Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will?
To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God’s will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus: Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour? According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer my Lord’s objection, and say, the power of God alone without other helps is sufficient justification of any action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighty’s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just in us.
For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his power: (Job xl. 9:) Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine? (Job xxviii. 4): Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? and the like. So our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the power of God might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God’s will they should be so. Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.
I am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by distinguishing between will and permission, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes permit sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not will it, nor necessitate it.
I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between the action and the law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an action and the sin of that action; as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when one is cause both of the action and of the law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no sin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another’s law, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau’s or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto my Lord’s opinion: for I now hold nothing in all this question betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.
TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.
Of the arguments from reason, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno’s beating of his man, which is therefore called argumentum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this; Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer. And the argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.
The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is fit to be preached, but, what is true.
The first inconvenience he says, is this; That the laws, which prohibit any action, will be unjust.