Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.
19. In every commonwealth, where particular men are deprived of their right to protect themselves, there resideth an absolute sovereignty, as I have already showed. But in what man, or in what assembly of men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to need some marks, whereby it may be discerned. And first, it is an infallible mark of absolute sovereignty in a man, or in an assembly of men, if there be no right in any other person, natural or civil, to punish that man, or to dissolve that assembly. For he that cannot of right be punished, cannot of right be resisted; and he that cannot of right be resisted, hath coercive power over all the rest, and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure, which is absolute sovereignty. Contrariwise, he that in a commonwealth is punishable by any, or that assembly that is dissolvable, is not sovereign. For a greater power is always required to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or dissolved; and that power cannot be called sovereign, than which there is a greater. Secondly, that man or assembly, that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other, may make laws, or abrogate them at his or their pleasure, have the sovereignty absolute. For seeing the laws they make, are supposed to be made by right, the members of the commonwealth, to whom they are made, are obliged to obey them, and consequently not resist the execution of them; which not-resistance, maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a mark of this sovereignty, to have the right original of appointing magistrates, judges, counsellors, and ministers of state. For without that power, no act of sovereignty, or government, can be performed. Lastly, and generally, whosoever by his own authority independent, can do any act, which another of the same commonwealth may not, must needs be understood to have the sovereign power. For by nature men have equal right. This inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the commonwealth. He therefore that doth any act lawfully by his own authority, which another may not, doth it by the power of the commonwealth in himself, which is absolute sovereignty.
CHAPTER II.
[1.] Democracy precedeth all other, &c. [2.]. The sovereign people covenanteth not with the subjects. [3.] The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c. [4.] The faults of the sovereign people, &c. [5.] Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators. [6.] Aristocracy how made. [7.] The body of the optimates not properly said to injure the subjects. [8.] The election of the optimates, &c. [9.] An elective king, &c. [10.] A conditional king, &c. [11.] The word people equivocal. [12.] Obedience discharged by release, &c. [13.] How such releases are to be understood. [14.] Obedience discharged by exile: [15.] By conquest: [16.] By ignorance of the right of succession.
Democracy precedeth all other, &c.
1. Having spoken in general concerning instituted policy in the former chapter, I come in this, to speak of the sorts thereof in special, how every of them is instituted. The first in order of time of these three sorts, is democracy; and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon, which agreement in a great multitude of men, must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy.
The sovereign people covenanteth not with the subjects.
2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant between the sovereign, and any subject. For while the democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any multitude, which supposeth union and sovereignty already made, it resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the major part of their whole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine and command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy, wherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks, by the name of Demus, that is, the people, from whence cometh democracy. So that, where to the supreme and independent court, every man may come that will, and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the people.
The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c.