The preface is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, If I be free to write this Discourse, I have obtained the cause: I deny that to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and, It was not necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear, if he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow: and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but, whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his preface.
In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and says he meaneth not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence; but, from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and determination to one.
It had been better to define liberty, than thus to distinguish. For I understand never the more what he means by liberty; and though he say he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what is else the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not?
There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely of doing not good, or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respectively, and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.
And with these distinctions his Lordship says he clears the coast, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?
The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into two squadrons, one of places of Scriptures, the other of reasons, which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some of them fight amongst themselves.
And the first place of Scripture, taken from Numb. xxx. 13, is one of those that look another way; the words are, If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice either to establish it or make it void. For it proves no more but that the husband is a free and voluntary agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose, by precedent necessary causes.
For if there come into the husband’s mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the husband’s opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of one’s hopes and fears, consisteth the nature of election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.
The second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12, whereby it is clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand.
But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have done, that necessity and election might stand together, and instance in the actions of children, fools, or brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says that the actions of children, fools, madmen, and beasts, are indeed determined, but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous agents. As for example, that the bee, when it maketh honey, does it spontaneously; and when the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, but not by election.