1. The question, which is the better man, is determinable only in the estate of government and policy, though it be mistaken for a question of nature, not only by ignorant men, that think one man’s blood better than another’s by nature, but also by him, whose opinions are at this day, and in these parts, of greater authority than any other human writings. For he putteth so much difference between the powers of men by nature, that he doubteth not to set down, as the ground of all his politics, that some men are by nature worthy to govern, and others by nature ought to serve. Which foundation hath not only weakened the whole frame of his politics, but hath also given men colour and pretences, whereby to disturb and hinder the peace of one another. For though there were such a difference of nature, that master and servant were not by consent of men, but by inherent virtue; yet who hath that eminency of virtue, above others, and who is so stupid, as not to govern himself, shall never be agreed upon amongst men, who do every one naturally think himself, as able, at the least, to govern another, as another to govern him. And when there was any contention between the finer and the courser wits, (as there hath been often in times of sedition and civil war) for the most part, these latter carried away the victory; and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined, how they can possibly live in peace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for peace sake, nature hath ordained this law, That every man acknowledge other for his equal. And the breach of this law, is that we call pride.
Another, that men allow æqualia æqualibus.
2. As it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to every thing, so also was it, that he should retain his right to some things; to his own body, for example, the right of defending, whereof he could not transfer; to the use of fire, water, free air, and place to live in, and to all things necessary for life. Nor doth the law of nature command any divesting of other rights, than of those only which cannot be retained without the loss of peace. Seeing then many rights are retained, when we enter into peace one with another, reason and the law of nature dictateth, Whatsoever right any man requireth to retain, he allow every other man to retain the same. For he that doth not so, alloweth not the equality mentioned in the former section. For there is no acknowledgment of worth, without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect. And this allowance of æqualia æqualibus, is the same thing with the allowing of proportionalia proportionalibus. For when a man alloweth to every man alike, the allowance he maketh, will be in the same proportion, in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made. And this is it men mean by distributive justice, and is properly termed equity. The breach of the law is that which the Greeks call Πλεονεξία, which is commonly rendered covetousness, but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word encroaching.
Another, that those things which cannot be divided, be used in common.
3. If there pass no other covenant, the law of nature is, That such things as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same, or without limitation, when the quantity thereof sufficeth. For first supposing the thing to be used in common, not sufficient for them that are to use it without limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the rest, that equality is not observed, which is required in the second section. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the laws of nature, without any other covenant antecedent: for a man may have given away his right of common, and so the case be altered.
Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be divided by lot.
4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common, the rule of nature must needs be one of these, lot, or alternate use: for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be imagined; and for alternate use, he that beginneth, hath the advantage; and to reduce that advantage to equality, there is no other way but lot, in things, therefore indivisible and incommunicable, it is the law of nature, That the use be alternate, or the advantage given away by lot; because there is no other way of equality. And equality is the law of nature.
Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession.
5. There be two sorts of lots; one arbitrary, made by men, and commonly known by the names of lot, chance, hazard, and the like; and there is natural lot, such as is primogeniture, which is no more but the chance, or lot, of being first born, which it seemeth they considered, that call inheritance by the name of κληρονομία, which signifieth distribution by lot. Secondly, prima occupatio, first seizing, or finding of a thing, whereof no man made use before, which for the most part also is merely chance.
That men submit to arbitration.