given, as sacrifice. For these things seem to tend to this end, that God may not be thought to rule; contrary to what was supposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or any other act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civil worship; for they may signify an acknowledgment of the civil power only. For divine worship is distinguished from civil, not by the motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the body, but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we do worship. As if we cast down ourselves before any man, with intention of declaring by that sign that we esteem him as God, it is divine worship; if we do the same thing as a sign of our acknowledgment of the civil power, it is civil worship. Neither is the divine worship distinguished from civil, by any action usually understood by the words λατρεία and δουλεία; whereof the former marking out the duty of servants, the latter their destiny, they are words of the same action in degree.