On the other hand, in the proper arena of disputation, they caution Professors against its abuse. Taking note, in one place, of the discord which can arise among learned men, they illustrate their point with some instances, taken precisely from a disputatious tendency, from that exaggerated scholasticism which had run into dialectic excesses. They say: "For the disturbance of harmony, it makes very little difference whether discord arises in great things or in little. It is not only the importance of a question, it is also the spirit of emulation, that fosters contention; so that sometimes a war of words and the bitterest altercation is kept up on a single term and phrase. Forsooth, what is more trivial than to ask whether God is in imaginary space? Yet what tragic scenes does not this very question give rise to!"[255]

Excesses of this kind being guarded against, the Fathers lay down the thesis that, when employed in its proper place, no exercise is more useful than disputation. You will see not a few wholly taken up with reading, writing, arranging, and paging what they have written; but they eschew most carefully all disputation, neglecting it, looking upon it as an idle occupation, having all their Theology locked up, not so much in their memory and intelligence, as in their paper books. Men of authority, they go on to say, have always been persuaded that Philosophy and Theology are learnt, not so much by hearing, as by discussing. For, in this exercise, you have a most certain test how much a man understands of what he is writing about or teaching; also how much solidity there is in one's own private cogitations, since it happens not unfrequently that what appears brilliant in one's private room is seen to drag in the mud, when it comes to disputation.[256] Then, too, while we are hard pressed by our adversary, we are forced to strain every nerve of our wits, and, when others are bearing down heavily upon us, we knock out of our brains many things which would never have come into our heads, while we stayed in the quiet of leisure and rested in the shade. We hear things which others have found out, and which either throw light on doubtful points, or indicate the path to some other point. Or, if what is said does not commend itself to our judgment, we see through the opponent's artifice; we meet him with more facility, and establish our own thesis with more stability. The auditors, meanwhile, can take note of the good points one Professor makes, the strong points of another, and, after the example of their Doctors, they quicken their wits for the fray, observing where the arguments limp, which are the distinctions that tell, how the whole doctrine of a Professor hangs together. In short, it is well established by the authority of the gravest men, and by the test of experience, that one disputation does more good than many lectures; not to mention the other consideration, that there is nothing more calculated to render our schools illustrious, than making our students competent to win great approbation and applause, in public sessions and disputations.[257]

These critics express their mind upon the need which exists, of reviving considerably the fervor and dignity of this exercise, and so restoring it to its former educational influence. But we can observe for ourselves, how congenial an element the whole exercise must be in a system like this, which is preëminently oral—oral examinations, oral and self-reliant defence and attack, free and open lecturing, with the influence of eye, voice, and person, to bring everything home, even though all the while there is no question of oratory, but of mere teaching. In the earlier stages, too, of the scholar's life, however much has been made of the acquirement of style, "forging the word with Grammar," as Robert of Sorbon had said, "and polishing it with Rhetoric," to make it glow on the written page, yet from the very first, also, no less account has been taken of the ability to express one's thought, with perfect presence of mind, without depending upon note or book. In the higher faculties, this holds good more than ever. Now the time has come for matter of the most approved kind. And the independent, self-possessed delivery of one's thoughts, with the power to force them home unto conviction, or to maintain them against all odds, appears not only as the scope proposed in the system, but also as the historical result, effected in the public career of the Order.

Father Laynez, at the Conference of Poissy, contended thus with Peter Martyr and others; Possevino at Lyons with Viret, using, not so much the severe syllogistic form, as copious and learned discussion. Maldonado was double-handed, either syllogistic or discursive. In the Conference at Sedan, in 1572, he argued first in dialectic form; then, on the demand of his opponents for a different kind of weapon, he took with the same facility to discursive exposition. Edmund Campian, in England, on being removed from the rack more dead than alive, was immediately brought face to face with Newell and Day, able champions as well of the Queen's spiritual supremacy, as of the doctrine of Justification by Faith alone. He proceeded to argue: "If faith alone justifies, it justifies without charity; but without charity it does not justify; therefore faith alone does not justify." Now for the answer, clear and incisive as the propositions. Deny or distinguish major or minor proposition, if you want to deny the conclusion; for, those premises standing, the inference remains intact, since the syllogism is perfect in form. And so argumentations proceed.

