And thus much of sense, imagination, discursion, ratiocination, and knowledge, which are the acts of our power cognitive, or conceptive. That power of the mind which we call motive, differeth from the power motive of the body; for the power motive of the body is that by which it moveth other bodies, and we call strength: but the power motive of the mind, is that by which the mind giveth animal motion to that body wherein it existeth; the acts hereof are our affections and passions, of which I am to speak in general.
CHAPTER VII.
[1.] Of delight, pain, love, hatred. [2.] Appetite, aversion, fear. [3.] Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude. [4.] End, fruition. [5.] Profitable, use, vain. [6.] Felicity. [7.] Good and evil mixed. [8.] Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.
Of delight, pain, love, hatred.
1. In the [eighth] section of the second chapter is shewed, that conceptions and apparitions are nothing really, but motion in some internal substance of the head; which motion not stopping there, but proceeding to the heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder the motion which is called vital; when it helpeth, it is called delight, contentment, or pleasure, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion in the head: and the objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful, or by some name equivalent; the Latins have jucundum, a juvando, from helping; and the same delight, with reference to the object, is called love: but when such motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion, then it is called pain; and in relation to that which causeth it, hatred, which the Latins express sometimes by odium, and sometimes by tædium.
Appetite, aversion, fear.
2. This motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is also a solicitation or provocation either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth; and this solicitation is the endeavour or internal beginning of animal motion, which when the object delighteth, is called appetite; when it displeaseth, it is called aversion, in respect of the displeasure present; but in respect of the displeasure expected, fear. So that pleasure, love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing.
Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude.
3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from another in constitution, they differ also from one another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it: and the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word pulchritudo, and the signs of evil, turpitudo; to which we have no words precisely answerable.