1. One of the first most general rules lays it down that the authority, in whose hands is the appointment of Professors, "should foresee far ahead what Professors he can have for every faculty, noting especially those who seem to be more adapted for the work, who are learned, diligent, and assiduous, and who are zealous for the advancement of their students, as well in their lectures (or lessons) as in other literary exercises."[273] "They are to procure the advancement of each of their scholars in particular," says Ignatius.[274] The Professor "is not to show himself more familiar with one student than with another; he is to disregard no one, to foster the studies of the poor equally with the rich."[275]
These are the regular and "ordinary Professors, who take account of their students in particular."[276] There can also be in a university one or more of another kind, "who, with more solemnity than the ordinary lecturers, treat Philosophy, Mathematical Sciences, or any other branch, after the manner of public Professors."[277]
In the lower, or literary courses the Masters must "be good and skilled," who "seriously, and with all the attention of their mind, work for the advancement of their scholars, as well in what concerns learning, as in the matter of morals. They will have to take care that besides the Christian doctrine, which is so integral a part of our Institute, they also give frequent exhortations, suited to the capacity of the boys, and not devised for empty ostentation; let them endeavor to instil solid affections of piety and love for the things of God, and a hatred for sin."[278]
What is meant by "good and skilled Masters" in these courses, we have already seen from Jouvancy's sketch of the accomplishments proper to a teacher of Literature.[279] If anything remained to be said on this topic, it would only be to note and reject false standards, by which the position or efficiency of Professors might possibly, but incorrectly, be measured. Thus, some five years ago, that is to say, three hundred years later than the drawing up of the Ratio, I find two such false standards distinctly repudiated; one is the idea of gathering in just enough of doctrine beforehand to be able, when occasion calls for it, to develop the attainments of a Professor; another is that which would look only to the environment around, and would measure the intellectual formation of men, and the supply of learning, by the estimate commonly formed of the article, and the actual demand for it.
2. If we regard not individual Professors, but the whole moral body or faculty of them, there are two characteristics which it may be difficult to find, or at least to ensure, outside of an organization such as the Society of Jesus. One is the very strict unity of educational matter presented to the studious world. The other is the degree of coördination and subordination of courses professed. A word upon each.
The unity of matter in question, as designed for the purposes of education, is prescribed on the strength of a double maxim; first, that the sifting of many opinions, by the varied and multiplied activity of many minds, leaves a residue of matter, quite solid enough to support a compact and reliable system of teaching; secondly, that, in point of fact, such matter, which I have called "a residue," is nothing else than the basis of truth, divine and eternal; since, in clearing away the ground, all the criteria of each order, the natural and supernatural, have been faithfully and assiduously regarded.
Hereupon, intellectual concord is felt to be the result in the entire teaching body. Of this concord the critics say, that it is the condition and cause of a wider and profounder learning in the faculties at large. Each Professor is engaged, "not in tilling some patch of his own, but in contributing his industry to the general field of all." Where is the gain, they ask, "if what one establishes, another upsets, not as if he had always excogitated something better, but for fear he should be thought to profit by the fruits of another's genius? Sometimes it really makes no difference whether one or other tenet is held; but, if we are bent on receiving no support from another, then, for all our labor, we get no other fruit but dissension."[280] I presume there is not a university anywhere but will bear witness, by its internal history, to the justice of this remark.
Nor do these Fathers apprehend that reputation for real science will suffer by such concord, since "reputation for science does not come from opinions contradicting one another, but from their having agreed." They express no lofty esteem for the notoriety which may be had, by fighting no less with friends than with foes, and reserving admiration for only what is at a respectable distance, and "turning up one's nose at what is near."[281] This pungent remark seems to be a new and pedagogical application of the old proverb, Nihil vicinia molestius, "Nothing more annoying than one's neighbors!" They hold that, upon a basis of concord, there is always room and liberty for the exercise of talent; first, in those questions which are manifestly indifferent; secondly, in thinking out new distinctions and reasons, whereby truths already certain may be made more secure still; thirdly, in attacking the same, either when publicly disputing, or also when actually teaching, if what they acutely urge against a position, they more acutely refute; fourthly, in proposing new opinions and questions, but after they have sought the approval of the responsible authorities, lest the labor be spent amiss. The most learned men have always been persuaded that there is more subtlety shown, more applause merited and comfort enjoyed, in pursuing the lines of approved and received thought, than in a general license and novelty of opinion.[282] But these critics throw out an idea of theirs, which quite possibly will not meet with universal acceptance. They say, "It is not every one who can build up a Theology for himself." The remark they add is graceful, that a modest genius does not court every kind of liberty, but that which is not divorced from virtue.
These principles explain for us the unity of educational matter, as presented to the studious world. The same marshalling and husbanding of force, which effectuates this result, operates another, akin to the former. It is the most definite coördination and subordination of courses, with a mutual understanding between Professors and faculties. Where grades exist, either in their perfect form, as in the five stages of the classical or literary course, or in a shape approximating to that, as in the three stages of the philosophical triennium, such subordination is easily secured. But, also, elsewhere the conditions of perfectly definite outlines are laid down for courses, which have any points of mutual contact.
This may be illustrated by some rules of the Ratio. The two Professors of Dogmatic Theology are to consider themselves dispensed from commenting on questions proper to Sacred Scripture, from treating philosophical matters, from evolving cases of Moral Theology. The Professor of Moral Theology is to despatch with the briefest definitions the matter which belongs to dogma. The Professor of Holy Scripture is desired not to go at length into points of controverted Theology. The Professor of Ecclesiastical History need not treat canons or dogma. The Professor of Canon Law will not touch Theology or Public Right, any more than his time permits, and the necessary understanding of Canon Law requires. The same reserve is practised between Theology in general, and Philosophy. Thus a Professor of Moral Theology despatches perhaps in ten minutes the definition of Natural Law, upon which he knows two days are spent by the Professor of Moral Philosophy.