To revive disputation in its best style, the critics devote several pages to a most valuable analysis of the conditions and method of the exercise.[258] Their suggestions are embodied in the final Ratio. The Rectors are to show their lively and active interest in the disputations, by attending on public and private occasions alike, and by the various arts which such interest will inspire. As argument "freezes except in a crowd," the critics require that the attendance of all be insisted on, when the days and hours of disputation arrive. This susceptibility of human nature, which the Fathers touch upon, when they speak of disputation freezing except in a concourse, is not without an exact counterpart, when, in another connection, they are speaking of the humanists, or Professors of the literary classes. There they adopt the view that the literary seminary of the Province should be in the same great college, along with the faculties of Philosophy and Theology; for, say they, among other reasons, "the humanists would languish in obscurity, if they had not the philosophers and theologians to be witnesses, spectators, and applauding auditors of their literary achievements." And again they plead sympathetically, "the philosophers and theologians, when composing the prefatory essays for their disputations, call for the taste of the humanists, by whose verses and orations, moreover, they are refreshed from time to time."[259]

Continuing their remarks, the Fathers define the limits of the weekly disputations to be two hours, not more, assigning four regular objectors for that time. The Professors, belonging to different faculties, should invite one another reciprocally to the private disputations in their classes, at least for an hour or so, that the intellectual contest may wax warm by the meeting of these Doctors. Other Doctors, too, not of the faculty, can be invited for the same purpose. But, continues the Ratio of 1599, in undertaking to push the arguments which are being urged, "they should not take the thread out of the hands of an objector, who is still ably and strenuously following it up."[260] Meanwhile, the students who receive the commission to act as objectors, on occasions of some publicity, must be the more qualified members of the course; the others have the practice of their private arena, until they can take part with dignity in a public tournament.

If argument freezes except in a crowd, so, too, it palls, if it never comes to a conclusion; and no useful point of doctrine is carried away by the listeners. Truth is lost in clouds, and there is no gain to good humor. Acrimony or melancholy may well be the only outcome of an unfinished or revolving argumentation. It will not revolve, if the disputants keep to strict syllogistic form. But when both or all parties become heated, and wit becomes lively, the syllogism may suffer, and then, when will they finish? To obviate this inconvenience, two persons are charged with the responsibility of the performance, one the Professor himself, who is presiding over his own disputation, the other, the General Prefect of Studies, who controls the whole series of disputations, as they follow one another in turn.

Of the Professor it is said, that he is to consider the day of disputation as no less laborious and useful than that of his own lecture; and that all the fruit and life of the exercise depends upon him. The earlier Ratio lays even more stress upon the private disputations, "which are wont to grow more frigid than the public ones." He is to assist the two disputants, "so as to be himself apparently the person contesting in each; let him signify his approval, if anything specially good is urged, excite the attention of all when any first-class difficulty is proposed, throw out a hint now and then to support the respondent or direct the opponent; call them back to strict syllogistic form, if they wander from it; not always be silent, nor yet be always talking, so as to let the students bring out what they know. What is brought forward, he can amend or improve; let him bid the objector proceed, so long as his argument carries weight with it; carry on the objector's difficulty for him farther; nor connive at it, if he slips off to another track. He is not to allow an argument which has been well answered to be kept up, nor an answer that is not solid to be long sustained; but, when the dispute has been sufficiently exhaustive, let him briefly define the matter, and explain it."[261]

The General Prefect of Studies is required to keep the series of disputations in due form; arguing himself but sparingly, and thereby discharging the duty of general direction with more dignity. He is not to suffer any difficulty which comes under debate, to be agitated this way and that, "so that it remains as much of a difficulty after as before"; but when such an agitated question has been sufficiently mooted, he will see that an accurate explanation of it is given by the Professor who is presiding.[262]

With the last public act, or general defence of Philosophy and Theology, the formation of the future Professor closes. This public defence occupies four or five hours, in two sessions. If the defendant is not a member of the Order, special care is taken to honor it with all solemnity, and with the attendance of all the faculties, of guests invited, Doctors from without, and princes or the nobility.[263] This act will be followed by the solemnity of conferring the final degree upon the Licentiate. When the student is a Jesuit, much more is made of thoroughness in a searching examination then, as at all times previously. He has now passed through a long series of yearly examinations, which were almost always disputations, and that, not with equals, but with four or five Professors.[264] So that, on viewing him at the close of his formation, we are enabled to conceive, with more distinctness, the meaning of that standard, "surpassing mediocrity," which, in a former chapter, I endeavored to define.[265]