5. Seeing there be many conceptions of one and the same thing, and for every conception we give it a several name; it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of just, valiant, &c. for divers virtues; of strong, comely, &c. for divers qualities of the body. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellation: as to all things we see, we give the same name of visible; and to all things we see moveable, we give the appellation of moveable: and those names we give to many, are called universal to them all; as the name of man to every particular of mankind: such appellation as we give to one only thing, we call individual, or singular; as Socrates, and other proper names: or, by circumlocution, he that writ the Iliads, for Homer.
Universals not in rerum natura.
6. The universality of one name to many things, hath been the cause that men think the things are themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call man, viz. man in general, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth: for if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are universal. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain therefore, that there is nothing universal but names; which are therefore called indefinite; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way.
Equivocal names.
7. The appellations that be universal, and common to many things, are not always given to all the particulars, (as they ought to be) for like conceptions, and like considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them are not of constant signification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those for which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As for example, the word faith signifieth the same with belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a promise. Also all metaphors are by profession equivocal: and there is scarce any word that is not made equivocal by divers contextures of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.
Understanding.
8. This equivocation of names maketh it difficult to recover those conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the drift, and occasion, and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves; but also in our discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call understanding.
Affirmation, negation, proposition.
9. Of two appellations, by the help of this little verb is, or something equivalent, we make an affirmation or negation, either of which in the Schools we call also a proposition, and consisteth of two appellations joined together by the said verb is: as for example, man is a living creature; or thus, man is not righteous: whereof the former is called an affirmation, because the appellation, living creature, is positive; the latter a negative, because not righteous is privative.
Truth, falsity.